INSIGHTi

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: European Union
Responses and Implications for U.S.-EU
Relations
Updated March 28, 2022
The 27-member European Union (EU) has responded with unprecedented unity and speed to Russia’s
February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. EU policy responses and coordination with the United States are of
interest to Congress given the EU’s role as a U.S. partner in addressing Russia’s aggression.
Key EU Responses
Sanctions
The EU has imposed several rounds of sanctions—or restrictive measures—intended to cripple Russia’s
ability to finance the war against Ukraine, enact costs on Russia’s elites, and diminish Russia’s economic
base. Imposing sanctions requires unanimity among EU members. To date, EU sanctions include
 Freezing the assets of 62 entities and imposing asset freezes and travel bans on 877
Russian officials, legislators, and other elites (Russian President Vladimir Putin and
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov are subject only to asset freezes);
 Expanding existing sanctions on Russia’s financial sector and key banks, including
restricting transactions with Russia’s Central Bank and blocking access to its reserve
holdings and cutting seven Russian banks off from SWIFT (the world’s dominant
international financial messaging system, headquartered in Belgium);
 Expanding existing or imposing new sanctions on Russia’s energy, aviation,
transportation, and technology sectors;
 Broadening the scope of export controls on dual-use goods to limit Russia’s access to
crucial technologies, such as semiconductors;
 Banning exports of luxury goods to Russia and certain metals imports from Russia;
 Closing EU airspace to all Russian-owned aircraft; and
 Expanding sanctions on Belarus for supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
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The EU’s increasingly punitive sanctions are notable given the bloc’s trade and investment ties to Russia,
its reliance on Russian energy imports, and the potential negative economic effects of Russian retaliatory
sanctions or Russian threats to cut off energy supplies. Some member states are critical that the EU has
not disconnected Sberbank (Russia’s largest bank) or Gazprombank (linked to Russia’s energy sector)
from SWIFT or banned energy imports from Russia. (See CRS Insight IN11869, Russia’s Invasion of
Ukraine: Overview of U.S. and International Sanctions and Other Responses; and CRS In Focus
IF12062, New Financial and Trade Sanctions Against Russia.)
Military Assistance
The EU has announced a total of $1 billion (about $1.1 billion) in financing for military assistance to
Ukraine through the European Peace Facility (EPF). For the first time, this financing includes funding for
lethal equipment, worth €900 million ($987 million); the remaining €100 million ($110 million) is for
nonlethal supplies. Member states are responsible for delivering equipment and may be reimbursed from
the EPF for assistance provided since the start of 2022.
Helping Refugees and Providing Aid
Over 3.8 million people have fled Ukraine, with about 60% of refugees arriving in Poland. The EU has
adopted a temporary protection mechanism to provide Ukrainian nationals and other legal residents of
Ukraine with immediate residency rights and access to benefits throughout the EU (for one year with
extension possible up to three years). EU assistance to date includes €500 million (around $548 million)
in humanitarian aid for Ukraine and neighboring countries from the EU’s budget and €107 million ($117
million) for emergency supplies through the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism. (See CRS Insight
IN11882, Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis in Ukraine.)
Tackling Disinformation
The EU has condemned Russia’s disinformation campaign against Ukraine and suspended broadcasting
of Russian state-owned media outlets Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik across all platform types (cable,
satellite, websites, apps, etc.). The EU also is addressing disinformation targeting Ukraine through its
EUvsDisinfo project.
U.S.-EU Cooperation
Russia’s war against Ukraine has strengthened U.S.-EU ties and transatlantic unity. The United States and
the EU have moved largely in lockstep in terms of the types and timing of sanctions imposed. Many EU
sanctions are identical or substantively similar to U.S. sanctions, including restrictions on Russia’s
Central Bank and prohibiting access to airspace. With other partners, the EU and the United States
established a transatlantic task force to ensure effective implementation of sanctions against designated
individuals and companies and announced plans to suspend Russia’s preferential trade treatment under
World Trade Organization rules.
One divergence between U.S. and EU sanctions centers on Russian energy imports. The United States has
banned imports of Russian crude oil and certain petroleum products, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and
coal. The EU, however, is far more dependent on Russian energy than the United States. Although some
EU countries reportedly support banning Russian energy imports, others—including Germany—remain
opposed. The EU has pledged to decrease its energy dependence on Russia, starting with reducing
demand for Russian gas by two-thirds by the end of 2022.
While in Brussels on March 24-25, President Biden committed to helping the EU reduce its dependency
on Russian gas by working with “international partners” to boost LNG shipments to the EU this year and

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outlined plans to enable additional annual U.S. LNG shipments through 2030. A new U.S.-EU task force
on energy security is to implement these and other goals. President Biden also announced plans for the
United States to welcome up to 100,000 Ukrainian refugees and noted close U.S.-EU coordination on
humanitarian assistance efforts.
U.S. and Congressional Interests
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has galvanized debate on several EU initiatives that could be central to how
the EU as an institution and U.S.-EU relations evolve. Among the most prominent of interest to Congress
are
 Security and Defense. Russia’s actions could prompt greater EU efforts to improve
military capabilities and become a more independent global actor (often referred to as
strategic autonomy). Such ambitions could create some U.S.-EU tensions. At the same
time, Russia’s aggression has reinforced NATO’s importance and could strengthen the
NATO-EU partnership (as suggested in the EU’s new Strategic Compass document).
 Energy and Climate Policies. Russia’s war in Ukraine could accelerate EU energy
diversification efforts (long called for by some in Congress), bolster the European Green
Deal to address climate change, and encourage U.S.-EU cooperation on clean energy
technologies and renewables.
 EU Enlargement. Traditionally, strong bipartisan support has existed in Congress for EU
enlargement. Russia’s invasion may be boosting Ukraine’s EU membership prospects,
with the EU agreeing to assess Ukraine’s recent membership application. Joining the EU,
however, typically takes many years, and some EU members remain wary about
Ukraine’s readiness and further antagonizing Russia.

Author Information

Kristin Archick

Specialist in European Affairs




Disclaimer
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to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
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IN11897 · VERSION 2 · UPDATED

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