INSIGHTi
FY2022 NDAA: Strategic Context
November 3, 2021
The Biden Administration stated efforts to align spending priorities with the President’s Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) helped shape its FY2022 defense budget request. By law, the
President is required to submit to Congress a National Security Strategy (NSS; 50 U.S.C §3043) and the
Secretary of Defense a National Defense Strategy (NDS; 10 U.S.C. §113). Officials said Secretary of
Defense Lloyd J. Austin III may submit the NDS in early 2022. In March, the President released the
INSSG, which stated the United States faces “growing rivalry” with China, Russia, and other
authoritarian states, and would “responsibly end America’s longest war in Afghanistan.”
Elements of the INSSG appear to build upon aspects of the Trump Administration’s strategic guidance
documents, including the 2017 NSS and 2018 NDS. The 2018 NDS unclassified summary emphasized
retaining a U.S. strategic competitive edge relative to China and Russia over countering violent extremist
organizations. This and the cal for “increased and sustained investment” to counter evolving threats from
China and Russia marked a change in emphasis from previous strategy documents.
The two approaches appear to differ in that the 2018 NDS did not address the question of pandemics or
climate change as national security threats. The INSSG referenced “pandemics and other biological risks,
the escalating climate crisis, cyber and digital threats, international economic disruptions, protracted
humanitarian crises,” among other threats.
The INSSG pledged to prioritize “new resources for diplomacy and development” and identified defense
priorities as follows:
 Military personnel. (“.. we wil continue to invest in the people who serve in our al -
volunteer forces and their families.”);
 Readiness. (“We wil sustain readiness and ensure that the U.S. Armed Forces remain the
best trained and equipped force in the world.”);
 Force structure. (“.. we wil assess the appropriate structure, capabilities, and sizing of
the force, and, working with the Congress, shift our emphasis from unneeded legacy
platforms and weapons systems to free up resources for investments in the cutting-edge
technologies and capabilities that wil determine our military and national security
advantage in the future.”);
 Acquisition processes. (“We wil streamline the processes for developing, testing,
acquiring, deploying, and securing these technologies.”);
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 DOD workforce. (“We wil ensure that we have the skil ed workforce to acquire,
integrate, and operate them.”);
 Ethical technology use. (“. . we wil shape ethical and normative frameworks to ensure
these technologies are used responsibly.”);
 Special operations forces. (“We wil maintain the proficiency of special operations
forces to focus on crisis response and priority counterterrorism and unconventional
warfare missions.”);
 Gray-zone capabilities. (“.. we wil develop capabilities to better compete and deter
gray zone actions.”);
 Climate resiliency. (“We wil prioritize defense investments in climate resiliency and
clean energy.”); and
 Equal opportunity. (“We wil work to ensure that the Department of Defense is a place
of truly equal opportunity where our service members do not face discrimination or the
scourge of sexual harassment and assault.”).
In 2018, the National Defense Strategy Commission, established by Section 942 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA; P.L. 114-328) to provide an independent assessment of
the NDS, recommended that policymakers increase defense spending by 3% to 5% per year in real terms
(i.e., adjusting for inflation)—or alter expectations of the strategy and America’s global strategic
objectives.
In written responses prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) in response to advance
policy questions for his nomination as Defense Secretary, Austin wrote, “The most urgent chal enge we
face is the pandemic,” referring to the outbreak of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Austin
described many of the concepts in the 2018 NDS as “fundamental y sound” and China as the “pacing
threat in most areas.” He wrote the strategy “assumes sustained defense budget growth, but that has not
fully materialized.” Austin pledged to undertake a comprehensive strategic review and cal ed for DOD to
be “prepared for modest growth in the coming years.” He added, “Given the fragile state of our economy
and the large deficits required to combat the impact of COVID, I expect fiscal pressure going forward.”
Austin also pledged to review U.S. nuclear posture and the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.
In written responses prepared for the same committee for her nomination as Deputy Defense Secretary,
Kathleen H. Hicks made related points, writing, “in light of COVID-19’s ongoing impact, the Department
must be fiscal y pragmatic if it is to design a successful approach to strategic competition.” In a 2020
Foreign Affairs article, Hicks argued DOD could reduce its annual costs by $20 bil ion to $30 bil ion
without detracting from national security objectives “after some upfront investment.” In her written
responses for the SASC, Hicks described some of the upfront investments that could yield future savings
as “workforce incentives—from buy-outs to recruiting bonuses, investments in technologies such as
artificial intel igence and robotics, and cyber defense.”
In debate over FY2022 defense authorization and appropriations legislation, some Members of Congress
proposed increasing defense spending by 3% per year above inflation to prepare for long-term strategic
competition with China and Russia. Other Members of Congress recommended decreasing defense
spending to fund non-defense priorities, such as response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Including amounts for national defense discretionary programs that are not in the jurisdiction of the
Armed Services committees or do not require additional authorization, plus national defense mandatory
programs, the total budget authority implication for the House-approved FY2022 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA; H.R. 4350) is $790.5 bil ion. That amount is $25.0 bil ion (3%) more than the
President’s request and $38.1 bil ion (5%) more than the FY2021 amount. Adjusting for inflation, that

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amount is $24.2 bil ion (3%) more than the FY2021 amount (in constant FY2022 dollars). The SASC-
reported FY2022 NDAA (S. 2792) would authorize a similar increase relative to the President’s request.

Author Information

Brendan W. McGarry
Kathleen J. McInnis
Analyst in U.S. Defense Budget
Specialist in International Security





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