INSIGHTi
The Afghanistan Withdrawal: Military and
Defense Implications
August 17, 2021
After a rapid Taliban campaign to capture cities and territories formerly controlled by the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), on August 15, 2021, the Taliban took Kabul and the
President of GIRoA, Ashraf Ghani, fled the country.
Information regarding the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and U.S. troop numbers is fluid and
should be treated with caution. This Insight, which may be updated as circumstances warrant, is intended
to assist Congress as it considers the military and defense implications of the withdrawal while events
unfold.
Current Military Footprint and Mission
Operation Al ies Refuge (OAR) was initiated on July 17, 2021, to support relocation flights for Afghan
nationals and their families eligible for Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs). On August 12, 2021, in light of
the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Secretary of
State Antony Blinken informed Ghani the United States would begin reducing its civilian footprint in
Kabul, and would accelerate Special Immigration Visa (SIV) flights previously undertaken as part of
OAR. The rapid collapse of GIRoA and subsequent Taliban takeover of Kabul has, to many observers,
underscored that plans to evacuate U.S. personnel and Afghan partners needed to be accelerated.
In support of OAR and U.S. withdrawal operations, the Department of Defense (DOD) has announced
that at least the following actions wil , or have been, taken:
Three infantry battalions—two Marine Corps, one U.S. Army—would deploy to Hamid
Karzai International Airport.
A joint U.S. Army/Air Force support element of around 1,000 personnel would be sent to
Qatar, and possibly to Afghanistan (or to other areas where the Afghans wil be
processed), to facilitate the processing of SIV applicants.
Two battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division would be deployed to Afghanistan. It was
previously announced that one of these battalions would be sent to Kuwait as a quick
reaction force. The deployment of a second battalion was announced on August 16, 2021.
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DOD officials have further noted:
As of August 17, 2021, approximately 4,000 troops had arrived in Kabul as part of the
surge of support for OAR and withdrawal operations.
Between 650 and 1,000 U.S. troops were already on the ground conducting withdrawal
operations.
As in al cases, U.S. service members have the right to self-defense if attacked.
DOD stil plans to complete the ongoing troop drawdown in Afghanistan by the end of
August 2021.
Questions and Considerations
The rapid collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Force (ANDSF), as wel as GIRoA itself,
has chal enged some of the central premises of post-September 11, 2001, national security policies and
raised questions about local and regional Afghan security dynamics that are currently being debated by
scholars and practitioners and that Congress may explore in its own deliberations. These include the
following:
What were U.S. military options?
The Trump Administration concluded a withdrawal deal with the Taliban in February 2020, stipulating
that U.S. forces would withdraw from Afghanistan by May 31, 2021, in return for some counterterrorism
assurances from the Taliban. The Biden Administration chose to delay the withdrawal date to August 31,
2021. Some observers contend that the Biden Administration could have chosen to ignore the agreement
and retained a smal footprint in the country comprising several thousand troops in order to facilitate a
better peace agreement. According to this view, the costs of retaining such a force would have been
minimal compared with the security risks associated with Afghanistan’s collapse. By contrast, President
Biden contended that retaining such a presence would have been unfeasible; the smal number of troops
would not have been sufficient to deter Taliban forces and a reescalation of forces and capabilities in
Afghanistan would ultimately have been required. Stil others contend that even assuming a minimal
footprint could have been feasible, doing so was not worth risking further U.S. resources and lives.
What might this mean for security cooperation efforts?
A central aspect of the U.S. and coalition campaign in Afghanistan was training and equipping a
sustainable ANDSF. Yet some observers, looking to long-standing deficiencies in some components of the
ANDSF, might question the efficacy of U.S. efforts to build the security capacity of al ies and partners
writ large. According to this logic, recent events in Afghanistan could suggest to some that such capacity-
building efforts are strategical y problematic and that the U.S. should exercise caution when trying to
build foreign militaries. Others might counter that the situation in Afghanistan was unique, particularly as
such efforts were being conducted during wartime, and that there were myriad other factors leading to the
collapse—including the withdrawal of U.S. support—that are not always present in other security
cooperation endeavors.
What was the U.S. exit strategy?
There are at least two separate but related aspects to questions regarding the U.S. exit strategy. At a
strategic level, some observers contend that the col apse of GIRoA and the ANDSF was ultimately
inevitable, given that over time the U.S. had built an Afghan security apparatus
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largely dependent upon U.S. forces and capabilities, and overseen by unitary political structures that were
inappropriate in an Afghan context alongside endemic corruption. Others contend that the U.S. never fully
factored effective war termination into its Afghanistan campaign strategies and force designs, resulting in
a military effort that did not enable a satisfactory conclusion to the war. At an operational level, some
observers question the robustness of the plan to withdraw U.S. troops and key Afghan partners from
Afghanistan. Congress may scrutinize whether, and how, military campaign planning could have
contained these significant strategic and operational flaws.
What new threats might emerge as a result of this withdrawal?
The initial purpose of the war in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, was ostensibly to depose the
Taliban and ensure that Al Qaeda could never again mount an attack against the United States or its al ies.
Almost 20 years later, the Taliban control more of Afghanistan than they did prior to the U.S.
intervention. Some express concern that U.S.-provided ANDSF equipment has fal en into Taliban hands
and that thousands of Afghan government prisoners—some of whom may be affiliated with Al Qaeda and
the Islamic State—have been released. Some observers may also question the extent to which the
Taliban’s victory might energize jihadist movements in other theaters.
Author Information
Kathleen J. McInnis
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in International Security
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
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