Updated March 30, 2022
United States Central Command
United States Central Command (CENTCOM) has
In the Middle East, we will maintain our ironclad
command authority over U.S. forces in the Middle East and
commitment to Israel’s security, while seeking to
West/Central Asia. CENTCOM was formally established by
further its integration with its neighbors and
the Department of Defense (DOD) on January 1, 1983. Its
resuming our role as promoter of a viable two-state
area of responsibility (AOR) comprises Egypt, Jordan,
solution. We will work with our regional partners to
Syria, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, West Bank & Gaza, Saudi
deter Iranian aggression and threats to sovereignty
Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE),
and territorial integrity, disrupt al-Qaeda and related
Oman, Yemen, Israel, Iran, Turkmenistan, Lebanon,
terrorist networks and prevent an ISIS resurgence,
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
address humanitarian crises, and redouble our
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. CENTCOM is headquartered at
efforts to resolve the complex armed conflicts that
MacDill Air Force Base (AFB) in Tampa, FL.
threaten regional stability. But we do not believe that
Component Commands
military force is the answer to the region’s
As with other Combatant Commands, CENTCOM is a
challenges, and we will not give our partners in the
headquarters; no military units are permanently assigned to
Middle East a blank check to pursue policies at odds
it. CENTCOM operates through component commands—
with American interests and values.
one for each of the U.S. armed services (with the exception
of Space Force), along with a joint special operations
Israel in CENTCOM
component. Each component command may or may not
For decades, DOD placed Israel in the European Command
have military forces assigned to it in theater.
(EUCOM) AOR due to significant tensions between Israel
CENTCOM and National Strategic Priorities
and its neighbors in the Middle East. On January 15, 2021,
The Trump and Biden Administrations both described the
DOD announced that the 2020 UCP review resulted in
need to effectively contend—economically, diplomatically,
shifting Israel from the EUCOM AOR to that of
and militarily—with China and Russia as the key national
CENTCOM. In so doing, DOD noted, “The easing of
security challenge facing the United States. Accordingly,
tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors subsequent to
activities vis-a-vis China and Russia would potentially be
the Abraham Accords has provided a strategic opportunity
prioritized over other strategic challenges that have been
for the United States to align key partners against shared
prominent in the CENTCOM AOR, including deterring
threats in the Middle East.” While improved Israeli ties with
Iranian aggression and countering violent extremist groups
some Arab states may allow more open coordination to
such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Some observers
counter Iran, including on air and missile defense, these
maintain that a shift in U.S. resources and focus away from
states may stay clear of some forms of direct cooperation
the CENTCOM AOR and toward Europe and Asia is
with Israel (including stationing Israeli personnel on their
advisable for several reasons. These include the
territory) to avoid provoking Iran or sparking domestic
reprioritization of military resources that, according to some, protest.
might be better applied to challenges in Europe—especially
in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine—or the
Funding
Indo-Pacific; skepticism about whether continued
DOD budget documentation does not delineate total funding
investments, presence, and operations in the region would
by Combatant Command (CCMD). Forces and operations
result in strategic gains; and the growing threat posed by
assigned to the commands are, in general, funded by the
U.S. strategic competitors such as Russia and China. Others
military services. CCMD funding justified in budget
note the continuing influential role some CENTCOM
documentation is, with some exceptions, generally limited to
countries play in world energy markets; the region’s
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts for
geographic location between Europe, Africa, and the Indian
headquarters and mission support activities.
Ocean basin; and the possible use of parts of the theater as a
In the case of CENTCOM, the U.S. Air Force is the
proxy for great power competition in arguing for the
Combatant Command Support Agent (CCSA) and primarily
continued prioritization of U.S. defense presence and
responsible for funding its headquarters. For FY2022, the
engagement in parts of the CENTCOM AOR, specifically
Air Force requested $372.4 million in the O&M budget sub-
the Middle East.
activity group (SAG) for Combatant Command Mission
The Biden Administration’s Interim National Security
Operations – USCENTCOM. Congress provided $366.54
million—$5.8 million (1.6%) less than the request.
Strategic Guidance (INSSG) notes:
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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United States Central Command
Figure 1. Select Installations in and Around the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility

In addition, DOD requested $14.3 billion for direct war
Commander General McKenzie, “current CENTCOM
requirements (i.e., combat or combat support costs that are
planning is based on clear and unambiguous signaling
not expected to continue after combat operations end) in the
to Iran and its threat network” to deter and respond to
CENTCOM AOR. Of this amount, $8.9 billion was for
Iranian aggression.
Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) in Afghanistan
(including the then-planned withdrawal of U.S. forces from
ï‚· U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia
the country) and $5.4 billion for Operation Inherent
(USMTM) and Advisory Missions. Using security
Resolve (OIR) in Iraq and Syria.
cooperation and security assistance authorities, the U.S.
Conflicts in the CENTCOM AOR
military provides Saudi-purchased training to Saudi
Arabian counterparts. U.S. forces provide advice to
A number of active conflicts are being waged in the
Saudi counterparts in relation to the war in Yemen.
CENTCOM AOR. The United States is a direct or indirect
party to hostilities in some of these conflicts.
ï‚· Maritime Operations. There are two complementary
ï‚·
maritime missions in the Persian Gulf. The Combined
Afghanistan. The United States prosecuted a variety of
Maritime Force (CMF) is a 34-nation coalition focused
military operations in Afghanistan starting in 2001 and
on defeating terrorism, preventing piracy, encouraging
ending on August 30, 2021. The Taliban are now again
regional cooperation, and promoting a safe maritime
in control of the country. President Biden has stated
environment. The second is the International Maritime
that the United States will manage any terrorist threats
Security Construct (IMSC), an eight-member coalition
that may emerge from Afghanistan by conducting
“over the horizon” counterterrorism
focused on ensuring safety of maritime shipping lanes
strikes.
through surveillance and naval patrolling in the Strait
ï‚· Syria/Iraq. The United States has conducted
of Hormuz and the Bab el Mandeb.
operations in Syria and Iraq to defeat the Islamic State
ï‚· Yemen. For over a decade, the Republic of Yemen
group since 2014 (Operation Inherent Resolve, or
Government has been engaged in multiple armed
OIR). OIR in Iraq is an advise-and-assist mission; U.S.
conflicts to which several internal militant groups and
forces with a combat mission left Iraq in 2021, in
foreign nations are parties. CENTCOM has provided
agreement with the Iraqi government. Biden
noncombat support to a Saudi-led coalition combatting
Administration officials have stated that approximately
the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement in Yemen, including
900 U.S. troops remain in Syria, with the majority
military advice and limited information, logistics, and
deployed in northeastern Syria in support of counter-IS
other support to regional forces. The Biden
operations by partner forces.
Administration ceased U.S. support for “offensive”
ï‚·
operations by the Saudi-led coalition. U.S. air and

Iran. The United States has been periodically engaged
naval forces deployed to the UAE in 2022 in response
in a hybrid, irregular conflict with Iran for decades.
to Houthi attacks on that country.
Iran-supported groups in countries such as Iraq,
Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon have conducted missile
Kathleen J. McInnis, Specialist in International Security
and unmanned aerial vehicle attacks against U.S.
Brendan W. McGarry, Analyst in U.S. Defense Budget
partners and U.S. forces stationed in the region.
According to March 2022 testimony from CENTCOM
IF11428
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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United States Central Command


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11428 · VERSION 2 · UPDATED

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