Updated April 8, 2022
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
Overview
plants at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and possibly at
North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and
Kangson. A March 2022 International Atomic Energy
missile programs despite UN Security Council sanctions
Agency (IAEA) report says that there were no indications
and high-level diplomatic efforts. Recent ballistic missile
of operations at its Radiochemical Laboratory
tests and military parades suggest that North Korea is
(reprocessing) plant since July 2021, but there was ongoing
continuing to build a nuclear warfighting capability
operation of the Yongbyon Experimental Light Water
designed to evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such
5MW(e) Reactor. Spent fuel from this reactor has been
an approach likely reinforces a deterrence and coercive
reprocessed in the past to extract plutonium for weapons.
diplomacy strategy—lending more credibility as it
The IAEA also observed activities at the Kangson complex
demonstrates capability—but it also raises questions about
and the Pyongsan uranium mine and concentration plant.
crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may choose
to examine U.S. policy in light of these advances.
Nuclear Warheads
Fissile material production in large part determines the
According to the U.S. intelligence community’s 2022
number and type of nuclear warheads North Korea is able
annual threat assessment, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un
to build. The 2021 DIA report says that North Korea
views nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic
“retains a stockpile of nuclear weapons.” Outside experts
missiles (ICBMs) as “the ultimate guarantor of his
estimate that North Korea has produced enough fissile
totalitarian and autocratic rule of North Korea and believes
material for between 20 to 60 warheads. Another goal of a
that over time he will gain international acceptance as a
nuclear power.”
nuclear weapons program is to lower the size and weight of
At the January 2021 North Korean
Workers’ Party Conference, Kim hailed the “status of our
nuclear warhead for deployment on missiles. In July 2017,
state as a nuclear weapons state” and praised
a DIA assessment and some outside observers believed
its “powerful
North Korea had achieved the level of miniaturization
and reliable strategic deterrent.” Kim Jong-un has said that
“nuclear weapons of the DPRK can be used only by a final
required to fit a nuclear device on weapons ranging across
the spectrum of its missiles, from short-range ballistic
order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s
missiles (SRBM) to intercontinental ballistic missiles
Army [Kim Jong-un] to repel invasion or attack from a
(ICBM). Kim Jong-un in January 2021 said that the country
hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory strikes.”
was able to “miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear
Nuclear Testing
weapons and to make them tactical ones.”
North Korea has tested a nuclear explosive device six times
Missile Development
since 2006. Each test produced underground blasts
U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions prohibit North
progressively higher in magnitude and estimated yield.
Korea’s development of the means of delivering
North Korea conducted its most recent test on September 3,
conventional and nuclear payloads, in addition to the
2017. A North Korean press release stated it had tested a
nuclear weapons themselves. UNSC resolutions ban “all
hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear warhead) that
ballistic missile tests” by North Korea. A ballistic missile is
it was perfecting for delivery on an intercontinental ballistic
a projectile powered by a rocket engine until it reaches the
missile.
apogee of its trajectory, at which point it falls back to earth
In April 2018, North Korea announced that it had achieved
using earth’s gravity. Ballistic missiles can deliver nuclear
its goals, would no longer conduct nuclear tests, and would
and large conventional payloads at high speed and over
close down its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. It dynamited the
great distances. They are categorized as short-range,
entrances to two test tunnels in May 2018 prior to the first
medium-range, or long-range (intercontinental) based on
Trump-Kim summit. In an October 2018 meeting with
the distance from the launch site to the target.
then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Kim Jong-un
“invited i
North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and delivery
nspectors to visit the [test site] to confirm that it
systems that possess certain critical features: mobility,
has been irreversibly dismantled,” but this did not occur. In
reliability, potency, precision, and survivability. Mobile
March 2022, press reports said South Korean government
weapons have increased survivability compared with fixed
sources, as well as open source analysts, had observed steps
launch sites and static stockpiles. Reliability, potency,
to restore the test site.
precision, and in-flight maneuverability work together to
Nuclear Material Production
maximize the impact of North Korea’s limited quantity of
weapons, launchers, and warheads. A key element to North
North Korea reportedly continues to produce fissile
Korean missile doctrine, therefore, is continued testing to
material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for
develop, ensure, and demonstrate these features.
weapons. North Korea restarted its plutonium production
facilities after it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in
2009, and is operating centrifuge uranium enrichment
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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
to observers, called a “new-type tactical guided projectile”
North Korea improved its ability to strike the continental
by official North Korean press statements.
United States with an ICBM through a series of tests in
North Korea has committed to expanding the performance
2017 and again in early 2022. The DPRK first successfully
of its precision guided tactical weapons. The newly
test-launched two liquid-propellant, road-mobile ICBMs in
developed KN-24 and KN-25 pose significant threats to
2017: the Hwasong-14 (U.S. designated KN-20) and
South Korea and U.S. assets on the peninsula. The KN-24
Hwasong-15 (U.S. designated KN-22). North Korea
is a tactical system with a mobile launcher, solid propellant,
displayed a larger new Hwasong ICBM at an October 2020
and relatively large payload. The KN-24 demonstrates the
military parade. The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses
it is “probably designed
guidance system and in-flight maneuverability to achieve
to deliver multiple warheads.” On
precision strikes. Outside experts assess that the North
March 16, an ICBM flight test exploded over Pyongyang.
Koreans may ultimately intend the KN-24 to serve as a dual
North Korea claimed a second ICBM test on March 24 was
capable system.
a successful test launch of the Hwasong-17, but South
Korean intelligence reportedly assessed it as a Hwasong-15
The KN-25 blurs the line between rocket and missile;
test. U.S. Special Representative Sung Kim said on April 6
however, it achieves the same effect as a traditional SRBM
that the 13 missile test launches in 2022 included “at least
by delivering destructive effects on a precision target at
three ICBM launches.” Reliability of these systems remains
significant range thanks to advanced avionics, inertial and
uncertain. Without further testing, neither the North
satellite guidance systems, and aerodynamic structures. The
Koreans nor others can assess whether the missiles will
KN-25 carries a conventional payload up to 380 km,
function as designed.
allowing it to strike any target in South Korea. Tests in
2019 and 2020 demonstrate that a crew can launch the four
Short- and Medium-Range Missiles
rockets composing the KN-25 system at 20-second
North Korea began a series of missile test launches in
intervals. Since the KN-25 is a more economical system
January 2022. In 2019 and 2020, North Korea also
than traditional SRBMs, the North Koreans may seek to fire
increased the pace of short-range ballistic missile (SRBM)
large numbers of these rockets in salvos to overwhelm the
test launches. There was a break in testing between March
ability of an adversary’s missile defense systems to
2020 and 2021, but a March 25, 2021, test launch of a
successfully engage all incoming projectiles. Salvo firing
short-range system ended the pause. In September 2021,
projectiles gives them the greatest likelihood of
tests of the KN-23 SRBM were launched from a new rail-
accomplishing their intended effect in the face of even the
mobile launcher. These test launches violate United Nations
most advanced missile defense systems.
prohibitions.
The newest missiles—including the Hwasong-14,
North Korean SRBMs and medium-range ballistic missiles
Hwasong-15, Hwasong-17, KN-15, KN-23, KN-24, and
(MRBM), precision-guided multiple launch rocket systems
KN-25—demonstrates mobility, potency, precision, and has
(MLRS), and artillery pose the most acute near-term threats
characteristics that make the missiles difficult to defeat in
to other nations. Advances in these systems demonstrate the
flight. These traits suggest that the North Korean test
a shift toward solid-propellants and satellite guidance
program may be intended to increase the reliability,
systems; advances that could carry over to larger, more
effectiveness, and survivability of their ballistic missile
potent systems like the Hwasong series ICBMs. These
force.
developments provide the projectiles greater mobility and
survivability prior to launch and greater precision on target.
The recent advances in North Korea’s ballistic missile test
program appear to be directed at developing capabilities to
In the MRBM category, the KN-15 poses the greatest threat
defeat or degrade the effectiveness of missile defenses
to North Korea’s regional adversaries and exhibits
deployed in the region: Patriot, Aegis Ballistic Missile
advanced technology. Known in North Korea as the
Defense (BMD), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
Pukguksong-2, the KN-15 is a solid-propellant missile
(THAAD). In addition, North Korea’s progress with
capable of striking mainland Japan and carrying a nuclear
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) suggests an
or conventional payload—known as dual capable. The
effort to counter land-based THAAD missile defenses by
North Koreans fire the missile from a tracked vehicle,
launching attacks from positions at sea outside the
which gives the system mobility and makes prelaunch
THAAD’s radar field of view, although local Aegis BMD
targeting of the system difficult.
systems could likely still track these projectiles. The
Pukgugsong-3 SLBM was successfully tested in late 2019.
The KN-23 SRBM exemplifies the most notable advance to
According to the 2021 DIA report, North Korea has said
the North Korean inventory in the smaller category of
this SLBM, to be launched from a ballistic missile
weapons. The May 2019 tests of two KN-23 missiles
submarine, will be cold-launched, solid-fueled and “will
revealed an atypical flight path in which the weapon flew
carry a nuclear warhead.” In recent parades, North Korea
much closer to the ground than a traditional ballistic
unveiled longer-range SLBMs (Pukguksong-4 and
missile. On terminal approach to its target, the KN-23
Pukguksong-5) but has not flight-tested them.
conducted a “pull-up” maneuver, intended to complicate the
ability of ground-based interceptors to destroy the hostile
North Korean tests have demonstrated growing success and,
missile in flight by increasing its speed and angle of attack
coupled with increased operational training exercises,
to the target. The KN-23 can strike any location on the
suggest a pattern designed to strengthen the credibility of
Korean peninsula with either a conventional or nuclear
North Korea’s regional nuclear deterrent strategy.
payload and uses a solid-propellant. A March 25, 2021,
launch may have tested a variant of the KN-23, according
Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation
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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs

IF10472


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