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U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine

The United States has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine, both before and after Russia renewed its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. From 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, through April 25, 2022, the United States has provided more than \$6.4 billion in security assistance “to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO.” Since the start of the 2022 war, the Biden Administration has committed a total of more than \$3.7 billion in security assistance to “provide Ukraine the equipment it needs to defend itself.”

FY2022 security assistance packages have been funded through regular and supplemental appropriations. The Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division N), included \$3.5 billion to replenish Department of Defense (DOD) equipment stocks that have been sent to Ukraine via presidential drawdown authority. Supplemental appropriations also provided \$650 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Ukraine and “countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine,” of which more than \$322 million is to be obligated for Ukraine. Regular defense appropriations included \$300 million for DOD’s Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).

On April 28, 2022, the Biden Administration sent an emergency supplemental request to Congress for additional funding and authority to address immediate needs in Ukraine and other countries impacted by the war. The request includes \$6 billion for USAI, \$4 billion for FMF, and \$5 billion to replenish DOD stocks.

Overview of Programs Since 2014

The United States has used a variety of security assistance programs and authorities to help build the defensive capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) through train, equip, and advise efforts across multiple spending accounts. Two of the primary mechanisms are the State Department’s FMF (22 U.S.C. §2763) and DOD’s USAI (P.L. 114-92, §1250) (see **Table 2**).

USAI packages have included training, equipment, and advisory efforts to enhance Ukraine’s defensive capabilities such as maritime domain awareness; operational safety and capacity of air bases; and lethality, command and control, and survivability of the UAF. USAI also supports cyber defense and strategic communications to counter Russian cyberattacks and misinformation. A portion of annual USAI funds is contingent on DOD and State certifying Ukraine’s progress on key defense reforms.

The United States also is providing defense items to Ukraine via Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), by which the President can authorize the immediate transfer of articles and services from U.S. stocks without congressional

approval in response to an “unforeseen emergency” (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)). Since August 2021, the Biden Administration has authorized eight drawdowns valued at \$3.31 billion (see **Table 1**).

Table 1. Presidential Drawdowns for Ukraine, FY2021-FY2022

Date Authorized	Amount
August 27, 2021	\$60,000,000
December 28, 2021	\$200,000,000
February 25, 2022	\$350,000,000
March 12, 2022	\$200,000,000
March 16, 2022	\$800,000,000
April 5, 2022	\$100,000,000
April 13, 2022	\$800,000,000
April 21, 2022	\$800,000,000
Total	\$3,310,000,000

Source: Department of State and Department of Defense.

Ukraine also has received assistance pursuant to DOD’s security cooperation authorities, notably 10 U.S.C. §333 Building Partner Capacity and 10 U.S.C. §332 Defense Institution Building, and International Military Education and Training (IMET), which has provided professional military education at U.S. defense institutions for Ukrainian military officers. Other State Department- and DOD-funded security assistance has supported conventional weapons destruction, border security, law enforcement training, and counter-weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

Through the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine, established in 2015, the U.S. Army and National Guard, together with military trainers from U.S. allied states, provided training, mentoring, and doctrinal assistance to the UAF before the war (at a training facility in western Ukraine that was targeted by a Russian missile strike in March 2022). This training mission was suspended at the outset of Russia’s invasion. In April 2022, DOD announced it would resume training Ukrainian personnel, outside Ukraine, specifically to operate U.S. and allied systems. Separately, U.S. Special Operations Forces have trained and advised Ukrainian special forces.

Provision of Defense Equipment

After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the Obama Administration provided Ukraine nonlethal security assistance, such as body armor, helmets, vehicles, night and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats, rations, tents, counter-mortar radars, uniforms, medical kits, and other related items. In 2017, the Trump Administration announced U.S. willingness to provide lethal weapons to Ukraine.

Table 2. Selected U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, FY2016-FY2023

(selected account allocations, in millions of dollars)

	FY2016	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023
Foreign Military Financing	85.0	99.0	95.0	115.0	115.0	115.0	322.0 (obl.)	165.0 (req.)
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative	226.5	148.6	195.5	214.8	256.7	275.0	300.0	300.0 (req.)

Sources: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications, Defense Department Budget Requests, and P.L. 117-103.**Notes:** Amount does not include security and nonproliferation assistance periodically provided via other accounts.

Since 2018, Ukraine used FMF, as well as some of its national funds, to procure U.S. defense equipment, including Javelin anti-armor missiles and Mark VI patrol boats, through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. Ukraine also used a combination of FMF and national funds to refurbish former U.S. Coast Guard Island-class patrol boats provided through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA; 22 U.S.C. §2321j) program. On April 24, 2022, the State Department notified Congress of a potential FMS sale of up to \$165 million for nonstandard ammunition for Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine has purchased firearms, ammunition, ordnance, and other laser, imaging, or guidance equipment directly from U.S. suppliers via Direct Commercial Sales.

According to DOD, USAI packages have provided sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, counter-artillery radars, Mark VI patrol boats, electronic warfare detection and secure communications, satellite imagery and analysis capability, counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS), air surveillance systems to monitor sovereign airspace, night vision devices, and equipment to support military medical treatment and combat evacuation procedures.

In 2022, the United States has provided more advanced defense equipment to Ukraine, as well as greater amounts of previously provided equipment. According to DOD, U.S. security assistance committed to Ukraine as of April 21, 2022 has included

- 1,400+ Stinger anti-aircraft systems;
- 5,500+ Javelin anti-armor systems and 14,000+ other anti-armor systems;
- 121+ Phoenix Ghost Tactical UAS and 700+ Switchblade Tactical UAS;
- 90 155 mm Howitzers with 184,000 artillery rounds;
- 16 Mi-17 helicopters;
- hundreds of Armored Humvee Vehicles;
- 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
- 7,500+ small arms 60+ million rounds of ammunition;
- laser-guided rocket systems; and
- other essential nonlethal equipment, including communications and intelligence equipment.

Several NATO and European Union (EU) members also have provided weapons and military assistance to Ukraine. In addition, the Biden Administration has authorized third-party transfers of U.S. defense articles and equipment from at least 14 NATO and EU members to Ukraine.

Discussion on Future Assistance

Since 2014, U.S. policy increasingly emphasized supporting the UAF's ability to deter Russia and defend its territorial integrity. Much of U.S. assistance has been

focused on providing systems and capabilities that Ukraine's domestic defense industry cannot produce, as well as on increasing UAF resilience and ability to sustain combat operations. Before the war, the U.S. government had sent teams to evaluate Ukrainian abilities and needs. Ukrainian officials have expressed interest in acquiring advanced systems, including fighter aircraft, anti-ship, and additional air defense and anti-missile capabilities.

Recent Legislation

Prior to and immediately following Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine, Congress authorized or proposed increased funding levels for existing security assistance authorities. Congress increased the PDA (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)) funding cap from \$100 million up to \$200 million via P.L. 117-70; up to \$300 million via P.L. 117-86; and up to \$3 billion via P.L. 117-103. Similarly, Congress increased a notwithstanding authority in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA; 22 U.S.C. §2364) used to fulfill PDA packages to Ukraine, from \$250 million to \$500 million via P.L. 117-103. The Biden Administration's emergency supplemental request seeks to increase PDA again, from \$3 billion to \$8 billion, and the 22 U.S.C. §2364 authority from \$500 million to \$1 billion.

The Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 (S. 3522) passed the Senate on April 6, 2022, and the House on April 28, 2022. This act would modify provisions in the FAA and Arms Export Control Act to bypass bureaucratic barriers for leasing or lending U.S. defense articles to Ukraine and neighboring countries.

Potential Considerations for Congress

Congress may consider what weapon systems the UAF are using most effectively and their ability to rapidly utilize new or more advanced systems. New systems can require time to train personnel, integrate into operational plans, deploy, and maintain. Congress also may consider whether providing more sophisticated weaponry risks further military escalation, including the potential for Russia to attack NATO member states to prevent support from reaching Ukraine. In light of increasing PDA authority and the frequency of drawdowns, Congress may consider the capacity of the defense industry to accelerate production of existing systems. Moreover, Congress may consider how to balance the short-term needs of Ukraine for more arms with longer-term concerns related to end-use and end-use monitoring of such arms.

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