September 20, 2021
Syria and U.S. Policy
Since 2011, conflict between the government of Syrian
Figure 1. Syria
President Bashar al Asad and opposition forces seeking his
removal has displaced roughly half of the country’s
population and killed nearly 600,000 people. Although
conflict has abated in many areas following military
intervention on Asad’s behalf from Russia, Iran, and
Hezbollah, fighting is ongoing in Idlib province, and
pockets of armed resistance to the Asad government have
re-emerged in Syria’s southwest. U.S. officials in 2021
assessed that humanitarian needs in Syria have increased by
more than 20% over the last year amid international
sanctions, the effects of the Coronavirus Disease-2019
(COVID-19) pandemic, and Syrian government restrictions
on humanitarian access.
U.S. military forces operate in Syria, where U.S. and
coalition air operations against the Islamic State (IS) group
began in 2014, and partner support operations have
continued with specific authorization from Congress since
2015. U.S. operations face challenges from external actors

including Iranian-backed militia groups, the Russian
Source: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
military, and Turkish-backed militia groups that control a
buffer zone in northeastern Syria. IS fighters lost the last
Political Developments
territory under their control in 2019, but remnants of the
U.N. Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pederson has continued
group remain active. Thousands of IS prisoners remain in
to call for a nationwide ceasefire in line with U.N. Security
the custody of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254 (2015) that would
Kurdish-led force supported by the United States and
allow political negotiations—ongoing since 2012—to
coalition partners. The United States seeks a negotiated
advance. In May 2021, President Asad won a fourth seven-
political settlement to the Syria conflict and the enduring
year term; voting occurred only in regime-held areas. U.S.
defeat of the Islamic State.
officials described the election as “an insult to democracy,”
noting that UNSCR 2254 calls for Syrian elections to occur
Developments in 2021
under U.N. supervision pursuant to a new constitution.
For a conflict chronology, see CRS In Focus IF11080, Syria
Economic and Public Health Conditions
Conflict Overview: 2011-2021, by Carla E. Humud.
Syria is facing a severe drought—viewed as one of the
triggers of conflict in 2011—which has reduced harvests
Military Developments
and increased poverty. Nine out of ten Syrians live in
Northwest. Northern areas of Idlib province (see Figure 1)
poverty, according to U.N. reports. In 2021, demand has
are the only remaining area of Syria still under the control
surged for spots at overcrowded Internally Displaced
of armed opposition groups actively seeking the removal of
Person (IDP) camps in Kurdish-held areas that provide
Syrian President Asad, including some affiliated with Al
residents with food assistance. Acting U.S. Special Envoy
Qaeda. According to U.N. reporting, aerial bombardments
for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS John Godfrey has
and shelling in Idlib increased in mid-2021, in violation of a
stated that the Islamic State is “actively seeking to exploit
March 2020 ceasefire agreement negotiated by Russia and
that economic situation to reconstitute ... in areas hardest hit
Turkey between the Syrian government and opposition
by the economic downturn.” The U.N. estimates a high
groups operating in Idlib. The U.N. reported that June 2021
degree of COVID-19 transmission in Syria, “far exceeding
saw the largest displacement in the area since the ceasefire.
the officially announced infection rates.” Fifty-eight percent
of Syrian hospitals are fully functional.
Southwest. In 2021, clashes escalated between regime and
The Islamic State
opposition forces in the southern province of Dar’a, where
U.S. military officials assess that the Islamic State remains
the Syrian uprising originated in 2011. Shelling and ground
entrenched as a cohesive, low-level insurgency in rural
clashes displaced thousands of civilians; U.N. officials in
areas of Syria. The group operates in ungoverned areas of
August condemned what they described as a “near siege-
the Syrian desert, from which it continues to launch attacks
like situation.” In September 2021, a Russian-brokered
against Syrian military outposts, oil convoys, and military
ceasefire came into effect.
personnel in transit. In June 2021, U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) assessed that, “ISIS likely has sufficient
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Syria and U.S. Policy
manpower and resources to operate indefinitely at its
program authorized by Congress in 2014. The program
present level in the Syrian desert.”
addresses one of OIR’s primary lines of effort, which seeks
Islamic State Detainees. As of 2021, the SDF continues to
to help make partner forces in Syria capable of defeating
hold about 10,000 IS fighters in detention facilities across
the Islamic State. U.S. military officials in 2021 reported
that the SDF has the ability to “win against ISIS,” but that it
northern Syria. In addition, roughly 59,000 people
(including 31,000 children under the age of 12) remained at
remains dependent on coalition capabilities including U.S.
the SDF-run Al Hol IDP camp. U.N. reports assess that
funding and equipment. The Biden Administration has
security conditions at Al Hol continue to deteriorate, with
stated it does not plan to withdraw U.S. forces or support.
over 63 murders at the camp in the first half of 2021. The
Sanctions
Islamic State continues to recruit at IDP camps, where it
has a strong presence, according to CENTCOM.
The United States maintains a range of sanctions on Syria
U.S. Policy
relating to its support for terrorism, interference in
Lebanon, use of chemical weapons, and human rights
In a continuation of goals pursued by both the Obama and
violations. Although U.S. sanctions contain exceptions for
Trump Administrations in Syria, the Biden Administration
humanitarian assistance, U.N. officials report that more
seeks the enduring defeat of the Islamic State and advocates
than half of international Damascus-based NGOs have
a political settlement to the civil war. The Administration
reported “serious banking issues” in 2021.
also has worked to counter “the destabilizing activities of
Iran and its supporters and proxies that threaten U.S. forces
Humanitarian Assistance
in Syria.” The Biden Administration has stated that the
The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian
United States will not provide reconstruction funding to
assistance in response to the Syria crisis, allocating more
regime-held areas of Syria until it “ceases to be a state
than $13.4 billion since FY2012 (mostly via implementing
sponsor of terrorism; does not threaten its neighbors;
partners such as U.N. entities and NGOs) to meet
verifiably dismantles and surrenders its weapons of mass
humanitarian needs in Syria and the region. That assistance
destruction; creates conditions for the safe, voluntary, and
has funded humanitarian efforts inside Syria, as well as
dignified return of refugees and internally displaced
activities in neighboring states that host Syrian refugees.
persons; and holds accountable those who have committed
war crimes or crimes against humanity.”
Cross-Border Assistance. The Asad regime has obstructed
the delivery of assistance to opposition-held areas. The
U.S. Military Presence: Operation Inherent Resolve
U.N. Security Council (UNSC) in 2014 authorized U.N.
U.S. forces have operated inside Syria since 2015 pursuant
agencies to deliver humanitarian assistance cross-border via
to the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military
four international crossing points, two from Iraq, and one
Force (AUMF), despite ongoing debate about the
each from Turkey and Jordan, with notification to Syrian
applicability of these authorizations to current operations in
authorities. In 2020, the UNSC authorization was reduced
Syria. Following a Turkish military incursion into Syria in
to a single crossing point from Turkey (Bab al Hawa) due
October 2019 targeting the SDF (Operation Peace Spring),
to pressure from Russia and China, who argued that cross-
the United States withdrew its military forces from border
border aid violated Syrian sovereignty and that, in light of
areas in north-central Syria and relocated them in what
improved security conditions in much of the country, aid
military officials have termed the Eastern Syria Security
should be distributed in coordination with Syrian authorities
Area (ESSA). As of 2021, the United States maintains
from government-held to rebel-held areas (termed “cross-
roughly 900 troops in Syria, with the majority deployed in
line” assistance). Humanitarian actors state that cross-line
the ESSA in support of SDF counter-IS operations.
assistance cannot replace the scale of U.N. cross-border
Roughly 100 U.S. personnel are based at the At Tanf
assistance, and have noted the regime’s obstruction of aid.
garrison in southeast Syria, where they support a local
partner force.
Stabilization Assistance
The United States has provided more than $1.3 billion in
Challenges Posed by Iran-Backed Militias in Syria. The
stabilization assistance for Syria since 2011. The State
Biden Administration on two occasions has carried out
Department describes such assistance as “a critical element
airstrikes against Iran-backed militias in eastern Syria,
in the OIR mission because it mitigates the economic and
which have used Syria-based facilities to target U.S. forces
social cleavages previously exploited by ISIS, closes gaps
in Iraq. In June 2021, a U.S. airstrike on Iran-backed
in local authority capacity, and supports civil society to
militias triggered a militia counterattack against coalition
advocate for citizen needs.” The Department also has
forces in Syria; no U.S. personnel were injured. Iran-backed
described stabilization assistance as a counterweight to the
forces previously had targeted U.S. forces at At Tanf in
influence of Iran, Russia, and the Syrian government.
2017. Other air strikes not attributed to the United States
Stabilization aid funds projects in non-regime held areas,
continue to target Iran-backed militias: press reports often
particularly those liberated from Islamic State control.
attribute these strikes to Israel; Israel generally does not
acknowledge involvement in specific cases.
Carla E. Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
U.S. Policy Tools
IF11930
Syria Train and Equip Program
The United States continues to train, advise, and enable
partner forces in Syria as part of the Syria Train and Equip
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Syria and U.S. Policy


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