Updated September 30, 2021
Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
The U.S. President has sole authority to authorize the use of
and controls the targeting and application of those forces.
U.S. nuclear weapons. This authority is inherent in his
Radars, satellites, and processing systems provide
constitutional role as Commander in Chief. The President
“unambiguous, reliable, accurate, timely, survivable, and
can seek counsel from his military advisors; those advisors
enduring” warning about attacks on the United States, its
are then required to transmit and implement the orders
allies, and its forces overseas.
authorizing nuclear use. But, as General John Hyten, then
the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
If this system identifies an attack or an anomalous event,
(STRATCOM), noted, his job is to give advice, while the
the President would participate in an emergency
authority to order a launch lies with the President.
communications conference with the Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other military
General Milley, the current Commander of the Joint Chiefs
advisors. They would offer the President details and an
of Staff (CJCS), made a similar point in a memo he
assessment of the possible incoming attack, while the
provided to Congress in September 2021. He noted that he
STRATCOM commander would explain the President’s
is a part of the “chain of communication,” in his role as the
options for a retaliatory attack. The President would then
President’s primary military advisor, but he is not in the
evaluate and respond to this information and decide
“chain of command” for authorizing a nuclear launch. He
whether to authorize the use of U.S. nuclear weapons. He
also noted that, if the President ordered a launch, the CJCS
would communicate his choices and provide this
would participate in a “decision conference” to authenticate
authorization through a communications device known as
the presidential orders and to ensure that the President was
the nuclear “football”—a suitcase carried by a military aid
“fully informed” about the implications of the launch.
who is always near the President. The suitcase is equipped
with communication tools and a book with prepared war
The President, however, does not need the concurrence of
plans for certain targets. The President could choose from
either his military advisors or the U.S. Congress to order the
these prepared plans or, time permitting, ask STRATCOM
launch of nuclear weapons. In addition, neither the military
to prepare an alternative.
nor Congress can overrule these orders. As former
STRATCOM Commander General Robert Kehler has
If the President did choose to respond with a nuclear attack,
noted, members of the military are bound by the Uniform
he would identify himself to military officials at the
Code of Military Justice “to follow orders provided they are
Pentagon with codes unique to him. These codes are
legal and have come from competent authority.” But
recorded on an ID card, known as the “biscuit,” that the
questions about the legality of the order—whether it is
President carries at all times. He would then transmit the
consistent with the requirements, under the laws of armed
launch order to the Pentagon and STRATCOM. The
conflict (LOAC), for necessity, proportionality, and
Secretary of Defense would possibly contribute to the
distinction—are more likely to lead to consultations and
process by confirming that the order came from the
changes in the President’s order than to a refusal by the
President, but this role could also be filled by an officer in
military to execute the order.
the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon.
STRATCOM would implement the order by preparing to
The Nuclear Command and Control
launch the weapons needed for the selected option.
System (NCCS)
According to Bruce Blair, an expert on U.S. command and
According to DOD’s Nuclear Matters Handbook, the
control, once the order is “transmitted to the war room, they
elements of the nuclear command and control system
would execute it in a minute or so.” If an immediate
(NCCS) “support the President, through his military
response was selected, “the (land-based) Minuteman
commanders, in exercising presidential authority over U.S.
missiles will fire in two minutes. The submarines will fire
nuclear weapons operations.” The system relies on “a
in 15 minutes.” Blair also noted that there is no way to
collection of activities, processes, and procedures
reverse the order.
performed by appropriate military commanders and support
personnel that, through the chain of command, allow for
Options for Nuclear Use
senior-level decisions on nuclear weapons employment.”
As General Michael Hayden, the former director of the CIA
Specifically, the NCCS provides the President “with the
noted, the system “is designed for speed and decisiveness.
means to authorize the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis
It’s not designed to debate the decision.” Long-range
and to prevent unauthorized or accidental use.”
missiles attacking the United States from Russian territory
could reach U.S. territory in around 30 minutes ; sea-based
The NCCS collects information on threats to the United
systems deployed closer to U.S. shores might arrive in half
States, communicates that information to the President,
that time. If the United States wanted to retaliate before
advises the President on response options, communicates
U.S. weapons, or, more importantly, the U.S. command and
the President’s chosen response to the forces in the field,
control system, were degraded by an attack, then the entire
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Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
process of identifying, assessing, communicating, deciding,
Congress or seek approval from other officials if the United
and launching would have to take place in less than that
States were under attack with nuclear weapons. But, in an
amount of time. Given that some time would be needed for
environment where the threat of a massive nuclear attack
mechanical or administrative steps, analysts estimate that
seems more remote than during the Cold War, they argue
the President would have less than 10 minutes to absorb the
that the President could take the time to consult with
information, review his options, and make his decision.
Congress before launching nuclear weapons in less extreme
circumstances.
The United States planned for such a scenario during the
Cold War, when the Soviet Union deployed thousands of
Some analysts outside the U.S. government have also
nuclear warheads that could reach the United States. U.S.
questioned whether the United States should retain the
doctrine argued that, to deter a Soviet attack, the United
option to launch nuclear weapons promptly because, they
States would need to be able to retaliate even if the Soviet
argue, the time pressures could lead to the accidental or
Union launched a massive attack with little warning. This
inadvertent start of a nuclear war. They note that the United
scenario, and the short time lines, would have provided the
States received false warning of nuclear attack several times
President with the option of launching U.S. weapons before
during the Cold War, and if the President had responded to
most of the attacking warheads detonated on U.S. soil.
that warning within the 30-minute time line of a nuclear
attack, it would have triggered global nuclear war. If the
But, even during the Cold War, an attack or anomalous
President could not launch the weapons in such haste, he
event was not the only possible scenario for the start of a
would necessarily have the time to wait for more accurate
nuclear war, and a massive U.S. response launched in under
or less ambiguous information.
30 minutes was not the only option available to the
President. If the nuclear war escalated out of a conflict in
Others, however, argue that there is nothing inherently
Europe, or if the Soviet Union launched a more measured
destabilizing or dangerous in the prompt launch options.
attack, the President might have more time to assess the
The President already has options to delay a response and
threat and determine his response. Moreover, because U.S.
await additional information. In addition, in the current
bombers could fly away from their bases earlier in a crisis
security environment, a President and his advisors would be
or conflict and U.S. submarine-based missiles might
unlikely to interpret ambiguous warning information as
survive an attack on U.S. territory, the President could
evidence of an all-out attack from Russia or another nation.
decide to delay the U.S. response. Nevertheless, some
Instead, they note that the presence of both prompt and
analysts have speculated that a launch under attack was the
delayed options bolsters deterrence by providing the
dominant option during the Cold War, and that the
President with the flexibility to choose the appropriate
command and control system was designed to permit such a
response to an attack on the United States or its allies.
prompt launch of U.S. nuclear weapons.
Legislation
The United States has reviewed and revised its nuclear
employment plans several times since the end of the Cold
H.R. 921, No First Use Act
War. According to unclassified reports, these reviews have
H.R. 669, Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of
added options to the plans available to the Pres ident. While
2017
some options probably still provide responses to an attack
from a nation, like Russia, with a large nuclear force, others
might provide for more measured and discriminate attacks.
In addition, even though the plans likely include options for
CRS Products
a prompt response in the face of an unexpected attack, they
CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background,
also likely have options for delayed responses. As a result,
Developments, and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf
although the prompt launch options may have dominated
U.S. planning during the Cold War, they may no longer
dominate U.S. nuclear war plans.
Other Resources
Another scenario could see the United States choose to use
nuclear weapons prior to a nuclear attack against the United
DOD. Nuclear Matters Handbook. April 2016.
States or its allies, on a time line that did not reflect an
Steve Liewer, “A Nuclear Decision: As global tension builds,
imminent nuclear attack against the United States. The
voters must choose which candidate they trust with the
United States has never declared a “no first use” policy, and
codes," Omaha World Herald, November 1, 2016.
the President could order the first use of nuclear weapons.
Jeffrey Lewis, “U.S. presidents are currently given a four-
As noted above, his military advisors may seek to adjust his
minute window to decide whether or not to initiate an
orders to meet the laws of armed conflict, but there is,
irreversible apocalypse,” Foreign Policy, August 5, 2016.
otherwise, no legal barrier to first use.
Peter Huessy, “The Prompt Launch Scare,” Real Clear Defense,
In recent years, some Members of Congress and analysts
November 9, 2016.
outside government have questioned whether the
Commander-in-Chief should have the sole authority to
launch a nuclear attack in all circumstances. They agree that
Amy F. Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
the President would not have the time to consult with
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Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
IF10521
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