Updated November 1, 2021
Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, FY2008-FY2022
Congress remains concerned about the effects of organized-
The Four-Pillars: FY2011-FY2017
crime-related violence in Mexico on U.S. security interests
In 2011, the U.S. and Mexican governments broadened the
and U.S. citizens’ safety in Mexico. Homicides in Mexico
scope of bilateral efforts under four pillars:
reached record levels from 2016 to 2019, followed by a
slight decline during the Coronavirus Disease 2019
1. Combating transnational criminal
(COVID-19) pandemic. Femicides, or killings of women,
organizations through intelligence sharing and
have increased faster than other homicides. With bipartisan
law enforcement operations;
support in Congress, the Mérida Initiative has comprised
2. Institutionalizing the rule of law while
the majority of U.S. foreign aid to Mexico since FY2008.
protecting human rights through justice sector
reform, forensic equipment and training, and
This product provides an overview of the roughly $3.3
police and corrections reform;
billion appropriated to date for the Mérida Initiative;
Mexico’s security strategy and key pillars of the new
3. Creating a 21st-century U.S.-Mexican border
“Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and
while improving immigration enforcement in
Safe Communities” that is to replace the Mérida Initiative.
Mexico; and
4. Building strong and resilient communities by
Origins of the Mérida Initiative
piloting approaches to address root causes of
Prior to FY2008, Mexico did not receive large amounts of
violence and reduce drug demand.
U.S. security assistance, partially due to Mexican sensitivity
about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal affairs.
Some analysts praised the wide-ranging cooperation. Others
In
criticized the increasing number of priorities the two
March 2007, then-Mexican President Felipe Calderón asked
nations adopted. Experts warned it would be difficult in
for more U.S. cooperation to fight criminal organizations
only eight years for Mexico to implement an accusatorial
and their cross-border trafficking operations. In response,
justice system requiring better evidence collection by police
the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. antidrug and rule of
and public trials with oral arguments. Mexico’s Congress
law assistance to Mexico began.
established the eight-year transition to a new justice system
As part of the Mérida Initiative’s emphasis on
in 2008 constitutional reforms .
shared
responsibility, the Mexican government pledged to tackle
Shifting Priorities Under Presidents
corruption. The U.S. government pledged to address drug
Trump and López Obrador: FY2018-
demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk
FY2021
currency to Mexico. Both governments have struggled to

fulfill those commitments. Impunity for public corruption
President Trump’s executive orders on combatting
continues in Mexico, and record U.S. drug overdoses in
transnational criminal organizations (E.O. 13773) and
2020 reveal challenges in addressing U.S. drug demand.
enhancing border security (E.O. 13767) refocused the
Initial Phase: FY2008-FY2010
Mérida Initiative. U.S. priorities included reducing
synthetic drug production, improving border interdiction
Congress appropriated some $1.5 billion for the Mérida
and port security, and combating money laundering. In
Initiative from FY2008 to FY2010, including $420.7
2019, President Trump praised Mexico’s stepped-up efforts
million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which
against illegal migration but criticized Mexico’s antidrug
enabled the purchase of equipment, including aircraft and
helicopters, to support Mexico’s federal security forces
performance in his FY2021 “drug majors” determination.
(military and police). Congress required the State
Beginning in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic hindered
Department to withhold 15% of certain U.S. aid for the
bilateral cooperation. In October 2020, the United States
Mexican military and police until the agency submitted an
arrested former Defense Minister Salvador Cienfuegos on
annual report stating that Mexico was taking steps to meet
drug charges; the move angered the Mexican government
human rights requirements. U.S. assistance focused on (1)
and further limited security cooperation. After the United
counternarcotics, border security, and counterterrorism; (2)
States dropped the case and allowed Cienfuegos to return to
public security; and (3) institution building. U.S. assistance
Mexico, President López Obrador exonerated him and
and intelligence supported Mexico’s strategy of arresting
dismissed the U.S. evidence as fabrications. Mexico’s
(and extraditing) kingpins from each of the major drug
Congress enacted a law requiring foreign law enforcement
trafficking organizations. This “kingpin” strategy also
officials to share any information they gather with
fueled violence, as fractured drug trafficking organizations
designated Mexican federal authorities and Mexican state
fought to regroup and reorganize.
and local officials to report contacts with foreign officials.
President López Obrador enjoys high approval ratings even
though his government has struggled to address homicides
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, FY2008-FY2022
and violent crime. Mexico’s security strategy, released in
Biden Administration
February 2019, focus es on addressing the socioeconomic
The Biden Administration inherited a tense security
drivers of violent crime. Thus far, López Obrador has
relationship with Mexico. President Biden and President
implemented broad social programs rather than the type of
López Obrador focused their early dialogues on migration
targeted crime prevention efforts that the U.S. Agency for
issues, COVID-19 response, and economic issues. On
International Development (USAID) has endorsed.
October 8, 2021, Mexico hosted the first U.S.-Mexico
High-Level Security Dialogue since 2016, which included
President López Obrador campaigned against Mexico’s
the participation of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken,
military-led “war” on criminal organizations but backed
U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas,
constitutional reforms to allow military involvement in
and Attorney General Merrick Garland. After the dialogue,
public security for five more years. Those reforms came
the governments pledged to
despite a 2018 Mexican Supreme Court ruling that
prolonged military involvement in public security violated
Protect people by investing in public health solutions to
the Mexican Constitution. López Obrador initially resisted
drug use, supporting safe communities, and reducing
the so-called kingpin strategy employed by his two
homicides and other high-impact crimes;
predecessors, but high-level arrests and extraditions
increased in 2020 until the U.S. arrest of Cienfuegos.
Prevent transborder crime by reducing arms
Instead of the federal police, which received U.S.
trafficking, targeting illicit supply chains, and reducing
equipment and training, President López Obrador secured
human trafficking and smuggling; and
congressional approval of a new National Guard composed
of mostly military officers. There are concerns about the
Pursue criminal networks by disrupting illicit
National Guard violating human rights. López Obrador has
financiers in both countries and importers of precursor
asked the Mexican Congress to enact a constitutional
chemicals and synthetic drug producers in Mexico while
reform to make the National Guard a part of the defense
strengthening security and justice.
ministry. Human rights and policing experts oppose this
move, asserting that military forces are ill-suited for civilian
The Biden Administration requested $116.5 million in
policing. Critics have faulted the administration for not
foreign assistance for Mexico for FY2022, nearly 27%
investing in state and local police forces, which investigate
lower than the estimated FY2021 appropriation of $158.9
most crimes.
million. The Administration’s FY2022 request for
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
Civil society and the private sector have criticized President
(INCLE) funds for Mexico, which support antidrug efforts
López Obrador for weakening some institutions charged
with federal agencies, is $44 million less than the FY2021
with combatting corruption. Mexico’s Congress approved
the creation of an independent prosecutor general’s o
estimated appropriation. The U.S. and Mexican
ffice;
governments are expected to release detailed agreements in
the individual selected for that post is the president’s close
December under the Bicentennial Framework. Future U.S.
ally. Although federal prosecutors have slowly pursued
budget requests could shift to reflect those priorities.
corruption cases against the former head of Petróleos
Mexicanos, they appear to have ignored most allegations
Congressional Action
involving López Obrador’s allies. The government has not
Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s
implemented the national anti-corruption system required
FY2022 foreign assistance request. The House-passed
by a 2017 constitutional reform.
version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill (H.R.
Replacing the Mérida Initiative?
4373, H.Rept. 117-84) would provide $158.9 million for
Mexico, the same amount as in FY2021. H.Rept. 117-84
Analysts have observed the need for more reporting on
would prohibit funding to support Mexican military
Mérida Initiative outcomes to help Congress oversee the
participation in public security efforts. It would require a
funds it has appropriated. In September 2021, the State
comprehensive review of funds provided through the
Department released a fact sheet on the four pillars of the
Mérida Initiative and a report on any funds appropriated to
Mérida Initiative. It asserts that U.S. funds have helped (1)
Mexican agencies involved in migration management
dismantle criminal organizations and interdict drug
within 90 days of the bill’s enactment. H.Rept. 117-84
shipments; (2) train and equip Mexican police, prosecutors,
would also require reports on plans to improve data
judges, forensics personnel, and corrections officers; (3)
collection on synthetic drug trafficking, the adequacy of
modernize Mexico’s ports, airports, and northern and
Mexico’s efforts to combat human rights abuses such as
southern border checkpoints; and (4) advance human rights
torture and enforced disappearances, crimes committed
and at-risk youth programming.
along Mexico’s northern highways, efforts to combat
fentanyl flows, and the efficacy of U.S. drug policy.
Despite those efforts, escalating violence in Mexico and
drug overdose deaths in the United States have led many to
The Senate Appropriation Committee’s version of the
question the Mérida Initiative’s overall efficacy. The
FY2022 foreign aid bill (S. 3075) would not stipulate a total
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has urged U.S.
funding level for Mexico. It would provide $80 million in
agencies to measure outcomes rather than outputs (e.g., the
INCLE funds. The explanatory statement accompanying the
impact of training rather than the number of police trained).
bill would require a review of the Mérida Initiative and a
A May 2020 GAO report asserted that USAID had tracked
report on Mexico’s human rights efforts.
performance data and the State Department had not.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, FY2008-FY2022

Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
IF10578


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10578 · VERSION 23 · UPDATED