INSIGHTi
Taliban Establish Control Over Afghanistan
Amid Government Collapse and U.S.
Withdrawal
August 16, 2021
On August 15, 2021, Taliban fighters entered Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, effectively reestablishing the
group’s rule over the country after a nearly two-decade-long insurgency against U.S. and international
forces and the former Afghan government. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and many other senior Afghan
leaders have fled the country, though as of August 16 Ghani has not resigned. The collapse of the Afghan
government comes as the U.S. military withdrawal, started under President Donald Trump, was nearing
completion at the direction of President Joseph Biden. The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan, the speed of
which has shocked many Afghans and other observers, has political, security, and humanitarian
implications. The evacuation of U.S. citizens and Afghan partners is seen as of particular urgency.
Background: Taliban Advance
The Taliban ruled most of Afghanistan from 1996 until their defeat by U.S., international, and U.S.-
backed Afghan forces in 2001 in response to the Taliban’s harboring of Al Qaeda, the Islamist terrorist
group that carried out the 9/11 attacks. The Taliban later regrouped and began an insurgency that by
October 2018 (the last time the U.S. government made such data publicly available) had come to control
or contest as much as 40% of the country. In February 2020, the U.S. government reached an agreement
with the Taliban to withdraw U.S. troops by May 2021 (later changed to August) in return for
counterterrorism guarantees by the Taliban. Talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban began
in September 2020 but made little progress, and the Afghan government was not part of the February
agreement.
In early May 2021, the Taliban began a sweeping advance across Afghanistan, quickly capturing vast
swaths of rural areas. The group captured its first provincial capital on August 6, 2021, and rapidly began
taking control of cities across the country by defeating U.S.-backed Afghan government forces and by
compel ing (sometimes through negotiations) the surrender or departure of those forces. The Taliban freed
prisoners and seized weapons and other military materiel (much of it U.S.-supplied) during their
offensive, which culminated in the takeover of Kabul. The Taliban reportedly faced little resistance in
moving into the capital. Observers and U.S. officials have offered numerous explanations for why the
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11725
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

---

Congressional Research Service
2
Afghan military, for which the United States has provided over $80 bil ion in support, did not stem the
Taliban’s advance.
U.S. Military Withdrawal
The U.S. military withdrawal was initiated by the Trump Administration under the February 2020 U.S.-
Taliban agreement. On April 14, 2021, President Biden announced that the United States would begin the
final phase of that withdrawal on May 1, 2021 (the date by which the withdrawal was supposed to be
completed, per the U.S.-Taliban agreement) and complete it by September 11, 2021 (later moved up to
August 31, 2021). As of July 2021, between 650 and 1,000 U.S. troops reportedly remained to protect the
U.S. embassy (of the 2,500 U.S. troops that were in Afghanistan when President Biden took office), and
al international forces had been withdrawn as wel ; thousands of additional U.S. forces were deployed by
August 14 to support the evacuation of the U.S. embassy (see below). The United States launched some
air strikes in support of Afghan forces in July and August 2021, reportedly including some intended to
destroy equipment to prevent it from fal ing into Taliban hands.
On August 14, President Biden released a statement saying, in part, “One more year, or five more years,
of U.S. military presence would not have made a difference if the Afghan military cannot or wil not hold
its own country. And an endless American presence in the middle of another country’s civil conflict was
not acceptable to me.”
Afghan Government Collapse
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose embattled seven-year tenure was characterized by factional
infighting and the slow deterioration of Afghan forces, left the country on August 15 (his location remains
unclear as of August 16); some other leaders, including northern Afghan figures formerly regarded as
influential powerbrokers, also fled Afghanistan.
Deputy Taliban leader Abdul Ghani Baradar, the lead Taliban negotiator based in Doha, said in a video
message that the group’s victory “wasn’t expected” and that they would now focus on securing the
nation’s welfare. The Taliban have proclaimed an amnesty for Afghan forces and other government
employees, with one spokesman saying the group “has its door open for al those who have previously
worked [with] and helped the invaders.” However, some Afghans report the group has carried out
executions of surrendered Afghan soldiers.
As the Taliban reestablish their rule, many Afghans fear for their safety and the progress made since 2001.
In some areas, the Taliban have reportedly reinstated restrictions on women’s freedom of movement and
other aspects of the group’s hardline rule, including forcing women to marry Taliban fighters; in others,
they appear more permissive (or are trying to create that impression). The Taliban seek to continue the
provision of basic services, though they reportedly face resistance from some civil servants.
U.S. Embassy Evacuation
On August 12, State Department spokesman Ned Price announced that “we are further reducing our
civilian footprint in Kabul in light of the evolving security situation,” drawing down to a “core diplomatic
presence,” but that the U.S. embassy would remain open. Later that same day, Pentagon spokesman John
Kirby announced that 3,000 U.S. forces would deploy in the next 24-48 hours to the Kabul airport to
“enable” the drawdown of embassy staff, while another 3,500 would deploy to Kuwait to provide
additional security in Kabul if needed, and 1,000 would deploy to Qatar to facilitate the processing of
Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants. Price also stated that the United States would “increase
the pace of ... relocation flights” to remove SIV applicants from Afghanistan.

---

Congressional Research Service
3
On August 13, embassy staff were reportedly instructed to “destroy sensitive documents and desktop
computers before they leave.” A State Department spokesman said on August 15, hours after the Taliban
entered Kabul, that al embassy personnel (U.S. and Afghan citizens) had been removed to the airport.
Later that day, the State and Defense Departments released a statement that the United States would
remove from Afghanistan “thousands of American citizens who have been resident in Afghanistan, as
wel as local y employed staff of the U.S. mission in Kabul and their families and other particularly
vulnerable Afghan nationals,” including Afghans eligible for SIVs. Other countries have closed their
embassies or reduced them to a smal airport-based presence. Many Afghans seeking SIVs or other refuge
remain at the airport and elsewhere in Afghanistan.
Outlook
In the coming days, Members of Congress may focus on a range of possible issues related to U.S. policy,
including:
 The security of Kabul International Airport, from which U.S. citizens and some
Afghans are being evacuated from the country. As of August 16, the security situation at
the airport is fluid.
 Counterterrorism concerns, in light of the Taliban’s release of hundreds of prisoners
reportedly associated with Al Qaeda.
 The fate of Afghan women; religious and ethnic minorities; and U.S. and
international partners, journalists, and others, as the Taliban establishes a new
government.
 Humanitarian impact, including the fate of hundreds of thousands of Afghans internal y
displaced by conflict and the potential for new refugee influxes.
 Oversight of past U.S. support for the Afghan government and understanding its rapid
collapse.


Author Information

Clayton Thomas

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs




Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,

---

Congressional Research Service
4
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

IN11725 · VERSION 1 · NEW

---