INSIGHTi
Iraq’s October 10, 2021, Election
October 1, 2021
With Demands for Change Unmet, Iraqis Vote Under New System
On October 10, 2021, Iraqis are set to vote in an early election to determine the makeup of the unicameral
Council of Representatives (COR), Iraq’s national legislature. The COR elects Iraq’s president and
approves the prime minister’s program and cabinet nominees. The election comes two years after the start
of mass protests that convulsed Iraqi society and ousted the government formed after Iraq’s 2018 national
election. The election result may shape Iraqi policy on issues of congressional concern, including U.S.-
Iraq security cooperation, Iran’s influence in Iraq, Iraq’s foreign policy, human rights, protection of
minorities, and prospects for economic and governance reform.
The 2019 protest movement’s demands for systemic political, administrative, and economic change have
not been realized, and smal er sporadic protests with varying demands have continued in 2020 and 2021.
Iraq weathered economic and fiscal crises in 2020 linked to the COVID-19 pandemic and low oil
revenues, and the state’s dependency on oil revenue persists. Experts warn that without structural change,
crises may recur if oil prices fal again. State forces and Iran-backed militias kil ed hundreds of protestors
and have assassinated and kidnaped activists. Perpetrators of violence continue to operate with impunity,
abetted by the failure of authorities to prosecute human rights violators. Leading parties partake in and
tolerate pervasive corruption, despite its cumulative immiserating effects on Iraq’s growing population.
Under a new voting law finalized in 2020, Iraq adopted a single nontransferable vote system (one vote,
one candidate, multiple seats per constituency). Voters wil select 320 candidates across 83 local
constituencies and nine candidates for seats reserved for minority groups. At least 25% of the COR seats
are reserved for women, with one seat per constituency designated for female candidates. Prior elections
saw voters choose party lists in province-wide constituencies. The provincial list system favored larger
parties and enabled them to seat loyalists who might not have attracted support as individual candidates.
Iraq’s new electoral system could enable independent and local y accountable candidates to prevail, but
few analysts expect fundamental change to result from the election. While fewer candidates registered, a
higher proportion are independent candidates, reflecting new political and tribal dynamics. Iraqi officials
and clerics are encouraging voters to participate, but most analysts expect low turnout, reflecting some
boycotts and Iraqis’ lack of confidence that participation wil produce change. Pro-Iran groups may have
lost some support by suppressing protests, but Iraqi analysts expect they wil use resources and
intimidation to maintain their influence.
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Political Coalitions and Possible Outcomes
Prominent parties, coalitions, and trends competing in the election include the following:
Sadrist Bloc. After winning the most seats in the 2018 election, Shia religious figure and
militia leader Muqtada al Sadr announced his Sa’irun (On the March) movement would
boycott the 2021 election, then reversed this position, as expected. Sadrists campaign
against corruption, but Sadrist officials face related al egations.
Fatah (Conquest) Coalition. Led by Badr Organization figure Hadi al Amiri, this
coalition aligns Shia, Iran-friendly opponents of the U.S. military presence in Iraq and
proponents of strengthening the Popular Mobilization Forces (militias official y
incorporated in the security sector). It includes the Sadiqun (The Honest) Bloc of the U.S.
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (League of the
Righteous).
State of Law. Former prime minister Nouri al Maliki’s coalition includes the Shia
Islamist Dawa (Cal ) Party and smal er Shia Arab and Turkoman parties critical of the
U.S.-Iraqi partnership.
Coalition of the National State Forces. Supporters of former prime minister Hayder al
Abadi’s Nasr (Victory) bloc and Shia leader Ammar al Hakim’s Hikma (Wisdom) make
up this coalition of establishment parties seeking pro-reform voters’ support.
Haquq (Rights) Movement. Supporters of U.S.-designated FTO Kata’ib Hezbollah,
which is widely considered a close al y of Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps–Qods Force (IRGC-QF), lead this party.
Taqaddum (Progress) and Al Azm (Resolve). These coalitions represent competing
blocs of Sunni Arab parties respectively led by COR Speaker Mohammed Halbusi
(Taqaddum) and Khamis Khanjar (Azm).
Kurdish Parties. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) remain the dominant parties in the federal y recognized Kurdistan
Region. The PUK has aligned with the Gorran (Change) movement in an electoral
al iance.
Activist Groups. New parties have organized to advance demands of the protest
movement through different agendas. Their relative electoral success could complicate
government formation negotiations. Observers of Iraqi politics expect established parties
to seek to coopt or marginalize successful activist candidates.
The interests of some established parties align around maintaining the status quo, and some analysts
report that negotiations over post-election al iances have already begun. Government formation requires
identifying the largest bloc in the COR to nominate a prime minister, though this bloc may or may not
include the coalition or party that wins the most COR seats. Past negotiations have taken months to
resolve. Iraqi officials hope to announce election results promptly and avoid the delays and fraud
al egations that marred the 2018 election.
Implications for the United States
The Biden Administration has said that it seeks a multifaceted partnership with Iraq, and alongside U.S.
aid programs, 2,500 U.S. military personnel provide advisory and intel igence support to Iraqi operations
against tenacious Islamic State remnants. In July, U.S. and Iraqi leaders decided that “there wil be no
U.S. forces with a combat role in Iraq by December 31, 2021.” Congress is now considering authorization
and appropriations legislation for the advisory mission beyond that date. An election outcome and
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governing coalition that favors Fatah could lead Iraq’s next government to request a fuller or more prompt
U.S. withdrawal. Any broad-based coalition also wil face pressure from Iran-backed groups to ensure the
planned end of Iraq-based U.S. combat missions. Results seen by Iraqis as reinforcing corrupt and
unaccountable governance could drive renewed confrontational protests, which, if met again with deadly
force, could prove destabilizing. U.S. policymakers may continue to debate whether and how to cooperate
with Iraqis to achieve shared short-term objectives while encouraging longer-term reform opposed by
entrenched elites.
Author Information
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Disclaimer
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