INSIGHTi

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Military and
Intelligence Issues and Aspects
February 28, 2022
Prior to February 24, 2022, Russian President Putin gave signals of impending aggression against
Ukraine. For example, on February 21, 2022, Putin announced that Russia would recognize the
independence of two Russia-controlled regions in eastern Ukraine (the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk
People’s Republics, or DNR/LNR), most of which had remained under Ukrainian control since Russia’s
first invasion of parts of Ukraine in 2014. Shortly thereafter, Putin announced Russia would send
“peacekeepers” into the DNR/LNR to defend against fabricated charges of Ukrainian plans for invasion
and sabotage attempts. Despite denials from Russian officials, Russia had spent months amassing a
significant portion of its military capabilities around Ukraine. The attack began after Russia had
mobilized between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel on the Ukrainian border, in Belarus, and in Ukraine’s
occupied Crimea region, according to U.S. government estimates. Russia’s invasion follows months of
warning and concern from the Biden Administration, European allies, NATO, and Members of Congress.
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
On February 24, Putin announced in a televised address a “special military operation” to protect the
civilian population and to “demilitarize” and “de-Nazify” Ukraine (the latter term understood by some
observers as a false pretext for overthrowing the democratically elected Ukrainian government).
Hours after Putin’s speech, the invasion began with a massed aerospace attack against key targets,
including logistics centers, naval installations, command and control centers, air defenses and critical
infrastructure. Russia initiated large-scale precision guided missile (PGM) and rocket artillery attacks
across Ukraine. In the initial attack, the Pentagon stated that Russia launched over 100 short-range
ballistic missiles (SRBM), including Iskander-M SRBMs, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. Some
observers believe Russia’s initial strategy was to achieve air superiority, degrade Ukrainian air defenses,
and undermine the Ukrainian military’s ability to coordinate defenses and counterattacks. This initial
bombardment, however, was more limited in duration and scale than some analysts expected and did not
establish full air superiority.
After the aerospace assault, Russian ground forces attacked from multiple directions: north from occupied
Crimea in the direction of Kherson; limited incursions west from DNR/LNR; from Russia’s Belgorod and
Kursk toward Ukraine’s cities of Kharkiv and Sumy; and a strong thrust toward Kyiv. Initially, Russia
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made the most progress in the south, driving north from Crimea toward Kherson and eventually turning
toward Melitopol, a town on the road to Mariupol (see Figure 1). Russia also conducted a risky air assault
by airborne (VDV) units to seize the Antonov International Airport outside of Kyiv; Ukrainian forces
successfully repulsed the assault.
Figure 1. Ukraine

Source: Congressional Research Service
Russia’s key target was seemingly Kyiv. Led by elite, but more lightly equipped, VDV and special forces,
Russia reportedly made advances along the western side of Kyiv and quickly reached the outskirts of
Kyiv. On February 25, the Pentagon assessed that Russia had committed one-third of its available troops
into Ukraine. U.S. officials and some analysts believe Russia’s initial operation was to “decapitate” the
Ukrainian government and rely on fast-moving, elite units to quickly seize key junctures, similar to
Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014.
The Ukrainian military, however, hindered, deflected, and imposed costs, in personnel and equipment, on
Russian forces. The Ukrainian military was seemingly able to draw in, and in many cases overextend,
Russian forces, allowing the Ukrainian military to conduct ambushes and counterattacks. Russia also
failed to completely achieve air dominance, leaving at least some of Ukraine’s air defenses and aircraft
operational. Ukrainian air defenses shot down multiple Russian fighters and helicopters, and the
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense released footage of what appeared to be a TB2 unmanned combat aerial
vehicle attacking Russian ground units.
Latest Developments
Reports indicate that Russia’s military and political leadership appeared surprised by the lack of progress
and level of resistance from Ukrainian forces. Some captured Russian prisoners of war also appeared
surprised by the invasion, having believed they were deployed for exercises. Some analysts believe the
Russian military did not rely on its traditional methods of heavy concentrated artillery fire to prepare
advances for fear of collateral damage, which would undermine its rationale for the invasion.

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Additionally, Russia initially surrounded and bypassed most heavily populated centers, such as Kharkiv,
instead prioritizing rapid progress.
In many areas, Russian units have appeared to outrun their logistics support, leaving many units stranded
and forcing offensives to halt until resupplied. Analysts noted that Russian units were often not operating
as combined arms formations (joint armor, infantry, and artillery), which left infantry exposed (such as
VDV, special operations, reconnaissance, and spetsnaz forces) and armor vulnerable to ambushes.
Additionally, communication has appeared to be an issue, with Russian units experiencing difficulty
coordinating among various units and service branches. Russian National Guard troops, including units
from Russia’s Chechnya region, are crucial to Russia for rear-security and occupation missions but
suffered heavy casualties when they appeared to advance ahead of the army. Some analysts also noted the
lack of combat air patrols and close air support from Russia’s aerospace forces; instead, Russia appeared
to rely on Iskander-M SRBMs for precision targeting as opposed to PGMs from fighters or bombers.
On Sunday, February 27, the Pentagon assessed that Russia had deployed two-thirds of its total forces to
the invasion.
Russia continues to face stiff resistance from Ukrainian forces, stalling many of its offensives, including
outside of Kyiv. In response to the lack of progress, some analysts believe Russia is reinforcing its units
and changing tactics to overcome Ukrainian resistance. Russia continues to make advances in the south,
capturing Berdyansk and moving to encircle Mariupol. As of February 28, satellite imagery had
documented the presence of large Russian armor convoys moving toward Kyiv. Some analysts suspect
Russia is possibly reinforcing and resupplying its units for a large-scale assault on Kyiv.
Despite significant Ukrainian resistance, Russia retains significant quantitative and qualitative advantages
over the Ukrainian military, including significant air and helicopter forces, electronic warfare, and
artillery.

Author Information

Andrew S. Bowen

Analyst in Russian and European Affairs




Disclaimer
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