INSIGHTi

Afghanistan Evacuation: The Civil Reserve
Air Fleet (CRAF) and the Defense Production
Act (DPA)
August 25, 2021
Created in 1951, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) operates under the Defense Production Act’s (DPA)
Title I allocations authority and is available to respond to national defense needs or other contingencies.
CRAF is a cooperative emergency airlift program involving U.S. civil air carriers, DOD, and the
Department of Transportation (DOT). On August 22, 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III ordered
the Department of Defense’s (DOD) United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to
activate the CRAF.
For more information on the Afghanistan withdrawal, see CRS Insight IN11730, Afghan Aerial
Evacuation in Context, CRS Report R46879, U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in
Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions, and CRS Insight IN11726, The Afghanistan Withdrawal:
Military and Defense Implications; on the DPA, see CRS Report R43767, The Defense Production Act of
1950: History, Authorities, and Considerations for Congress.
Background on the CRAF
After the 1948-1949 Berlin Airlift, wherein U.S. and U.K. forces, plus civilian air carriers, resupplied
Allied-held West Berlin during a Soviet land blockade, President Harry Truman used DPA authorities to
create a federal emergency airlift capability. In December 1951, DOD and the Commerce Department
established the CRAF by joint agreement; DOT took over primary management of the program in 1967.
CRAF provides additional emergency airlift capability to DOD, and the federal government as a whole,
during contingencies where DOD cannot meet airlift requirements. The CRAF is authorized under the
allocations authority in Title I of the DPA, which relates to the presidential authority to control the
distribution of goods, services, and materials in promotion of the national defense when the Title I
prioritization authority is insufficient to the needs of the emergency. Under CRAF, participating U.S. civil
air carriers (i.e., commercial air passenger and cargo companies) enter into a contractual relationship with
TRANSCOM and receive certain preferences in providing commercial cargo and passenger services for
DOD.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11731
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

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CRAF Composition
DOT manages civil carriers’ participation in the CRAF, while USTRANSCOM, for DOD, manages the
activation of the fleet. According to Air Mobility Command, the U.S. Air Force component of
TRANSCOM, participating CRAF aircraft are assigned into one of two main “segments”: national and
international. The national segment consists of aircraft capable of meeting domestic airlift requirements.
The international segment is sub-divided into long-range and short-range sections. Long-range passenger
and cargo aircraft supplement long-range, inter-theater military aircraft (mainly C-5 and C-17 aircraft),
while medium-sized passenger and cargo aircraft comprise the short-range international section.
To participate in international segments, according to Air Mobility Command, participating U.S.-
registered carriers must be able to commit 40% of their CRAF-capable fleet and maintain four complete
crews for each participating aircraft. As of August 2021, a total of 24 carriers and 450 aircraft are reported
to be enrolled in CRAF.
Prior to August 2021, the CRAF has been activated for emergency use twice: to support Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm from August 1990 to May 1991; and to support Operation Iraqi Freedom
from February 2002 to June 2003. The Afghanistan evacuation is the third CRAF activation.
CRAF in the Afghanistan Evacuation
Although DOT manages the overall program, the USTRANSCOM commander is the activation authority
for the CRAF. The CRAF has three graduated stages of emergency activation that incrementally make
more airlift capacity available. Stage I is for “minor regional crises and humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief efforts.” Stage II is for “major theater war,” and Stage III for “periods of national mobilization.” As
the Afghanistan evacuation is a humanitarian assistance effort, the Defense Secretary has directed a Stage
I CRAF activation.
According to DOD, the current CRAF activation involves aircraft from multiple domestic carriers,
including three each from American Airlines, Atlas Air, Delta Air Lines, and Omni Air; two from
Hawaiian Airlines; and four from United Airlines. DOD noted it “does not anticipate a major impact to
commercial flights from this activation.” DOD also stated that CRAF-activated aircraft will not fly into
Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan. Instead, they will reportedly be used for “the
onward movement of passengers from temporary safe havens and interim staging bases,” which will
allow military aircraft to focus on flights to and from Kabul.
Policy Issues
As is the case with most DPA authorities and their derived programs, the CRAF operates at the
President’s discretion—or at the discretion of the President’s delegate. As such, beyond its inherent
oversight powers, Congress has a limited role in shaping implementation of CRAF and other DPA-
authorized programs in response to the Afghanistan evacuation. However, with regard to the DPA and the
Afghanistan evacuation, there are policy considerations Congress may explore, including:
 CRAF employment processes, including potential activation, and other alternatives.
During past contingencies, the federal government has chosen to obtain emergency airlift
capabilities through other means. For example, early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) created Project Airbridge, which used
privately contracted aircraft to transport overseas supplies of personal protective
equipment in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

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 Resettling Afghan evacuees under other DPA authorities. FEMA and the Department of
Homeland Security have made use of Title I authorities in response to the COVID-19
pandemic and past natural disasters, including for development of post-disaster
infrastructure. Similarly, outside of the CRAF, the President could use the DPA to
establish domestic temporary staging areas and shelters for evacuees and procure
contractual services for the facilities’ staffing and maintenance.
 Assigning interagency DPA coordination. The CRAF’s recent emergency activation,
along with the DPA’s employment in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, suggest the
executive branch’s broader and more frequent use of DPA authorities. However, despite
FEMA’s nominal coordination role via Executive Order 13603, there is no central,
interagency organization to plan and direct the implementation of DPA authorities across
the federal government. The DPA Committee was authorized for this purpose in 2009, but
does not currently appear to fulfill this function.


Author Information

Michael H. Cecire
Heidi M. Peters
Analyst in Intergovernmental Relations and Economic
Analyst in U.S. Defense Acquisition Policy
Development Policy





Disclaimer
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IN11731 · VERSION 1 · NEW

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