Updated December 13, 2021
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
Overview
its Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing) plant and its
North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and
Yongbyon Experimental Light Water 5MW(e) Reactor.
missile programs despite UN Security Council sanctions
Spent fuel from this reactor has been reprocessed in the past
and high-level diplomatic efforts. Recent ballistic missile
to extract plutonium for weapons. During the September
tests and military parades suggest that North Korea is
2018 North-South Korea Pyongyang Summit, the North
continuing to build a nuclear warfighting capability
stated it would “permanently disable” the Yongbyon
designed to evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such
facilities if the United States took “corresponding
an approach likely reinforces a deterrence and coercive
measures.”
diplomacy strategy—lending more credibility as it
demonstrates capability—but it also raises questions about
Nuclear Warheads
crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may choose
Fissile material production in large part determines the
to examine U.S. policy in light of these advances.
number and type of nuclear warheads North Korea is able
to build. The 2021 DIA report says that North Korea
According to the U.S. intelligence community’s 2021
“retains a stockpile of nuclear weapons.” Outside experts
annual threat assessment, North Korean leaders view
nuclear weapons as “
estimate that North Korea has produced enough fissile
the ultimate deterrent against foreign
material for between 20 to 60 warheads. Another goal of a
intervention.” At the January 2021 North Korean Workers’
nuclear weapons program is to lower the size and weight of
Party Conference, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un hailed
the “status of our state as a nuclear weapons state” and
nuclear warhead for deployment on missiles. In July 2017,
a DIA assessment and some outside observers believed
praised its “powerful and reliable strategic deterrent.” Kim
North Korea had achieved the level of miniaturization
Jong-un has said that “nuclear weapons of the DPRK can be
required to fit a nuclear device on weapons ranging across
used only by a final order of the Supreme Commander of
the spectrum of its missiles, from short-range ballistic
the Korean People’s Army [Kim Jong-un] to repel invasion
missiles (SRBM) to intercontinental ballistic missiles
or attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make
retaliatory strikes.”
(ICBM). Kim Jong-un in January 2021 said that the country

was able to “miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear
Nuclear Testing
weapons and to make them tactical ones.”
North Korea is observing a self-imposed moratorium on
Delivery Vehicles
nuclear and long-range missile testing. It has tested a
U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions prohibit North
nuclear explosive device six times since 2006. Each test
Korea’s development of the means of delivering
produced underground blasts progressively higher in
conventional and nuclear payloads, in addition to the
magnitude and estimated yield. North Korea conducted its
nuclear weapons themselves. UNSC resolutions ban “all
most recent test on September 3, 2017. A North Korean
ballistic missile tests” by North Korea. A ballistic missile is
press release stated it had tested a hydrogen bomb (or two-
a projectile powered by a rocket engine until it reaches the
stage thermonuclear warhead) that it was perfecting for
apogee of its trajectory, at which point it falls back to earth
delivery on an intercontinental ballistic missile.
using earth’s gravity. Ballistic missiles can deliver nuclear
In April 2018, North Korea announced that it had achieved
and large conventional payloads at high speed and over
its goals, would no longer conduct nuclear tests, and would
great distances. They are categorized as short-range,
close down its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. It dynamited the
medium-range, or long-range (intercontinental) based on
entrances to two test tunnels in May 2018 prior to the first
the distance from the launch site to the target.
Trump-Kim summit in front of a group of journalists. In an
North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and delivery
October 2018 meeting with then-Secretary of State Mike
systems that possess certain critical features: mobility,
Pompeo, Kim Jong-un “invited inspectors to visit the [test
reliability, potency, precision, and survivability. Mobile
site] to confirm that it has been irreversibly dismantled,”
weapons have increased survivability compared with fixed
but this has not yet occurred.
launch sites and static stockpiles. Reliability, potency,
Nuclear Material Production
precision, and in-flight maneuverability work together to
maximize the impact of North Korea’s limited quantity of
North Korea reportedly continues to produce fissile
weapons, launchers, and warheads. A key element to North
material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for
Korean missile doctrine, therefore, is continued testing to
weapons. North Korea restarted its plutonium production
develop, ensure, and demonstrate these features.
facilities after it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in
2009, and is operating centrifuge uranium enrichment
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
plants at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and possibly at
North Korea improved its ability to strike the entire
Kangson. An August 2021 International Atomic Energy
continental United States with an ICBM through a series of
Agency (IAEA) report says that North Korea was operating
tests in 2017. The DPRK successfully test-launched two
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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
liquid-propellant, road-mobile ICBMs in 2017: the
developed KN-24 and KN-25 pose significant threats to
Hwasong-14 (U.S. designated KN-20) and Hwasong-15
South Korea and U.S. assets on the peninsula. The KN-24
(U.S. designated KN-22). North Korea displayed a larger
is a tactical system with a mobile launcher, solid propellant,
new Hwasong ICBM at an October 2020 military parade
and relatively large payload. The KN-24 demonstrates the
but has not flight-tested it. The Defense Intelligence
guidance system and in-flight maneuverability to achieve
Agency assesses it is “probably designed to deliver multiple
precision strikes. Outside experts assess that the North
warheads.” Reliability of these systems remains uncertain.
Koreans may ultimately intend the KN-24 to serve as a dual
Without further testing, neither the North Koreans nor
capable system.
others can assess whether the missiles will function as
The KN-25 blurs the line between rocket and missile;
designed. The absence of ICBM tests since the only
however, it achieves the same effect as a traditional SRBM
successful launch of the Hwasong-15 in November 2017
by delivering destructive effects on a precision target at
may also suggest that the North Korean missile force
significant range thanks to advanced avionics, inertial and
possesses only a small quantity of these weapons or that it
satellite guidance systems, and aerodynamic structures. The
is continuing its test moratorium for nontechnical reasons.
KN-25 carries a conventional payload up to 380 km,
Short- and Medium-Range Missiles
allowing it to strike any target in South Korea. Tests in
2019 and 2020 demonstrate that a crew can launch the four
In 2019 and 2020, North Korea increased the pace of short-
rockets composing the KN-25 system at 20-second
range ballistic missile (SRBM) test launches. There was a
intervals. Since the KN-25 is a more economical system
break in testing between March 2020 and 2021, but a
than traditional SRBMs, the North Koreans may seek to fire
March 25 test launch of a short-range system ended the
large numbers of these rockets in salvos to overwhelm the
pause. In September, tests of the KN-23 SRBM were
ability of an adversary’s missile defense systems to
launched from a new rail-mobile launcher. These test
successfully engage all incoming projectiles. Salvo firing
launches violate United Nations prohibitions.
projectiles gives them the greatest likelihood of
North Korean SRBMs and medium-range ballistic missiles
accomplishing their intended effect in the face of even the
(MRBM), precision-guided multiple launch rocket systems
most advanced missile defense systems.
(MLRS), and artillery pose the most acute near-term threats
The newest crop of North Korean weapons—including the
to other nations. Advances in these systems demonstrate the
Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15, KN-15, KN-23, KN-24, and
North Korean shift toward solid-propellants and satellite
KN-25—demonstrates mobility, potency, precision, and has
guidance systems; advances that could carry over to larger,
characteristics that make the missiles difficult to defeat in
more potent systems like the Hwasong series ICBMs. These
flight. These traits suggest that the North Korean test
developments provide the projectiles greater mobility and
program may seek to achieve more than a simple political
survivability prior to launch and greater potency and
statement, and that it may be intended to increase the
precision on target.
reliability, effectiveness, and survivability of their ballistic
In the MRBM category, the KN-15 poses the greatest threat
missile force.
to North Korea’s regional adversaries and exhibits
The recent advances in North Korea’s ballistic missile test
advanced technology. Known in North Korea as the
program appear to be directed at developing capabilities to
Pukguksong-2, the KN-15 is a solid-propellant missile
defeat or degrade the effectiveness of missile defenses
capable of striking mainland Japan and carrying a nuclear
deployed in the region: Patriot, Aegis Ballistic Missile
or conventional payload—known as dual capable. The
Defense (BMD), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
North Koreans fire the missile from a tracked vehicle,
(THAAD). In addition, North Korea’s progress with
which gives the system mobility and makes prelaunch
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) suggests an
targeting of the system difficult.
effort to counter land-based THAAD missile defenses by
The KN-23 SRBM exemplifies the most notable advance to
launching attacks from positions at sea outside the
the North Korean inventory in the smaller category of
THAAD’s radar field of view, although local Aegis BMD
weapons. The May 2019 tests of two KN-23 missiles
systems could likely still track these projectiles. The
revealed an atypical flight path in which the weapon flew
Pukgugsong-3 SLBM was successfully tested in late 2019.
much closer to the ground than a traditional ballistic
According to the 2021 DIA report, North Korea has said
missile. On terminal approach to its target, the KN-23
this SLBM, to be launched from a ballistic missile
conducted a “pull-up” maneuver, intended to complicate the
submarine, will be cold-launched, solid-fueled and “will
ability of ground-based interceptors to destroy the hostile
carry a nuclear warhead.” In recent parades, North Korea
missile in flight by increasing its speed and angle of attack
unveiled longer-range SLBMs (Pukguksong-4 and
to the target. The KN-23 can strike any location on the
Pukguksong-5) but has not flight-tested them.
Korean peninsula with either a conventional or nuclear
North Korean tests have demonstrated growing success and,
payload and uses a solid-propellant. A March 25, 2021,
coupled with increased operational training exercises,
launch may have tested a variant of the KN-23, according
suggest a pattern designed to strengthen the credibility of
to observers, and was called a “new-type tactical guided
projectile” by official North Korean press statements
North Korea’s regional nuclear deterrent strategy.
.
North Korea has committed to expanding the performance
Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation
of its precision guided tactical weapons. The newly
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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10472 · VERSION 21 · UPDATED

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