INSIGHTi
The Collapse of the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces: Implications for U.S.
Security Assistance and Cooperation
August 23, 2021
The swift collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), which had received
tens of bil ions of dollars in U.S. training and equipment over two decades, has prompted questions about
U.S. security assistance in Afghanistan and beyond.
Background on U.S. Support to the ANDSF
From FY2002 through June 20, 2021, the United States appropriated or otherwise made available
approximately $144.98 bil ion toward the reconstruction of Afghanistan. From that total, $88.61 bil ion
was for security-specific activities, primarily through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF),
which received $82.90 bil ion of the security funding. Another $5.71 bil ion was appropriated through
other sources, including Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training,
Peacekeeping Operations, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, and Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug
Activities.
In 2005, Congress established the ASFF (P.L. 108-375, §1202) to build, train, equip, and sustain the
ANDSF, which consisted of the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), the
Afghan Air Force (AAF), and the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). The ASFF also funded
ANDSF salaries, fuel, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.
Within the Defense Department (DOD), the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
(CSTC-A) was tasked with managing the ASFF and acquiring equipment for the ANDSF. Some of the
U.S.-provided equipment to the ANDSF between FY2003-2016 included approximately
 600,000 weapons, such as rifles;
 163,000 tactical and non-tactical radios;
 76,000 vehicles, such as Humvees;
 30,000 items of equipment for detecting and disposing of explosives;
 16,000 items of equipment for intel igence, surveil ance, and reconnaissance; and
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 208 aircraft, such as helicopters.
In 2021, DOD began transitioning the CSTC-A’s counterterrorism, security assistance, and end-use
monitoring mission to an “over-the-horizon” model through the newly created Defense Security
Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan (DSCMO-A) based in Qatar.
Figure 1. Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) Disbursements, FY2005-FY2021, Quarter 3

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress, July 30, 2021.
Notes: ANA = Afghan National Army; ANP = Afghan National Police; AAF = Afghan Air Force; and ASSF = Afghan
Special Security Forces.
What Led to the Swift Collapse of the ANDSF?
The Biden Administration has attributed the collapse to the ANDSF’s refusal to fight and a lack of “wil
and leadership.” U.S. government oversight reporting in 2020 and 2021 highlighted the increasing
pressure on the ANDSF from Taliban attacks, declining ANDSF readiness and performance, and warnings
about the potential failure of the force following the withdrawal of U.S. forces and enablers. Other
observers have pointed to more deeply rooted missteps and strategic misassumptions over two decades.
Some observers point to systemic issues within the ANDSF, such as a corrupt chain of command,
significant rates of desertion and attrition, a lack of leadership, and widespread il iteracy. The corrosive
effect of persistent human rights abuses and failures to protect civilians by the United States, U.S. al ies,
and the Afghan government have also been attributed to undermining U.S. efforts to build the ANDSF.
Other observers contend that U.S. programs exacerbated these issues by using DOD’s centralized
command structures and complex bureaucracy. According to the U.S. Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), poor U.S. understanding of social, cultural, and political contexts
in Afghanistan contributed to major failures at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
Other observers have found that the U.S. train and equip mission overemphasized tactical skil s and
neglected higher-level expertise, forced the ANDSF to be heavily reliant on airpower and technology that
Afghans could not maintain independently, and excluded Afghan involvement or input in equipping
decisions.
The withdrawal of U.S.-funded contractors in 2021 left aircraft overtaxed and the AAF overtasked.
Taliban operations isolated ANDSF units, and chronic Afghan government failures to provide food or
logistical, hardware, and manpower support to many units meant that Afghan soldiers quickly became
unable to fight. At the same time, the ANDSF was suffering an accumulation of losses to the Taliban,

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including from insider attacks. Some reports found that many ANDSF soldiers negotiated surrenders with
the Taliban or simply kept their weapons and joined them.
What Is the Current Situation?
The U.S. military has been conducting airstrikes in attempt to destroy some U.S.-provided equipment
from being stolen by the Taliban; however, the Administration has acknowledged that a fair amount of
U.S. weaponry has fal en into Taliban hands. Reports and photos continue to emerge of Taliban touting
U.S. weapons and driving police vehicles and Humvees that have been confiscated from the ANDSF. To
avoid Taliban capture, members of the ANDSF have reportedly flown U.S.-provided military aircraft and
driven armored vehicles and pickup trucks into neighboring countries. Other reports suggest that many of
the ASSF commandos who refused to surrender to the Taliban are now being targeted and some have
joined a nascent resistance.
Questions and Considerations
U.S. Weapons and Equipment. Does the United States have a record of weapons and other materiel that
have been destroyed by intentional U.S. airstrikes? What U.S.-provided weapons pose the most risk if
confiscated by the Taliban? What is the estimated timeframe for the Taliban to potential y lose the ability
to sustain any captured U.S. equipment? What risks do captured U.S. weapons pose to neighboring
countries and the larger region?
FY2022 ASFF Budget. In the days leading up to the fal of the ANDSF, President Biden committed to
continued U.S. support to the ANDSF. Now that the ANDSF has dissolved, how, if at al , wil the FY2022
$3.3 bil ion request be reprogrammed or realigned to a new mission?
U.S. Security Cooperation Enterprise. How wil the ANDSF collapse change the way the United States
trains foreign militaries? What oversight requirements might ensure Congress is better informed of the
capabilities and weaknesses of other major U.S. security assistance recipients? To what extent are other
U.S. partners as reliant as the ANDSF on U.S. intel igence, air power, and contracted logistics support?
How can future monitoring and evaluation efforts mitigate the shortfal s identified in U.S. efforts to build
a sustainable ANDSF?

Author Information

Christina L. Arabia

Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation
and the Global Arms Trade




Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.

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