Updated January 26, 2022
Burkina Faso
On January 24, 2022, military officers ousted President
people, including an American. These events coincided
Roch Marc Christian Kaboré—the first head of state in
with the southward spread of conflicts in Mali.
Burkina Faso to have entered office via elections—amid a
worsening security and humanitarian crisis. The military’s
Figure 1. Burkina Faso at a Glance
actions came amid rising tensions over the government’s
inability to stem Islamist insurgent attacks, and followed
coups in Mali and Guinea. Regional and Western leaders
have struggled to respond to the spread of conflicts in the
Sahel region and democratic backsliding. Donors have also
raised concerns with the recent arrival of Russian military
contractors in Mali; some in Burkina Faso have called for
increased Russian security assistance.
Kaboré was reelected to a second term in 2020 in elections
marred by security threats in several regions and opposition
claims of fraud. He faced growing public demands for
greater security, job creation, governance reforms, and
accountability for abuses under prior governments. In late
2021, as restiveness grew among troops and civilian
protesters, he dismissed his cabinet and reshuffled the
military leadership. Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba,
age 41, an army special operations forces officer who was
Source: CIA World Factbook, IMF; 2021 figures unless noted.
elevated to a regional command post in the 2021 reshuffle,
appears to have led the January 24 seizure of power.
Attacks escalated in 2017 after a faction of Algerian-origin
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) merged with a
Insurgent groups control parts of the country and some have
regional offshoot and two Mali-based groups to form the
carried out terrorist attacks in Ouagadougou (Fig. 1), most
Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims (aka JNIM). In
recently in 2018. Some local and regional armed groups
2018, JNIM clamed a complex assault on the military’s
have ties to Al Qaeda or the Islamic State. Kaboré’s
headquarters and the French embassy in Ouagadougou.
administration struggled to counter insurgent gains despite
donor backing and military aid, while state security forces
Burkina Faso’s northern and eastern regions have been
and state-backed militia groups have been implicated in
most affected by conflict, with signs of spillover into the
severe human rights abuses. The conflict has crippled
countries of coastal West Africa. Local security forces and
health and education systems in parts of the country. The
civilians have been the primary victims. In the north,
COVID-19 pandemic has deepened health and socio-
Ansarul Islam and JNIM have exploited ethnic tensions and
economic hardships. Over 1.4 million Burkinabè (6.5%)
perceptions of state neglect, as well as grievances over
were internally displaced and 2.9 million faced food
corruption, patronage politics, social stratification, and land
insecurity as of late 2021, according to U.N. data.
disputes. Eastern Burkina Faso is a stronghold of the
Islamic State-Greater Sahara (IS-GS), a former AQIM
Background. Burkina Faso has a history of military
splinter faction that has reportedly cultivated ties with local
intervention in politics and social unrest. Kaboré’s election
criminal networks. IS-GS notably claimed the 2017 deadly
in 2015 capped a political transition after mass protests,
ambush of U.S. troops in neighboring Niger. U.N. sanctions
backed by some military commanders, ousted semi-
investigators report that IS-GS has some ties to Nigeria-
authoritarian President Blaise Compaoré. A towering figure
based IS-West Africa but remains distinct.
in West African politics, Compaoré had come to power in a
1987 coup; his attempt to evade term limits again by
Several factors may explain why violence has spread so
changing the constitution sparked the protests that unseated
quickly in Burkina Faso despite a history of religious and
him. A counter-coup by Compaoré loyalists nearly derailed
ethnic coexistence. Compaoré’s ouster in 2014 and the
the civilian-led transition, but protesters and conventional
transitional government’s decision to dissolve his elite
army units induced the coup leaders to stand down.
presidential guard unit (aka the RSP) arguably disrupted the
Terrorism and Insurgency
state security apparatus, which in any case had little combat
experience. Mali-based insurgents appear to have lent
Burkina Faso enjoyed relative peace and stability prior to
support to Burkinabè allies, and have long threatened to
2016, when an Islamist insurgency known as Ansarul Islam
attack countries, such as Burkina Faso, that have deployed
emerged in the rural north and regional Al Qaeda affiliates
U.N. peacekeeping troops to Mali. Minority Christian
claimed a large attack in Ouagadougou that killed 30
dominance of the civil service and political class reportedly
spurred tensions as well.
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Burkina Faso
State counterinsurgency tactics also may have driven armed
voters out of 6.5 million who registered. Local civil society
group recruitment in some areas. Human rights groups and
observers noted some procedural problems and voter
journalists have reported extrajudicial killings and other
disenfranchisement in conflict-affected areas, but expressed
abuses by state security forces and state-backed militias.
satisfaction with the election process overall.
Members of the minority ethnic Fulani (alt. Peul)
The Economy
community, who are Muslim and are often livestock
Landlocked with a largely agrarian workforce, Burkina
herders, reportedly have been particularly targeted; several
Faso is one of the world’s poorest countries. Food
Islamist armed factions, including Ansarul Islam, were
insecurity is widespread, and remittances from Burkinabè
founded by Fulani individuals. Perceived collective
workers in wealthier coastal states are a lifeline for many.
punishment may further fuel local grievances and prompt
Exports of cotton and gold are a key source of tax revenues
communities to turn to armed groups for protection or
and foreign exchange. Economic growth slowed from 5.7%
revenge. Kaboré’s administration pledged to investigate
in 2019 to 1.9% in 2020 amid the effects of the COVID-19
abuses, which appeared to decrease after mid-2020.
pandemic, but the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Rights advocates also raised concerns with legislation
estimated a rebound to 6.7% in 2021. The State
enacted in 2019 barring citizens from publishing or
Department’s latest Investment Climate Statement reported
circulating information on terrorist attacks or military
that Burkina Faso “welcomes foreign investment” but noted
operations without state authorization, and criminalizing
growing security threats. Insurgent attacks on gold mining
reports that could “demoralize” the armed forces.
operations have notably swelled in recent years.
Regional Initiatives. Burkina Faso and other members of
U.S. Policy and Aid
the G5 Sahel (Mali, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger) have
The State Department condemned the military’s seizure of
sought to coordinate counterterrorism operations in border
power on January 24. As of January 26, the Department had
areas. Lack of capacity, mutual distrust, and tensions
not indicated whether it constituted a “coup d’état” with
between Mali’s military junta and Western donors have
regard to §7008 of annual foreign aid appropriations
complicated these efforts. Donors—including the United
legislation, which would trigger restrictions on certain aid
States, the European Union, and Arab Gulf states—have
to the government. The State Department previously
provided equipment and training, but have not offered
characterized bilateral relations as “excellent.” U.S.
funding at the scale that G5 leaders have solicited. Pledges
engagement has focused on regional security, development,
from the African Union and Economic Community of West
and humanitarian relief efforts. In light of recent events,
African States (ECOWAS, to which most, but not all, G5
Members of Congress may examine U.S. security
Sahel countries belong), to increase participation in regional
cooperation with Burkina Faso and consider implications of
security efforts have been slow to materialize.
developments there for regional stability and governance.
French Military Operations. France conducts regional
In 2020, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation
counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, to which the U.S.
(MCC) agreed to a five-year, $450 million compact to
Department of Defense (DOD) provides logistical and
enhance Burkina Faso’s electricity sector—the country’s
intelligence support. French military cooperation with
second MCC compact. The State Department and USAID
Burkina Faso expanded after the 2018 Ouagadougou
separately allocated $53 million in FY2020 bilateral aid for
attacks, at President Kaboré’s request. In 2019, French
Burkina Faso (latest publicly available, not including food
forces intervened in Burkina Faso to free two French
aid or emergency humanitarian relief). These funds largely
hostages from possible JNIM custody, and also freed a
focused on health ($46 million), education ($4 million), and
South Korean and an American hostage whose existence
governance ($2 million). Additional development aid has
had not been reported. The former colonial power’s role in
been provided through regional and global programs,
the region has sparked local criticism, including from some
including a Sahel-focused USAID initiative.
state officials. In 2021, France announced it would reduce
Additional counterterrorism assistance has been provided
its forces in the Sahel. President Kaboré and some officials
by DOD under its global train-and-equip authority (10
in his government called for more Russian support, a call
U.S.C. §333), and by the State Department under the Trans-
echoed by some pro-military protesters in January 2022.
Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and other
Politics
regional programs. Burkinabè forces have participated in
The 2015 general elections produced Burkina Faso’s first
DOD exercises, and Burkina Faso has a State Partnership
ever electoral transfer of power. President Kaboré was
Program with Washington DC’s National Guard.
reelected in 2020 with 58% of the vote against 12 other
In mid-2020, U.S. officials publicly threatened to suspend
candidates, a margin large enough to avert a run-off. His
People’
security assistance unless Burkinabè authorities addressed
s Movement for Progress party won 56 out of 127
human rights concerns. U.S. officials did not announce
seats in simultaneous legislative elections, with allied
subsequent actions, but as noted above, abuses appeared to
parties winning enough seats to form a majority. The
decrease. The FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act
former ruling Congress for Democracy and Progress
(P.L. 116-283) required the executive branch to submit a
performed relatively well, possibly reflecting Compaoré’s
“plan to address gross violations of human rights and
enduring influence and nostalgia for a more peaceful era.
civilian harm” in Burkina Faso and other Sahel countries.
Opposition candidates ultimately conceded to Kaboré after
initially rejecting the 2020 election results as “riddled with
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
fraud.” Polling stations did not operate in about a fifth of
the country due to security threats, affecting some 300,000
IF10434
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Burkina Faso
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10434 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED