Updated March 4, 2022
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Cuban Political and Economic Developments
widespread detentions of hundreds of protesters, activists,
Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a
and journalists. The Cuban government also denied
government that has sharply restricted freedoms of
permission and disrupted plans for a dissident group to
expression, association, assembly, and other basic human
conduct a countrywide “civic march for change” in
rights since the early years of the 1959 Cuban revolution.
November 2021. Hundreds of the July 11 protestors have
been tried and convicted, many in summary trials, with
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
some receiving sentences of 20 years or more. As of March
2018 and as head of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) at
3, 2022, the human rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders
its eighth party congress in April 2021. The departure of
(CPD) reported that Cuba had 1,007 political prisoners (up
Castro and other older leaders from the PCC’s Politburo
from 152 on July 1), of which 696 were imprisoned and
reflects the generational change in Cuban leadership that
considered prisoners of conscience by CPD, 198 were
began several years ago. While in power (2006-2018), Raúl
under some form of conditional release, and 113 were
Castro (who succeeded his brother, longtime leader Fidel
imprisoned for other politically motivated acts.
Castro) began to move Cuba toward a mixed economy with
a stronger private sector, but his government’s slow,
U.S. Policy
gradualist approach did not produce major improvements.
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019 that introduced
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
some reforms but maintained the state’s dominance over the
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
economy and the PCC’s predominant political role.
isolating the Cuban government. In late 2014, the Obama
Administration initiated a policy shift away from sanctions
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by the economic
and toward engagement and the normalization of relations.
shutdown associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019
Changes included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
(COVID-19) pandemic; Venezuela’s economic crisis,
state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); the
which has reduced Venezuelan financial support; and U.S.
restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); and an
economic sanctions. The Cuban government reports the
easing of restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
economy contracted almost 11% in 2020 and estimates 2%
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
growth in 2021, although some economists maintain there
(2015-2016). The restoration of relations led to increased
was virtually no growth in 2021. In January 2021, Cuba
government-to-government engagement, with over 20
eliminated its dual currency system; the long-debated
bilateral agreements and numerous dialogues.
reform has spurred inflation, with some estimates ranging
from 300% to over 700% in 2021.
President Trump unveiled his Administration’s Cuba policy
in 2017, issuing a national security presidential
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic initially kept
memorandum that introduced new sanctions, including
cases and deaths low, but both increased in late 2020 and
restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by
surged until August 2021. The country experienced another
the Cuban military. By 2019, the Trump Administration had
surge in cases in January 2022 due to the Omicron variant,
largely abandoned engagement and significantly increased
but deaths remained low because of high vaccination rates.
sanctions, particularly on travel and remittances, to pressure
As of March 3, 2022, Cuba reported almost 8,500 deaths
Cuba on human rights and for its support of the Venezuelan
since the pandemic began and had fully vaccinated 87% of
government of Nicolás Maduro.
its population with its own COVID-19 vaccines.
In its initial months, the Biden Administration announced it
Increased Repression. Beginning in November 2020, the
was conducting a review of policy toward Cuba. The White
government cracked down on the San Isidro Movement
House press secretary said in March 2021 that the
(MSI), a civil society group opposed to restrictions on
Administration would make human rights a core pillar of
artistic expression. Motivated by the repression of the MSI,
policy and would review policy decisions made in the prior
in February 2021, a group of well-known Cuban hip-hop
Administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as
recording artists released a song and music video, Patria y
a state sponsor of terrorism.
Vida, critical of the government that became an instant hit.
In the aftermath of the July 11 protests, the Administration
On July 11, 2021, anti-government demonstrations broke
took several actions. President Biden and other
out in Havana and cities and towns throughout the country,
Administration officials expressed solidarity with the
with thousands of Cubans protesting economic conditions
protesters and criticized the Cuban government for its
(food and medicine shortages, blackouts) and long-standing
repression. In July and August 2021, the Treasury
concerns about the lack of freedom of expression. The
Department imposed four rounds of targeted financial
government responded with harsh measures, including
sanctions on several Cuban security entities and officials
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
involved in actions to suppress the peaceful, democratic
symptoms since 2016. Congress enacted legislation (P.L.
protests. In November 2021, the State Department imposed
117-46) in September 2021 authorizing payment to Central
visa restrictions on officials implicated in suppressing a
Intelligence Agency and State Department personnel who
planned civic march; in January 2022, it imposed visa
experience certain brain injuries. The National Defense
restrictions on officials connected to the detention,
Authorization Act for FY2022 (P.L. 117-81), approved in
sentencing, and imprisonment of the July 11 protesters.
December 2021, has provisions to address health care and
treatment, national security challenges, and U.S.
Among other actions, the Administration established a
government coordination of the response to the incidents.
working group to identify the most effective ways to get
remittances directly to the Cuban people, began reviewing
117th Congress: Legislative Action on Cuba
plans to increase staffing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana to
Congress is continuing consideration of the Biden
facilitate consular services and engagement with civil
Administration’s FY2022 request of $20 million for Cuba
society, and stated it was actively collaborating with the
democracy and human rights programming (same as
private sector to identify creative ways to ensure Cuban
provided annually since FY2014) and $12.973 million for
citizens have internet access. On March 3, 2022, the U.S.
Cuba broadcasting (same as appropriated in FY2021). Both
Embassy in Havana announced it would initiate limited
the House-approved and Senate introduced versions of the
resumption of some immigrant visa services.
FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill (H.R. 4373, H.Rept.
117-84; S. 3075) would fully fund both programs. Of the
Selected U.S. Sanctions Imposed Since 2017
$20 million for Cuba democracy programs, the House bill
Transactions with the Cuban Military. In 2017, the State
would provide not less than $5 million to support free
Department published a list of entities controlled by the
enterprise, private business organizations, and people-to-
Cuban military, intelligence, or security services with
people and cultural activities. In contrast, the Senate bill
which direct financial transactions would disproportionately
would provide $5 million for such activities in addition to
benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the
the $20 million in democracy funding.
Cuban people or private enterprise. Last updated in January
2021, this “Cuba restricted list” includes 231 entities
On human rights, the House and Senate approved H.Res.
(ministries, hotels, and numerous businesses).
760 and S.Res. 310, in November and August 2021,
respectively; both resolutions expressed solidarity with
Travel and Remittances. Since 2019, the United States has
Cubans demonstrating peacefully, condemned Cuba’s acts
increased restrictions on travel and remittances. These have
of repression, and called for the immediate release of
included eliminating people-to-people educational travel,
arbitrarily detained Cuban citizens. The Senate also passed:
prohibiting cruise ships and private and corporate aircraft
S.Res. 37 in April, expressing solidarity with the MSI;
from going to Cuba, suspending commercial flights to cities
S.Res. 81 in May, honoring Las Damas de Blanco, a
other than Havana, and prohibiting U.S. travelers from
woman-led human rights group; S. 2045 in July, which
staying at over 400 hotels and private residences identified
would rename the street in front of the Cuban Embassy
as owned or controlled by the Cuban government. The
after a democracy activist; and S.Res. 489 in January 2022,
Treasury prohibited processing of remittances through
commending Cuban pro-democracy and human rights
entities on the “Cuba restricted list,” which resulted in
activists, including José Daniel Ferrer Garcia.
Western Union ceasing its operations in Cuba in 2020.
Among other bills, H.R. 198 would permit Cuban nationals
Terrorism Designations. In May 2020, then-Secretary of
to play U.S. professional baseball; H.R. 287, S. 689, and S.
State Pompeo (pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act)
3468 would prohibit the rescission of Cuba’s designation as
included Cuba in the annual list of countries certified as not
a state sponsor of terrorism until Cuba satisfies certain
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts for the
conditions; H.R. 6907 would direct the Secretary of
first time since 2015. Secretary of State Antony Blinken
Homeland Security to reinstate the processing of
also included Cuba on the annual list in May 2021. In
applications for parole under the Cuban Family
January 2021, pursuant to several laws, Pompeo designated
Reunification Parole Program, and H.R. 2684 would
the Cuban government as a state sponsor of international
establish such a program in U.S. immigration law; S. 249
terrorism, citing Cuba’s harboring several U.S. fugitives
and H.R. 3625 would lift economic sanctions; S. 1694
and members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army.
would lift trade restrictions; S. 2138 would allow certain
Cuban medical personnel working in third countries
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel
admission into the United States; H.R. 5069 would direct
Between late 2016 and May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy
the Secretary of State to facilitate unrestricted internet
Havana community members suffered a series of
access in Cuba; and H.R. 5557/S. 2990, among its
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive
provisions, would impose sanctions on foreign persons for
issues. In December 2020, the National Academies of
engaging in certain transactions related to Cuba.
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine released a report
concluding the most plausible mechanism for the source of
Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on
the health symptoms was directed pulsed radio frequency
Travel and Remittances; and CRS Report R45657, Cuba:
energy. U.S. officials maintain that investigations into the
U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the Trump
cause or source of these anomalous health incidents have
Administration.
not reached a conclusion. A number of U.S. government
and military officials worldwide have reported these
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

IF10045


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 93 · UPDATED

---