Updated January 20, 2022
Iraq and U.S. Policy
Violence Shadows Post-Election Talks
stability posed by the persistence of patronage politics,
Iraq held a national election on October 10, 2021, with
corruption, oil dependence, and armed non-state actors.
voters selecting 329 members for the unicameral
Challenges Await New Government
legislature, the Council of Representatives (COR). The
COR elects Iraq’s president and approves the prime
Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi has led the government
minister’s program and cabinet nominees.
since May 2020, after months of political deadlock
The election
following his predecessor’s protestor-demanded resignation
results are informing negotiations among political groups to
identify the new COR’s “
in late 2019. Negotiations leading to Kadhimi’s nomination
largest bloc,” which nominates the
occurred during a period of escalating U.S.-Iran tensions in
prime minister. The largest bloc may or may not include the
Iraq. Attacks by Iran-backed groups targeting U.S. and
coalition or party that won the most COR seats. Past
Coalition forces—and their Iraqi hosts—continue and have
government formation talks have taken months to resolve.
tested Prime Minister Al Kadhimi throughout his tenure.
Election observers judged that officials administered the
Figure 1. Iraq
election fairly, amid low turnout and some boycotts.
Recounts did not result in major changes and courts ruled
against some parties’ claims of electoral malfeasance. Some
Iran-aligned groups engaged in confrontational protests and
have intimated that violence could result if Iraq’s next
government excludes them. Unnamed Iraqi officials
attributed a November 2021 drone attack on the prime
minister’s residence to Iran-aligned Iraqi militia, but militia
leaders and Iranian officials have denied any involvement.
Condemning the “terrorist attack” against Prime Minister
Al Khadimi, President Biden said, “The United States
stands firmly with the government and people of Iraq as
they strive to uphold Iraq’s sovereignty and independence.”
Iraq adopted a new electoral law for the October election
based on individual candidacy and local districts, creating
new political opportunities for independents and members
of the protest movement that brought down the government
formed after the 2018 election. Shia leader Muqtada al
Sadr’s supporters won fewer votes than in 2018 but adapted
their candidacy approach to the new system and won the

most seats (73). Independents and grassroots candidates
Sources: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
won 43 seats, followed by the Taqaddum (Progress)
movement of COR Speaker Mohammed al Halbousi (37),
The Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) group’s control of
former prime minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law bloc
territory in Iraq ended in 2017, creating space for Iraqis to
(33), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) (31). The
seek more accountable governance, improved service
pro-Iran Fatah (Conquest) bloc drew half as many votes as
delivery, an end to corruption, and greater economic
Sadr’s bloc, but won just 17 seats, down from 48 in 2018.
opportunity. These demands drove mass protests in 2019
and 2020 that subsided as the Coronavirus Disease-2019
It remains to be seen whether the election result and
(COVID-19) pandemic spread, but resurged in May 2021
government formation talks will reduce the formal
with demonstrators insisting that the government identify
influence of Iran-aligned groups who seek to revise or
and prosecute suspects in a series of assassinations and
rescind Iraq’s invitation to the U.S. military to retain an
kidnappings of protest leaders, activists, and others. The
advisory presence in Iraq. Iraqi analysts expect a
state’s use of force to contain and disperse protests and the
compromise coalition government to emerge that includes
impunity surrounding violence against activists has
or reflects the interests of Iran-backed groups alongside
intensified public scrutiny of the government’s ability to act
their more electorally successful rivals. Such a government
against armed groups operating outside state control.
could lower the risk of political violence, but also may
make systemic reforms less likely.
Continued dependence on oil revenues and expansive state
liabilities left Iraq vulnerable to financial collapse in 2020,
In assessing the government that emerges in Iraq, U.S.
as the systemic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
officials may weigh the benefits of continued security
cooperation and other bilateral ties against risks to Iraq’s
exacerbated underlying economic and fiscal challenges. A
precipitous drop in global oil prices slashed state revenues
through mid-2020, but price increases since have created
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Iraq and U.S. Policy
some fiscal breathing room. Iraq’s $89 billion 2021 budget
Masrour Barzani serves as KRG Prime Minister. His cousin
projected a $20 billion deficit but oil prices exceeded
Nechirvan Barzani is KRG President. Factional struggles in
projections throughout the year.
the PUK’s leading Talibani family may affect prospects for
the party’s relations with the KDP and parties in Baghdad.
Iraqi leaders in 2020 described the condition of state
Human rights in the Kurdistan region have come under
finances as dire, but the COR-approved 2021 budget did not
additional scrutiny since the October 2020 arrests and
include some cabinet-proposed spending reforms. Protests
subsequent convictions and sentencing of individuals
have followed some cabinet-approved public spending cuts
reporting on corruption and protests among Kurds.
since 2020. The International Monetary Fund describes
Iraq’s improved fiscal picture as an opportunity for change
Partnership with the United States
and has recommended “civil service reform… and
Prime Minister Al Kadhimi visited Washington, DC, in July
containing the wage bill, reducing inefficient energy
2021, marking the culmination of a four round strategic
subsidies, diversifying fiscal revenues, stemming losses in
dialogue between Iraq and the United States that began in
the electricity sector, [and] strengthening governance.”
2020. The Prime Minister and President Biden jointly
Islamic State Remnants and Militias Pose Threats
reviewed the discussions, “which focused on strengthening
the long-term strategic partnership defined by” the bilateral
Iraqi forces continue to combat remaining Islamic State
2008 Strategic Framework Agreement. They reaffirmed
insurgents, who retain an ability to operate in rural areas
Iraq’s sovereign invitation to host U.S. and other coalition
and particularly in under-secured, disputed territories
forces, and, in December 2021, U.S. and Iraqi officials
between the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq and areas to
confirmed that remaining U.S. forces have “a mission
the south secured by national government forces. In
limited to advising, assisting and enabling the Iraqi Security
November 2021, U.S. officials reported to Congress that IS
Forces to ensure ISIS can never resurge.” The Biden
fighters in Iraq remain capable of complex attacks, and said
that IS leaders “continued to focus on expanding the
Administration renewed a sanctions waiver on specific Iraqi
energy purchases from Iran in November 2021.
insurgency to reestablish physical control of territory.”
Since March 2020, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad has
Tensions involving militia groups have remained high since
operated under ordered departure rules because of “security
2019, when Iran-backed groups expanded attacks on U.S.
conditions and restricted travel options as a result of the
targets, and 2020, when a U.S. strike in Iraq killed Iranian
COVID-19 pandemic.” The U.S. Consulate in Erbil remains
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force
open; the State Department suspended operations at the
Commander Qassem Soleimani and Iraqi Popular
U.S. Consulate in the southern city of Basrah in 2018.
Mobilization Forces (PMF) leader Abu Mahdi al Muhandis,
and Iran retaliated with attacks on Iraqi sites hosting U.S.
Iraqi and U.S. officials have endorsed continued security
forces. Intermittent rocket, drone, and improvised explosive
cooperation, including a U.S. military presence. U.S. force
device (IED) attacks against U.S. and Iraqi facilities and
levels in Iraq declined from 5,200 in 2020 to 2,500 in
convoys have continued since 2020, with some analysts
January 2021. U.S. assessments note that Iraq’s security
observing less coordination among militia leaders.
forces remain dependent on coalition support for some
operations against Islamic State fighters. Congress has
COVID-19 Surges, Vaccines Arrive
authorized U.S. train and equip programs for Iraq through
Iraq’s public and private health systems have significant
December 2022, including aid to KRG forces, and has
shortcomings and limited capacity. Data is incomplete, but
appropriated defense funding for train and equip programs
as of January 19, Iraq had recorded more than 2.1 million
in Iraq through September 2022. Since 2014, Congress has
COVID-19 cases with more than 24,200 deaths. As of
allocated nearly $7 billion for train and equip programs for
November 2021, the United States had provided more than
Iraqis. The Administration’s FY2022 defense request seeks
$60 million to support the COVID-19 response in Iraq. U.S.
$345 million for train and equip efforts under Iraq-specific
vaccine donations have been among the more than 6 million
authorities, including $240 million for KRG Peshmerga
doses Iraq has received through the COVAX initiative. As
stipends, which the United States resumed paying in 2021.
of January 4, 2022, more than 14.4 million vaccine doses
The House and Senate FY2022 defense appropriations bills
had been administered in Iraq. Iraq’s total population is
would provide funding for Iraq at the requested level.
more than 41 million people.
U.S. aid in Iraq supports de-mining, public sector financial
Views from the Kurdistan Region
management reform, U.N.-coordinated stabilization, and
Leaders of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
other goals. The U.S. government has obligated more than
seek to preserve the Kurdistan federal region’s rights under
$405 million for stabilization of liberated areas since 2016,
Iraq’s constitution and remain engaged with counterparts in
including funds for religious and ethnic minority
Baghdad to resolve differences over oil production, the
communities. Congress allocated $454.1 million for U.S.
budget, disputed territories, and security. Following a 2017
aid programs in Iraq in FY2021. President Biden requested
KRG-sponsored independence referendum, the national
$448.5 million for FY2022. The United States has provided
government reasserted control over some disputed
more than $294.8 million in humanitarian aid for Iraq in
territories and has maintained conditions on the transfer of
FY2021 and FY2022. Nearly 1.2 million Iraqis are
funds to the KRG, contributing to the KRG’s fiscal strains.
internally displaced and more than 1.4 million have
The Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the
returned to areas labelled “hotspots” due to various risks.
Suleimaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
are the largest Kurdish parties in the COR and won the
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
most seats in the KRG’s 2018 regional election. KDP leader
Affairs
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Iraq and U.S. Policy

IF10404


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