Updated March 11, 2022
AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation
On December 1, 2021, President Joseph Biden submitted to
The agreement includes provisions to protect transferred
Congress an “Agreement among Australia, the United
data. For example, no party may communicate any
Kingdom, and the United States for the Exchange of Naval
information governed by the agreement to any
Nuclear Propulsion Information.” This In Focus explains
“unauthorized persons or beyond” the party’s “jurisdiction
the agreement’s substance, as well as provisions of the
or control.” In addition, a recipient party communicating
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended (P.L. 83-
such information to nationals of a third AUKUS
703; 42 U.S.C. §§2153 et seq.), concerning the content and
government must obtain permission from the originating
congressional review of such agreements.
party. The agreement includes an appendix detailing
“security arrangements” to protect transferred information.
An accompanying message to Congress explains that the
agreement would permit the three governments to
Related Nuclear Cooperation
“communicate and exchange Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Agreements
Information and would provide authorization to share
The AEA authorizes and contains requirements for nuclear
certain Restricted Data as may be needed during trilateral
cooperation agreements governing both civil and military
discussions” concerning a project to develop Australian
applications. The United States has nuclear cooperation
nuclear-powered submarines. This project is part of an
agreements with both Australia and the United Kingdom
“enhanced trilateral security partnership” named AUKUS,
that are relevant to the AUKUS agreement. The United
which the three governments announced on September 15,
Kingdom is a nuclear-weapon state under the nuclear
2021. The United States has a similar nuclear naval
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); Australia is not a nuclear-
propulsion arrangement only with the United Kingdom
weapon state.
pursuant to the bilateral 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement.
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
The partnership’s first initiative, according to a September
The United States and Australia first concluded a civil
15 Joint Statement, is an 18-month study “to seek an
nuclear cooperation agreement in 1957. Those governments
optimal pathway to deliver” this submarine capability to
updated that agreement in 1979 and renewed it in 2010.
Australia. This study is to include “building on” the U.S.
Australia sells around 36% of its $1 billion in uranium
and UK nuclear-powered submarine programs “to bring an
exports to the United States. The United States is also a
Australian capability into service at the earliest achievable
major processor of Australian uranium sold to other
date.” The study is “in the early stages,” according to a
countries. Australia does not currently possess any nuclear
November 2021 non-paper from Australia, the United
power plants, but it operates one research reactor. This
Kingdom, and the United States, which adds that “[m]any
agreement “specifically prohibits the transfer of restricted
of the program specifics have yet to be determined.”
data under it,” as well as “sensitive nuclear technology,
sensitive nuclear facilities and major critical components.”
Agreement Details
The agreement, which the governments signed on
As a nonnuclear-weapon state under the NPT, Australia has
November 22, 2021, permits each party to exchange “naval
a comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency
nuclear propulsion information as is determined to be
(IAEA) safeguards agreement. Such agreements, according
necessary to research, develop, design, manufacture,
to the agency, are designed “to provide credible assurance
operate, regulate, and dispose of military reactors.” As
to the international community that nuclear material and
noted, this information includes restricted data; the AEA
other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear
defines such data to include “all data concerning ... the use
uses.”
of special nuclear material in the production of energy.”
The AEA and 10 C.F.R. Part 810.3 define special nuclear
The 1958 U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with the
material as plutonium, uranium-233, or enriched uranium.
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), renewed
in 1995, provided the legal framework for civilian nuclear
The agreement, which entered into force on February 8,
cooperation between the United States and United
2022, is to remain in force until December 31, 2023, when
Kingdom. In anticipation of the latter’s withdrawal from the
it will “automatically extend for four additional periods of
European Union (EU), and its legal association with
six months each.” Any party may terminate its participation
Euratom, the two governments concluded a bilateral nuclear
in the agreement with six months written notice. Should any
cooperation agreement in 2018. Following the required
party abrogate or materially violate the agreement, the other
congressional review period, the new agreement entered
parties may “require the return or destruction” of any
into force on December 31, 2020, after the UK withdrawal
transferred data.
from the EU. The agreement is to remain in force for 30
years.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation
US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement
mandatory criteria for the agreement. This section mandates
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-585) restricted the
that nuclear cooperation agreements pursuant to AEA
sharing of nuclear weapons information with foreign
section 144 c. (2) contain
governments, including the United Kingdom. However, an
October 1957 Declaration of Common Purpose issued by
a guarantee that safeguards on transferred nuclear
President Dwight Eisenhower and UK Prime Minister
material and equipment continue in perpetuity;
Harold MacMillan stipulated that Eisenhower would
request Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act “as may
a provision requiring the application of comprehensive
IAEA safeguards to be applied in nonnuclear-weapon
be necessary and desirable to permit” bilateral nuclear
states;
cooperation. (For more information, see CRS Insight
IN11762, New Developments in the United States’ Strategic
a prohibition on the retransfer of material or restricted
and Defense Ties with Australia, by Bruce Vaughn.)
data without U.S. consent;
Congress adopted an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act
in 1958 (P.L. 85-479) authorizing U.S. government transfer
a requirement that the recipient state maintain physical
to foreign governments of information, as well as certain
security on transferred nuclear material;
components, related to nuclear weapons. This amendment
a prohibition on the recipient state’s use of transferred
also authorizes the export of nuclear reactors and related
items or technology for any nuclear explosive device or
information for naval propulsion.
for any other military purpose; and
In 1958, the United States and United Kingdom concluded
a provision specifying the U.S. right to demand the
the U.S.–UK Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA). The
return of transferred nuclear materials and equipment, as
United States subsequently transferred a nuclear plant and
well as any special nuclear material produced through
associated reactor fuel to the United Kingdom for use in a
their use, if the cooperating state detonates a nuclear
submarine. The agreement, which the two parties amended
explosive device or terminates or abrogates an IAEA
in 2014, “provides the necessary requirements for the
safeguards agreement.
control and transmission of submarine nuclear propulsion
technology, atomic information and material between the
Section 123 d. specifies the procedure for congressional
UK and US, and the transfer of non-nuclear components to
approval of agreements such as the AUKUS agreement.
the UK.” The 2014 amendment extended the MDA until
2024.
Congress has the opportunity to review a nuclear
cooperation agreement for 60 days of continuous session.
Atomic Energy Act Requirements
The President must submit the text of the proposed
The AEA includes requirements for the content of nuclear
agreement, along with required supporting documents, to
cooperation agreements, related presidential determinations
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Foreign
and other supporting information for submission to
Relations Committee, and the House and Senate Armed
Congress, conditions affecting the implementation of an
Services Committees. The agreement may enter into force
agreement, and procedures for Congress to consider and
after the end of the 60-day period unless, during that time,
approve the agreement. (For more information, see CRS
Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the
Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other
agreement and the resolution becomes law.
Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D.
Nikitin.)
At the beginning of this 60-day period, joint resolutions of
approval or disapproval, as appropriate, are to be
Section 144 c. (2): Military Nuclear Reactor Data
automatically introduced in each house. During this period,
This section permits the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
the committees are to hold hearings on the proposed
and Department of Defense, with presidential authorization,
agreement and “submit a report to their respective bodies
“to communicate or exchange with that nation Restricted
recommending whether it should be approved or
Data concerning research, development, or design, of
disapproved.” If no committee has reported the requisite
military reactors.” The President must determine that “the
joint resolution of approval or disapproval by the end of 45
proposed cooperation” and data communication “will
days, it is automatically discharged from further
promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the
consideration of the measure. After the joint resolution is
common defense and security.”
reported or discharged, Congress is to consider it under
expedited procedures, as established by Section 130 i. of
Section 123
the AEA.
AEA section 123 contains provisions governing nuclear
cooperation agreements’ content, as well as associated
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
congressional review procedures. Section 123 a. states that
Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation
the proposed agreement is to include the terms, conditions,
duration, nature, and scope of cooperation and lists
IF11999
https://crsreports.congress.gov
AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation
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