Updated November 17, 2021
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Cuban Political and Economic Developments
and journalists, and Cuban human rights groups reported
Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a
summary trials for some of those detained. In October
government that has sharply restricted freedoms of
2021, Human Rights Watch issued a report documenting
expression, association, assembly, and other basic human
“human rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions, ill-
rights since the early years of the 1959 Cuban revolution.
treatment in detention, and abusive criminal proceedings”
against 130 protesters. As of November 4, the human rights
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
group Cuban Prisoners Defenders (CPD) reported 591
2018 and as head of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) at
political prisoners (up from 152 on July 1), of which 375
its eighth party congress in April 2021. The departure of
were imprisoned and considered prisoners of conscience by
Castro and other older leaders from the PCC’s Politburo
CPD, 143 were under conditional release, and 73 were
reflects the generational change in Cuban leadership that
imprisoned for other politically motivated acts.
began several years ago. While in power (2006-2018), Raúl
Castro (who succeeded his brother, longtime leader Fidel
The Cuban government denied permission and disrupted
Castro) began to move Cuba toward a mixed economy with
plans for a new dissident group, Archipiélago, to conduct a
a stronger private sector, but his government’s slow,
countrywide “civic march for change” on November 15.
gradualist approach did not produce major improvements.
The government used police, state security, and civilian
Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019 that introduced
pro-government mobs to thwart the planned protests. Cuban
some reforms but maintained the state’s dominance over the
officials also had threatened opposition leaders with
economy and the PCC’s predominant political role.
prosecution, and President Díaz-Canel accused the United
States of playing a role in fomenting the protests.
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by the economic
shutdown associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019
U.S. Policy
(COVID-19) pandemic; Venezuela’s economic crisis,
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
which has reduced Venezuelan financial support; and U.S.
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
economic sanctions. The Cuban government reports the
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
economy contracted 11% in 2020 and projects around 2%
isolating the Cuban government. In late 2014, the Obama
growth in 2021. In January 2021, Cuba eliminated its dual
Administration initiated a policy shift away from sanctions
currency system; the long-debated reform has spurred
and toward engagement and the normalization of relations.
inflation, but economists maintain it should boost
Changes included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
productivity in the long term.
state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); the
restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); and an
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic initially kept
easing of restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
cases and deaths low, but both increased in late 2020 and
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
surged until August 2021. As of November 17, Cuba had
(2015-2016). The restoration of relations led to increased
reported over 8,200 deaths and had fully vaccinated almost
government-to-government engagement, with over 20
77% of its population. Cuba has produced its own COVID-
bilateral agreements and numerous dialogues.
19 vaccines, and it eased requirements for foreign visitors
beginning November 15.
President Trump unveiled his Administration’s Cuba policy
in 2017, issuing a national security presidential
Increased Repression. Beginning in November 2020, the
memorandum that introduced new sanctions, including
government has cracked down on the San Isidro Movement
restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by
(MSI), a civil society group opposed to restrictions on
the Cuban military. By 2019, the Trump Administration had
artistic expression. Motivated by the repression of the MSI,
largely abandoned engagement and significantly increased
in February 2021, a group of well-known Cuban hip-hop
sanctions, particularly on travel and remittances, to pressure
recording artists released a song and music video, Patria y
Cuba on human rights and for its support of the Venezuelan
Vida, critical of the government that became an instant hit.
government of Nicolás Maduro.
On July 11, 2021, widespread anti-government
In its initial months, the Biden Administration announced it
demonstrations broke out in Havana and in cities and towns
was conducting a review of policy toward Cuba. The White
throughout the country, with thousands of Cubans
House press secretary said in March 2021 that the
protesting shortages of food and medicine, daily blackouts,
Administration would make human rights a core pillar of
slow progress on COVID-19 vaccinations, and long-
policy and would review policy decisions made in the prior
standing concerns about the lack of freedom of expression.
Administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as
The government responded with harsh measures, including
a state sponsor of terrorism.
widespread detentions of hundreds of protesters, activists,
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
After Cuba’s July 11 protests, President Biden and other
issues. In December 2020, the National Academies of
U.S. officials expressed solidarity with the protesters and
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine released a report
criticized the Cuban government for its repressive response.
concluding the most plausible mechanism for the source of
The Treasury Department imposed targeted sanctions on
the health symptoms was directed pulsed radio frequency
several Cuban security officials and entities (see below),
energy. U.S. officials maintain that investigations into the
and the State Department joined with 20 countries to
cause or source of these anomalous health incidents have
condemn Cuba’s mass arrests and detentions. The
not reached a conclusion. As many as 200 U.S. government
Administration also established a working group to identify
and military officials worldwide have been affected by
effective ways to get remittances directly to the Cuban
these incidents since 2016, according to U.S. officials. In
people and began reviewing plans to increase staffing at the
September 2021, Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 117-
U.S. Embassy in Havana to facilitate consular services and
46) authorizing the provision of payment to Central
civil society engagement. The State Department condemned
Intelligence Agency and State Department personnel who
Cuba’s denial of permission for peaceful protests on
experience certain brain injuries.
November 15 and denounced the repression by Cuban
security, police, and government-backed mobs.
117th Congress: Legislative Initiatives
Congress has begun consideration of the Administration’s
Selected U.S. Sanctions Imposed Since 2017
FY2022 request of $20 million for Cuba democracy and
Transactions with the Cuban Military. In 2017, the State
human rights programming (same as appropriated annually
Department published a list of entities controlled by the
since FY2014) and $12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting
Cuban military, intelligence, or security services with
(same as appropriated in FY2021). Both the House-
which direct financial transactions would disproportionately
approved and Senate introduced versions of the FY2022
benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the
foreign aid appropriations bill (H.R. 4373, H.Rept. 117-84;
Cuban people or private enterprise. Last updated in January
S. 3075) would fully fund both programs. Of the $20
2021, this “Cuba restricted list” includes 231 entities
million for Cuba democracy programs, the House bill
(ministries, hotels, and numerous businesses).
would provide not less than $5 million to support free
enterprise, private business organizations, and people-to-
Travel and Remittances. Since 2019, the United States has
people and cultural activities. In contrast, the Senate bill
imposed an array of restrictions on travel and remittances.
would provide $5 million for such activities in addition to
These have included eliminating people-to-people
the $20 million in democracy funding.
educational travel, prohibiting cruise ships and private and
corporate aircraft from going to Cuba, suspending
On human rights, the House approved H.Res. 760 in early
commercial flights to cities other than Havana, and
November 2021, and the Senate approved S.Res. 310 in
prohibiting U.S. travelers from staying at over 400 hotels
August; both resolutions expressed solidarity with Cubans
and private residences identified as owned or controlled by
demonstrating peacefully, condemned Cuba’s acts of
the Cuban government. On remittances, Treasury prohibited
repression, and called for the immediate release of
the processing of remittances through entities on the “Cuba
arbitrarily detained Cuban citizens. In other action, the
restricted list,” which resulted in Western Union ceasing its
Senate passed: S.Res. 37 in April, expressing solidarity
operations in Cuba in November 2020.
with the MSI; S.Res. 81 in May, honoring Las Damas de
Blanco
, a woman-led human rights group; and S. 2045 in
Targeted Human Rights Sanctions. Under the Trump
July, which would rename the street in front of the Cuban
Administration, the State and Treasury Departments
Embassy after a democracy activist.
imposed targeted sanctions on several high-ranking Cuban
officials and the Ministry of the Interior. Under the Biden
Among other bills, H.R. 198 would permit Cuban nationals
Administration, in the aftermath of the July 11 protests, the
to play U.S. professional baseball; H.R. 287 and S. 689
Treasury Department imposed four rounds of targeted
would prohibit the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
financial sanctions, from July 22 to August 19, on three
state sponsor of terrorism until Cuba satisfies certain
Cuban security entities and eight security officials.
conditions; H.R. 2684 would establish a Cuban family
reunification parole program; S. 249 and H.R. 3625 would
Terrorism Designations. In May 2020, then-Secretary of
lift economic sanctions; S. 1694 would lift trade
State Pompeo (pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act)
restrictions; S. 2138 would allow certain Cuban medical
included Cuba in the annual list of countries certified as not
personnel working in third countries admission into the
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts for the
United States; H.R. 5069 would direct the Secretary of
first time since 2015. Secretary of State Antony Blinken
State to facilitate unrestricted internet access in Cuba; and
also included Cuba on the annual list in May 2021. In
H.R. 5557/S. 2990, among its provisions, would impose
January 2021, pursuant to several laws, Pompeo designated
sanctions on foreign persons for engaging in certain
the Cuban government as a state sponsor of international
transactions related to Cuba.
terrorism, citing Cuba’s harboring several U.S. fugitives
and members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army.
Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on
Travel and Remittances
; and CRS Report R45657, Cuba:
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel
U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the Trump
Between late 2016 and May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy
Administration.
Havana community members suffered a series of
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

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