Updated April 19, 2022
Syria and U.S. Policy
Since 2011, conflict between the government of Syrian
depend on U.N. assistance to meet their basic needs. Armed
President Bashar al Asad and opposition forces seeking his
extremist groups also operate in this region.
removal has displaced roughly half of the country’s
population and killed over half a million people. Five
Figure 1. Syria: Areas of Influence
countries operate in or maintain military forces in Syria:
Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and the United States. The
United States seeks a negotiated political settlement to the
Syria conflict and the enduring defeat of the Islamic State
(IS, aka ISIS/ISIL). Challenges for U.S. policymakers
include: responding to threats posed by IS remnants and
detainees, countering groups linked to Al Qaeda,
facilitating humanitarian access, and managing Russian and
Iranian challenges to U.S. operations in Syria. For a conflict
chronology, see CRS In Focus IF11080, Syria Conflict
Overview: 2011-2021, by Carla E. Humud.
Syria in 2022: Protracted Stalemate
In early 2022, U.N. Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pederson
described the conflict in Syria—between the Syrian
government and its partners on one side and various
opposition and extremist groups on the other side—as a
“stalemate,” noting that “militarily, front lines remain

unshifted.” Pederson also warned that “any of a number of
Source: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
flashpoints could ignite a broader conflagration.” Several
rival administrations hold territory in Syria, including:
Turkish Forces and Aligned Militias
Turkish-held areas of northern Syria include territories
The Asad Government
occupied in three military operations by Turkish forces in
The Asad government—backed by Russia, Iran, and
cooperation with Syrian Arab proxy forces (Operations
aligned militia forces—controls about two thirds of Syria’s
Peace Spring, Euphrates Shield, and Olive Branch). In these
territory, including most major cities. In 2021, President
areas, Turkey has established local councils subordinate to
Asad won a fourth seven-year term; U.S. officials described
the Turkish provinces they border, with Turkish provincial
the election as “an insult to democracy.” Pockets of armed
governments overseeing the provision of some basic
resistance to Asad rule remain, particularly in the south.
services. Many of the original inhabitants of Turkish-held
areas remain in camps for internally displaced persons
Kurdish-Arab Military and Civilian Authorities
(IDPs) in AANES-held areas.
Following the defeat of the Islamic State by the U.S.-
backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Kurdish
The Islamic State
authorities and their Arab partners in northeast Syria
U.S. military officials assess that the Islamic State remains
established the Autonomous Administration of North and
entrenched as a cohesive, low-level insurgency, focusing its
East Syria (AANES), also known as the Self
activities against Asad government forces in southwest
Administration of Northeast Syria (SANES)—shown in
Syria and the central Syrian desert, and against the SDF in
yellow in Figure 1. The SDF and its political wing (the
northern and eastern Syria. In 2021, U.S. Central Command
Syrian Democratic Council, SDC) play a leading role in the
(CENTCOM) assessed that, “ISIS likely has sufficient
AANES, whose leaders have stated that it is not aligned
manpower and resources to operate indefinitely at its
with either the Asad government or with opposition forces.
present level in the Syrian desert.” In February 2022, a U.S.
military operation in Idlib resulted in the death of IS leader
Opposition and Extremist Forces
Abu Ibrahim al Qurashi, also known as Hajji Abdullah. In
Opposition-held areas of northwest Syria are administered
March the group named a new leader. Some reports have
by the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG). The SSG was
identified him as Juma Awad al Badri, an Iraqi national and
established in 2017 and is affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al
brother of former IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.
Sham, which the United States has designated as a Foreign
Islamic State Detainees. The SDF continues to hold about
Terrorist Organization (FTO) due to its links to Al Qaeda.
10,000 IS fighters in detention facilities across northern
Many residents of this area have been displaced from areas
Syria. In January 2022, U.S. air and ground forces in Syria
of Syria now under Asad control, and an estimated 75%
joined SDF partner forces in a lengthy battle to retake a
prison seized by IS fighters. It was the largest U.S. military
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Syria and U.S. Policy
engagement with the group since 2019. The SDF also
Sanctions
retains custody of about 57,000 people linked to the Islamic
The United States maintains sanctions on Syria relating to
State (mostly women and children) at the Al Hol IDP camp.
its support for terrorism, interference in Lebanon, use of
U.S. Policy
chemical weapons, and human rights violations. The Biden
In late 2021, the Biden Administration completed a policy
Administration has expressed support for a regional deal to
review on Syria and identified four policy priorities to meet
export natural gas and electricity from Egypt and Jordan to
the U.S. objective for a political settlement to the conflict as
Lebanon via Syria, describing it as a humanitarian effort
envisioned in U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
that would be funded by the World Bank and thus not
2254: (1) sustaining the U.S. and coalition campaign
require a sanctions waiver. In a February 2022 letter to
against the Islamic State; (2) supporting local ceasefires; (3)
Secretary of State Blinken, the ranking Members of the
expanding humanitarian access; and (4) pressing for
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee argued that the deal would “undoubtedly
accountability and respect for international law while
promoting human rights and nonproliferation, including
enrich the Assad regime and trigger U.S. sanctions under
the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act.”
through the imposition of targeted sanctions. The Biden

Administration has stated that it will not recognize the Asad
Humanitarian Assistance
government, and that it opposes others doing so.
The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian
U.S. Military Presence: Operation Inherent Resolve
assistance to the Syria crisis, allocating more than $14
U.S. forces have operated inside Syria since 2015 pursuant
billion since FY2012 for humanitarian efforts in Syria and
to the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military
in neighboring states that host Syrian refugees.
Force (AUMF), amid ongoing debate in Congress about the
Cross-Border Assistance. Due to the Asad government’s
authorization for U.S. operations in Syria. U.S. operations
obstruction of humanitarian assistance to opposition-held
focus on countering the Islamic State as part of Operation
areas, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) in 2014
Inherent Resolve (OIR). Roughly 900 U.S. troops are based
authorized U.N. agencies to deliver humanitarian assistance
in Syria to support counter-IS operations by local partner
cross-border via four international crossing points with
forces. Most U.S. forces are deployed in what military
notification to the Asad government. In 2020, the UNSC
officials term the Eastern Syria Security Area (ESSA), in
authorization was reduced to a single crossing point from
support of the SDF. About 100 U.S. personnel support
Turkey (Bab al Hawa) due to pressure from Russia and
Jaysh Mughawir ath Thawra (MaT), an Arab force, at the
China, who argued that cross-border aid violated Syrian
At Tanf garrison. At Tanf is located along a primary transit
sovereignty and that aid distribution should be coordinated
route between Iraq and Syria, including for IS fighters.
with Syrian authorities from government-held to rebel-held
Since 2015, CENTCOM has conducted periodic military
areas (termed “cross-line” assistance). Humanitarian actors
strikes in Syria outside the framework of OIR, including on
state that cross-line assistance cannot replace the scale of
targets linked to Al Qaeda, the Syrian government, and
U.N. cross-border assistance. The current UNSC
Iran-backed militias. In February and June 2021, the U.S.
authorization for cross border aid expires in July 2022.
military conducted airstrikes against Iran-backed militias in
Stabilization Assistance
eastern Syria, which have used Syria-based facilities to
target U.S. forces in Iraq. Iran-backed militias also have
The United States has provided more than $1.3 billion in
targeted U.S. forces at At Tanf with armed drones.
stabilization assistance for Syria since 2011. The State
U.S. Policy Tools
Department describes such assistance as “a critical element
in the OIR mission because it mitigates the economic and
Syria Train and Equip Program
social cleavages previously exploited by ISIS, closes gaps
The United States continues to train, advise, and enable
in local authority capacity, and supports civil society to
partner forces in Syria as part of the Syria Train and Equip
advocate for citizen needs.” The Department also has
program authorized by Congress in 2014. The program
described stabilization assistance as a counterweight to the
seeks to make partner forces in Syria capable of defeating
influence of Iran, Russia, and the Syrian government.
the Islamic State. U.S. military officials in late 2021 stated
Stabilization aid funds projects in non-regime held areas.
that while SDF operations limited the Islamic State’s ability
Issues for Congress
to reconstitute and conduct high-profile attacks, the SDF
“remained fully dependent on the Coalition’s intelligence,
Recent appropriations measures reflect congressional
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.”
efforts to prioritize security at detention facilities for IS
fighters, particularly following the January 2022 IS
FY2022 Funding and the FY2023 Request. The
Administration’s FY2022 defense funding request sought
takeover of a detention facility in northern Syria. The
FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act, presented to the
$522 million in Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund
President in March 2022, prohibits the use of CTEF funds
(CTEF) funding for train and equip programs in Iraq ($345
in Syria and Iraq for any construction activity other than
million) and Syria ($177 million). The FY2022
detention facility fortification. The Administration’s
Consolidated Appropriations Act (Division C of P.L. 117-
FY2022 request sought $10 million for prison basic life
103) makes $500 million available for CTEF, including
support services including $2 million for infrastructure
$155 million for Syria. It also directs the rescission of $250
repair and renovation (including of detention facilities).
million in prior year CTEF funds. The FY2022 NDAA
extends the authority for the program until December 2022.
The Administration’s FY2023 defense funding request
Carla E. Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
seeks $541 in CTEF funds, including $183 million for
IF11930
Syria.
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Syria and U.S. Policy


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11930 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED

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