Updated August 26, 2021
Russia: The Navalny Poisoning, Chemical Weapons Use, and
U.S. Sanctions
On March 2, 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken
during his hospitalization abroad. Navalny was sentenced to
determined that in August 2020 the Russian government
serve 32 months of his suspended sentence and transferred
used a chemical weapon in an attack on opposition figure
to a penal colony. In June 2021, authorities ordered the
and anticorruption activist Alexei Navalny in violation of
closure of Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation, calling it
international law and against one of its own nationals. This
an “extremist” organization.
finding triggered requirements under the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act
On March 2, 2021, the Biden Administration determined
of 1991 (CBW Act; title III, P.L. 102-182; 22 U.S.C. 5601
that Russian government agents were responsible for the
et seq.).
attack on Navalny. The Department of State called the
attack an “attempted assassination,” and the White House
The CBW Act requires the President to impose economic
stated that the intelligence community assessed with “high
and diplomatic measures that could cut off foreign aid, arms
confidence” that officers of Russia’s Federal Security
sales, and export licenses for controlled goods, services,
Service (FSB) were responsible for the Novichok attack.
and technology, and ratchet up in intensity if certain
Russian authorities deny involvement in the attack or
conditions are not met within 90 days.
possession of chemical weapons.
The March 2021 determination is the second time the
The CBW Control and Warfare
United States has determined that Russia has used a
Elimination Act
chemical weapon and imposed sanctions under the CBW
Act. The Trump Administration leveled two rounds of
First Round of Sanctions
CBW Act sanctions in August 2018 and August 2019 in
The finding that Russia had used a chemical weapon
response to a March 2018 attack against British citizen
triggered requirements for policy actions specified in the
Sergei Skripal and his daughter in the United Kingdom
CBW Act. When such a finding is made, the CBW Act first
using an advanced nerve agent known as a Novichok. The
requires the President (delegating authority to the Secretary
United States also imposes sanctions against Russia for
of State) to, forthwith,
other reasons. For more, see CRS In Focus IF10962,
terminate foreign assistance other than that which
Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions; CRS In
addresses urgent humanitarian situations or provides
Focus IF10779, U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview;
food, agricultural commodities, or agricultural products;
and CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia.
terminate arms sales;
The Poisoning of Alexei Navalny
terminate export licenses for U.S. Munitions List
In 2020, Russian authorities appeared to intensify a
(USML) items;
campaign to silence Navalny, a prominent opposition figure
terminate foreign military financing;
and one-time Moscow mayoral candidate. Navalny had
been barred from competing in elections since 2013, after
deny credit, credit guarantees, or other financial
receiving a suspended sentence on what observers widely
assistance from the U.S. government, including Export-
considered to be trumped up charges of embezzlement.
Import Bank programs; and
Nevertheless, Navalny and his Anti-Corruption Foundation
deny export licenses for goods or technology controlled
remained active in exposing government corruption and
for national security reasons (Commodity Control List).
organizing antigovernment actions.
[CBW Act, §307(a); 22 U.S.C. 5605(a)]
The CBW Act authorizes the President to waive sanctions if
In August 2020, Navalny fell ill on a flight to Moscow.
he finds it essential to U.S. national security interests or if
After public outcry, authorities allowed him to be evacuated
he finds that the violating government has undergone
to Germany for medical care. German officials later cited
“
fundamental changes in leadership or policies.
unequivocal” evidence Navalny had been poisoned with a
Novichok nerve agent, a chemical weapon developed by the
On March 2, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced the
Soviet Union and presumably accessible only to Russian
imposition of a first round of sanctions, effective on March
state authorities. Other official international investigations
18, but invoked national security waiver authority (as did
reached similar conclusions.
the Trump Administration after the 2018 Skripal attack) to
allow for the continuation of
In early 2021, on his return to Russia from Germany,
foreign assistance;
Navalny was arrested, ostensibly for having missed parole
check-ins related to his suspended sentence, including
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Russia: The Navalny Poisoning, Chemical Weapons Use, and U.S. Sanctions
exports related to space cooperation and, until
downgrade or suspend diplomatic relations; and
September 1, 2021, commercial space launches; and
set in motion the suspension of foreign air carriers
export licensing for national security-sensitive goods
owned or controlled by Russia “to engage in foreign air
and technology in specific categories, including exports
transportation to or from the United States.”
related to civil aviation safety, deemed exports or
[§307(b)(2); 22 U.S.C. 5605(b)(2)]
reexports, and wholly owned U.S. and other foreign
subsidiaries operating in Russia.
On August 20, 2021, the State Department announced that
the Departments of State, Commerce, Justice, and the
In addition, Secretary Blinken invoked authorities granted
Treasury would take several steps in a second round.
his office related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
Effective September 7, 2021, the importation of certain
proliferation to impose sanctions on the FSB, GRU
Russian firearms are prohibited and applications for the
(Russia’s military intelligence agency), two GRU officers,
importation of firearms and ammunition manufactured or
and three research institutes for use of a chemical weapon
located in Russia will be subject to denial. In addition, the
in either the 2020 attack or the 2018 attack against Skripal
Department of Commerce is expected to tighten export
(the FSB, GRU, and the GRU officers were already subject
restrictions on nuclear and missile-related goods and
to similar sanctions). Secretary Blinken also added Russia
technology destined for Russia.
to the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations
(ITAR). The ITAR decision could indicate that restrictions
CBW-related sanctions remain in place for at least a year
on export licensing could remain in place beyond the 12
and may be removed only after the President determines
months required by the CBW Act.
and certifies to Congress that the three conditions stated
above have been met and that Russia is making restitution
Simultaneously, the Department of the Treasury invoked
to those affected by the use of the chemical weapon.
authorities related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and
WMD proliferation to impose sanctions on seven Russian
In addition to a second round of CBW Act sanctions, the
government officials, including the FSB director and
Department of the Treasury and State Department imposed
Russia’s prosecutor general, for Navalny’s poisoning and
sanctions on nine Russian individuals (mostly FSB officers)
subsequent imprisonment.
and four Russian entities (two already subject to sanctions)
involved in Navalny’s poisoning or Russia’s chemical
These sanctions were imposed in coordination with the
weapons program.
European Union (EU), which imposed an earlier round of
sanctions in October 2020.
In response to the Skripal attack, the Trump
Administration’s second round of sanctions (which remain
Second Round of Sanctions
in place) included opposing IFI loans or assistance to
Within three months after the initial determination (in this
Russia; prohibiting U.S. banks from “lending non-ruble
case, by early June 2021), the CBW Act required the
denominated funds to the Russian sovereign” and
President to impose at least three additional restrictions
participating “in the primary market for non-ruble
unless he determines and certifies to Congress that Russia
denominated bonds issued by the Russian sovereign”; and a
“presumption of denial” policy for export licenses for goods
“is no longer using chemical or biological weapons in
controlled for their dual-use chemical and biological
violation of international law or using lethal chemical or
biological weapons against its own nationals,”
applications.
“has provided reliable assurances that it will not in the
Under separate authorities, the Biden Administration has
future engage in any such activities,” and
expanded the prohibition against U.S. financial institutions’
“is willing to allow on-site inspections by United
participating in the primary market for Russian sovereign
Nations observers or other internationally recognized,
bonds or lending to the Russian government to include
impartial observers, or other reliable means exist, to
ruble-denominated funds.
ensure that that government is not using chemical or
biological weapons in violation of international law and
Other CBW Determinations
is not using lethal chemical or biological weapons
The CBW Act has been invoked on two other occasions. In
against its own nationals….” [CBW Act, §307(b)(1); 22
2013, the State Department determined that the government
U.S.C. 5605(b)(1)]
of Syria had used chemical weapons but for national
security reasons sanctions decisions would be applied on a
The CBW Act’s menu of possible second-round sanctions
case-by-case basis. In 2018, the Secretary of State
includes the authority to:
determined that the government of North Korea was
oppose loans or financial or technical assistance to
responsible for a lethal 2017 nerve agent attack on the half-
Russia by international financial institutions (IFIs);
brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, in Malaysia.
Sanctions imposed were largely redundant with restrictions
prohibit U.S. banks from making loans or providing
already in place.
credit to the Russian government, except for the
purchase of food, or other agricultural products;
Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy
prohibit exports to Russia of other goods and
Legislation
technology, except food and other agricultural products;
Cory Welt, Specialist in Russian and European Affairs
restrict importation into the United States of articles that
are of Russia-origin growth, product, or manufacture;
IF11872
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Russia: The Navalny Poisoning, Chemical Weapons Use, and U.S. Sanctions
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permissio n of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11872 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED