Updated November 12, 2021
Iraq and U.S. Policy
Violence Shadows Post-Election Talks
Challenges Await New Government
Iraq held a national election on October 10, 2021, with
Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi has led the government
voters selecting 329 members for the unicameral
since May 2020, after months of political deadlock
legislature, the Council of Representatives (COR). The
following his predecessor’s protestor-demanded resignation
COR elects Iraq’s president and approves the prime
in late 2019. Extensive negotiations leading to Kadhimi’s
minister’s program and cabinet nominees. The election
nomination occurred during a period of escalating U.S.-Iran
results will inform negotiations among political groups to
tensions in Iraq. Attacks by Iran-backed groups targeting
identify the new COR’s “largest bloc,” which nominates the
U.S. and Coalition forces—and their Iraqi hosts—have
prime minister. The largest bloc may or may not include the
tested Prime Minister Al Kadhimi throughout his tenure.
coalition or party that won the most COR seats. Past
Figure 1. Iraq
government formation talks have taken months to resolve.
Election observers judged that officials administered the
election fairly, amid low turnout and some boycotts.
Recounts have not resulted in major changes. Some parties
nevertheless have continued to question the outcome, with
some Iran-aligned groups engaging in confrontational
protests and intimating that violence could result if Iraq’s
next government excludes them. Unnamed Iraqi officials
attributed a November 2021 drone attack on the prime
minister’s residence to Iran-aligned Iraqi militia, but militia
leaders and Iranian officials have denied any involvement.
Condemning the “terrorist attack” against Prime Minister
Al Khadimi, President Biden said, “The United States
stands firmly with the government and people of Iraq as
they strive to uphold Iraq’s sovereignty and independence.”
Iraq adopted a new electoral law for the October election
based on individual candidacy and local districts, creating
new political opportunities for independents and members
of the protest movement that brought down the government
formed after the 2018 election. Shia leader Muqtada al
Sadr’s supporters won fewer votes than in 2018 but adapted
Sources: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
their candidacy approach to the new system and won the
The Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) group’s control of
most seats (75). Independents and grassroots candidates
territory in Iraq ended in 2017, creating space for Iraqis to
won 41 seats, followed by the Taqaddum (Progress)
seek more accountable governance, improved service
movement of COR Speaker Mohammed al Halbousi (40),
delivery, an end to corruption, and greater economic
former prime minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law bloc
opportunity. These demands drove mass protests in 2019
(37), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) (34). The
and 2020 that subsided as the Coronavirus Disease-2019
pro-Iran Fatah (Conquest) bloc drew support comparable to
(COVID-19) pandemic spread, but resurged in May 2021
Sadr’s, but won 29 seats, down from 48 in 2018.
with demonstrators insisting that the government identify
For the United States, the election result could reduce the
and prosecute suspects in a series of assassinations and
formal influence of Iran-aligned groups who seek to revise
kidnappings of protest leaders, activists, and others. The
or rescind plans for a continued U.S. military advisory
state’s use of force to contain and disperse protests and the
presence in Iraq after December 31, 2021. However, Iraqi
impunity surrounding violence against activists has
analysts expect a compromise coalition government to
intensified public scrutiny of the Prime Minister’s
emerge that includes or reflects the interests of Iran-backed
credibility and his government’s ability to act against armed
groups alongside their more electorally successful rivals.
groups operating outside state control.
Such a government could lower the risk of political
Continued dependence on oil revenues and expansive state
violence, but also may make systemic reforms less likely.
liabilities left Iraq vulnerable to financial collapse in 2020,
In assessing the government that emerges in Iraq, U.S.
as the systemic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
officials may weigh the benefits of continued security
exacerbated underlying economic and fiscal challenges. A
cooperation and other bilateral ties against risks to Iraq’s
precipitous drop in global oil prices slashed state revenues
stability posed by the persistence of patronage politics,
through the middle of 2020, but price increases have since
corruption, oil dependence, and armed non-state actors.
created some fiscal breathing room. Iraq’s $89 billion 2021
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Iraq and U.S. Policy
budget projected a $20 billion deficit on an assumed oil
Masrour Barzani serves as KRG Prime Minister. His cousin
price of $45 per barrel (Through September 2021, the
Nechirvan Barzani is KRG President. Factional struggles in
average year-to-date OPEC Basket price was $66.83.)
the PUK’s leading Talibani family may affect prospects for
the party’s relations with the KDP and parties in Baghdad.
Iraqi leaders in 2020 described the condition of state
Human rights in the Kurdistan region have come under
finances as dire, but the COR-approved 2021 budget did not
additional scrutiny since the October 2020 arrests and
include some cabinet-proposed spending reforms. Protests
subsequent convictions and sentencing of individuals
have followed some cabinet-approved public spending cuts
reporting on corruption and protests among Kurds.
since 2020, and some politicians have derided austerity
measures in populist critiques of the government. The
Partnership with the United States
International Monetary Fund has recommended “reversing
Prime Minister Al Kadhimi visited Washington, DC, in July
the unsustainable expansion of wage and pension bills,
2021, marking the culmination of a four round strategic
reducing inefficient energy subsidies, and raising non-oil
dialogue between Iraq and the United States that began in
revenues,” with targeted cash transfers to those in need.
2020. The Prime Minister and President Biden jointly
Islamic State Remnants and Militias Pose Threats
reviewed the discussions, “which focused on strengthening
the long-term strategic partnership defined by” the bilateral
Iraqi forces continue to combat remaining Islamic State
2008 Strategic Framework Agreement. They reaffirmed
insurgents, who retain an ability to operate in rural areas
Iraq’s sovereign invitation to host U.S. and other coalition
and particularly in under-secured, disputed territories
forces and announced, “there will be no U.S. forces with a
between the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq and areas to
combat role in Iraq by December 31, 2021.” The Biden
the south secured by national government forces. According
Administration renewed a sanctions waiver on specific Iraqi
to U.S. military oversight reporting, the Islamic State
energy purchases from Iran in August 2021.
maintains a “well-entrenched, low-level insurgency” in Iraq
and Syria but is unable to sustain “coherent military
Since March 2020, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad has
operations” against U.S. partner forces.
operated under ordered departure rules because of “security
conditions and restricted travel options as a result of the
Tensions involving militia groups have remained high since
COVID-19 pandemic.” The U.S. Consulate in Erbil remains
2019, when Iran-backed groups expanded attacks on U.S.
open; the State Department suspended operations at the
targets, and 2020, when a U.S. strike in Iraq killed Iranian
U.S. Consulate in the southern city of Basrah in 2018.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force
Commander Qassem Soleimani and Iraqi Popular
Iraqi and U.S. officials have endorsed continued security
Mobilization Forces (PMF) leader Abu Mahdi al Muhandis,
cooperation, including a U.S. military presence. U.S. force
and Iran retaliated with attacks on Iraqi sites hosting U.S.
levels in Iraq declined from 5,200 in 2020 to 2,500 in
forces. Intermittent rocket, drone, and improvised explosive
January 2021. U.S. assessments note that Iraq’s security
device (IED) attacks against U.S. and Iraqi facilities and
forces remain dependent on coalition support for some
convoys have continued since 2020, with some analysts
operations against Islamic State fighters. Congress has
observing less coordination among militia leaders.
authorized U.S. train and equip programs for Iraq through
December 2021, including aid to KRG forces, and has
COVID-19 Surges, Vaccines Arrive
appropriated defense funding for train and equip programs
Iraq’s public and private health systems have significant
in Iraq through September 2022. Since 2014, Congress has
shortcomings and limited capacity. Data is incomplete, but
allocated nearly $7 billion for train and equip programs for
reported COVID-19 infections increased through August
Iraqis. The Administration’s FY2022 defense request seeks
2020 and then declined before resurging in 2021, with new
$345 million for train and equip efforts under Iraq-specific
case rates reaching a peak of more than 13,500 daily in late
authorities, including $240 million for KRG Peshmerga
July 2021. As of November 9, Iraq had recorded more than
stipends, which the United States resumed paying in 2021.
2 million COVID-19 cases with more than 23,370 deaths.
The House and Senate FY2022 defense appropriations bills
Iraq received some Sinopharm vaccine from China and is
would provide funding for Iraq at the requested level.
receiving shipments of other vaccines via the COVID-19
U.S. foreign aid in Iraq supports de-mining, public sector
Vaccines Global Access Facility (COVAX) that should
financial management reform, U.N.-coordinated
allow for vaccination of 20% of its population in 2021.
stabilization, and other goals. The U.S. government has
Views from the Kurdistan Region
obligated more than $405 million for stabilization of
Leaders of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
liberated areas since 2016, including funds for religious and
seek to preserve the Kurdistan federal region’s rights under
ethnic minority communities. Congress allocated $454.1
Iraq’s constitution and remain engaged with counterparts in
million for U.S. aid programs in Iraq in FY2021. President
Baghdad to resolve differences over oil production, the
Biden requested $448.5 million for FY2022. The United
budget, disputed territories, and security. Following a 2017
States provided more than $344 million in humanitarian aid
KRG-sponsored independence referendum, the national
for Iraq in FY2020 and FY2021, and more than $47 million
government reasserted control over some disputed
for COVID-19 programs. Nearly 1.2 million Iraqis remain
territories and has maintained conditions on the transfer of
internally displaced and more than 1.4 million have
funds to the KRG, contributing to the KRG’s fiscal strains.
returned to areas labelled “hotspots” due to various risks.
The Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the
Suleimaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
are the largest Kurdish parties in the COR and won the
Affairs
most seats in the KRG’s 2018 regional election. KDP leader
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Iraq and U.S. Policy
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