Updated September 20, 2021
Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, FY2008-FY2021
Congress remains concerned about the effects of organized-
1. Combating transnational criminal
crime-related violence in Mexico on U.S. security interests
organizations through intelligence sharing and
and U.S. citizens’ safety in Mexico. Homicides in Mexico
law enforcement operations;
reached record levels from 2016 to 2019, followed by a
2. Institutionalizing the rule of law while
slight decline during the Coronavirus Disease 2019
protecting human rights through justice sector
(COVID-19) pandemic. Femicides, or killings of women,
reform, forensic equipment and training, and
have increased at a faster rate than other homicides. With
police and corrections reform;
the bipartisan support of Congress, the Mérida Initiative has
3. Creating a 21st-century U.S.-Mexican border
comprised the majority of U.S. foreign aid to Mexico since
while improving immigration enforcement in
FY2008.
Mexico; and
This product provides an overview of the roughly $3.3
4. Building strong and resilient communities by
billion appropriated to date for the Mérida Initiative;
piloting approaches to address root causes of
Mexico’s security strategy; and bilateral security efforts,
violence, reduce drug demand, and build a “culture
including the Biden Administration’s priorities.
of lawfulness” through education programs.
Origins of the Mérida Initiative
Some analysts praised the wide-ranging cooperation
between the governments. Others criticized the increasing
Prior to FY2008, Mexico did not receive large amounts of
number of priorities the two nations adopted. Experts
U.S. security assistance, partially due to Mexican sensitivity
about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal affairs.
warned it would be difficult in only eight years for Mexico
In
to implement an accusatorial justice system requiring better
March 2007, then-Mexican President Felipe Calderón asked
evidence collection by police and public trials with oral
for more U.S. cooperation to fight criminal organizations
arguments. Mexico’s Congress established the eight-year
and their cross-border trafficking operations. In response,
transition to a new justice system in 2008 constitutional
the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. antidrug and rule of
reforms.
law assistance to Mexico (and Central America), began.
Trump Administration (FY2018-FY2021)
As part of the Mérida Initiative’s emphasis on shared
President Trump’s executive orders on combatting
responsibility, the Mexican government pledged to tackle
transnational criminal organizations (E.O. 13773) and
corruption. The U.S. government pledged to address drug
enhancing border security (E.O. 13767) refocused the
demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk
Mérida Initiative. U.S. priorities included reducing
currency to Mexico. Both governments have struggled to
synthetic drug production, improving border interdiction
fulfill those commitments. Impunity for public corruption
and port security, and combating money laundering. In
continues in Mexico, and record U.S. drug overdoses in
2019, President Trump praised Mexico’s stepped-up efforts
2020 reveal challenges in addressing U.S. drug demand.
against illegal migration but criticized Mexico’s antidrug
Initial Phase: FY2008-FY2010
performance in his FY2021 “drug majors” determination.
Congress appropriated some $1.5 billion, including $420.7
Beginning in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic hindered
million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which
bilateral cooperation. In October 2020, the United States
enabled the purchase of equipment, including aircraft and
arrested former Defense Minister Salvador Cienfuegos on
helicopters, to support Mexico’s federal security forces
drug charges; the move angered the Mexican government
(military and police). Congress withheld 15% of certain
and further limited security cooperation. After the United
U.S. aid for the Mexican military and police until the State
States dropped the case and allowed Cienfuegos to return to
Department submitted an annual report stating that Mexico
Mexico, President López Obrador exonerated him and
was taking steps to meet human rights requirements. U.S.
dismissed the U.S. evidence as fabrications. Mexico’s
assistance focused on (1) counternarcotics, border security,
Congress enacted a law requiring foreign law enforcement
and counterterrorism; (2) public security; and (3) institution
officials to share any information they gather with
building. U.S. assistance and intelligence supported
designated Mexican federal authorities and Mexican state
Mexico’s strategy of arresting (and extraditing) kingpins
and local officials to report contacts with foreign officials.
from each of the major drug trafficking organizations. This
“kingpin” strategy also fueled violence, as fractured drug
López Obrador Administration
trafficking organizations fought to regroup and reorganize.
Inaugurated in December 2018, President López Obrador
The Four-Pillars: FY2011-FY2017
enjoys high approval ratings even though his government
has struggled to address homicides and violent crime.
In 2011, the U.S. and Mexican governments broadened the
Mexico’s security strategy, released in February 2019,
scope of bilateral efforts under four pillars:
includes a focus on addressing the socioeconomic drivers of
violent crime. Thus far, López Obrador has implemented
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Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, FY2008-FY2021
broad social programs rather than the type of targeted crime
Biden Administration
prevention efforts that USAID has endorsed.
The Biden Administration inherited a tense security
relationship with Mexico at the federal level, but one in
President López Obrador campaigned against Mexico’s
which state and local cooperation had continued. President
military-led “war” on transnational criminal organizations
Biden and President López Obrador have committed to
but backed constitutional reforms to allow military
collaborate on migration issues and on COVID-19 response
involvement in public security for five more years. Those
and economic recovery. Those issues, as well as economic
reforms came despite a 2018 Mexico Supreme Court ruling
concerns, have publicly predominated over security issues
that prolonged military involvement in public security
in bilateral relations . Nevertheless, high-level talks held in
violated the Mexican Constitution. López Obrador initially
August 2021 suggest security cooperation, which remains
resisted the so-called kingpin strategy employed by his two
strained, is also a top U.S. concern. A cabinet-level security
predecessors, but high-level arrests and extraditions
dialogue is scheduled for November 2021.
increased in 2020 until Cienfuegos’s arrest.
Instead of bolstering the federal police, which received U.S.
A September 2021 State Department fact sheet identifies
equipment and training, President López Obrador secured
achievements of the Mérida Initiative under the four-pillar
congressional approval of a new National Guard composed
strategy, signaling a possible return to that Obama-era
of mostly military officers. He has deployed the National
framework. Biden officials may also be amenable to some
Guard to secure oil pipelines , reassert territorial control in
of Mexico’s top priorities, such as addressing U.S. arms
high-crime areas, and secure Mexico’s borders. There are
trafficking to Mexico. A February 2021 GAO report
concerns about the National Guard violating human rights
suggests several measures that U.S. agencies could adopt to
and operating as a branch of the military. López Obrador
improve efforts in that area.
has asked the Mexican Congress to enact a constitutional
reform to make the National Guard a part of the defense
The Biden Administration requested $116.5 million in
ministry. Human rights and policing experts oppose this
foreign assistance for Mexico for FY2022, nearly 27%
move, asserting that military forces are ill-suited to perform
lower than the estimated FY2021 appropriation of $158.9
civilian policing. Critics have faulted the administration for
million. The Administration’s FY2022 request for
not investing in state and local police forces, which
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
investigate most crimes.
(INCLE) funds for Mexico, which usually support antidrug
efforts with federal agencies, is $44 million less than the
Civil society and the private sector have criticized President
FY2021 estimated appropriation. In contrast, funds
López Obrador for abandoning his pledges to combat
requested for USAID, which works at the state and local
corruption and impunity. Mexico’s Congress approved the
levels, remained level.
creation of an independent prosecutor general’s office; the
individual selected for that post is the president’s close ally.
Congressional Action
Although federal prosecutors have slowly pursued
Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s
corruption cases against the former head of Petróleos
FY2022 foreign assistance request for Mexico. The House-
Mexicanos (extradited from Spain) and the former social
passed version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations
development minister, they appear to have ignored most
bill (H.R. 4373, H.Rept. 117-84) would provide $158.9
allegations involving López Obrador’s allies. The
million for Mexico, the same amount appropriated in
government has not moved to implement the national anti-
FY2021. The bill would prohibit funding to support
corruption system established through constitutional
Mexican military participation in public security efforts. It
reforms in 2017.
would require a comprehensive review of funds provided
Assessing the Mérida Initiative
through the Mérida Initiative and a report on any funds
appropriated to Mexican agencies involved in migration
Many analysts have observed the need for more reporting
management within 90 days of the bill’s enactment. It
on Mérida Initiative outcomes to help Congress oversee the
would also require reports on plans to improve data
funds it has appropriated. The State Department asserts that
collection on synthetic drug trafficking, the adequacy of
the Mérida Initiative has led to (1) intelligence-sharing and
Mexico’s efforts to combat human rights abuses such as
police cooperation that has enabled the capture and
torture and enforced disappearances, crimes committed
extradition of high-profile criminals; (2) the creation of
along Mexico’s northern highways, efforts to combat
national training standards for Mexican police, prosecutors,
fentanyl flows, and the efficacy of U.S. drug control tools
and judges; and (3) the international accreditation of
(e.g., sanctions).
Mexican prisons, labs, and police training institutes.
See CRS Report R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and
Despite those results, escalating violence in Mexico and
Drug Traffick ing Organizations; CRS Insight IN11535,
drug overdose deaths in the United States have led many to
Mexican Drug Trafficking and Cartel Operations amid
question the Mérida Initiative’s overall efficacy. For years,
COVID-19; CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has urged
Control Efforts; and CRS In Focus IF10400, Trends in
U.S. agencies working in Mexico to adopt outcome rather
Mexican Opioid Trafficking and Implications for U.S.-
than just output measures. A May 2020 GAO report
Mexico Security Cooperation.
asserted that USAID followed “key monitoring practices
and tracked performance data” for its programs, but the
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
State Department did not.
Affairs
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Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, FY2008-FY2021

IF10578


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