Updated August 6, 2021
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Cuban Political and Economic Developments
including widespread detentions of hundreds of protesters,
Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a
activists, and journalists, according to Cuban human rights
government that has sharply restricted freedoms of
groups, which reported summary trials for some of those
expression, association, assembly, and other basic human
detained. The government blocked access to social media
rights since the early years of the 1959 Cuban revolution.
and messaging platforms that had been instrumental in
bringing Cubans to the streets. As of August 3, 2021, the
Current President Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl
human rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders (CPD)
Castro in 2018. In April 2021, Díaz-Canel also succeeded
reported 272 political prisoners (up from 152 on July 1),
Castro as head of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) at its
with 198 imprisoned and considered prisoners of
eighth party congress. The departure of Castro and other
conscience by CPD, 39 under conditional releas e, and 41
older leaders from the PCC’s Politburo reflects the
imprisoned for other politically motivated acts.
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several
years ago. While in power (2006-2018), Raúl Castro began
U.S. Policy
to move Cuba toward a more mixed economy with a
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
stronger private sector, but his government’s slow,
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
gradualist approach did not produce major improvements.
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019 that introduced
isolating the Cuban government.
some reforms but maintained the state’s dominance over the
economy and the PCC’s predominant political role.
In late 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy
shift away from sanctions and toward engagement and the
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by the economic
normalization of relations. Changes included the rescission
shutdown associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019
of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international
(COVID-19) pandemic; Venezuela’s economic cris is,
terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of diplomatic
which has reduced Venezuelan financial support; and U.S.
relations (July 2015); and an easing of restrictions on travel,
economic sanctions. The Cuban government reports the
remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and
economy contracted 11% in 2020, and the Economist
financial services (2015-2016). The restoration of relations
Intelligence Unit projects 2.2% growth in 2021. In January
led to increased government-to-government engagement,
2021, Cuba eliminated its dual currency system; the long-
with over 20 bilateral agreements and numerous dialogues.
debated reform has spurred inflation, but economists
maintain it should boost productivity in the long term.
President Trump unveiled his Administration’s Cuba policy
in 2017, issuing a national security presidential
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic initially kept
memorandum that introduced new sanctions, including
cases and deaths low, but both increased in late 2020 and
restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by
have surged in 2021. As of August 5, 2021, the country had
the Cuban military. By 2019, the Trump Administration had
reported 3,091 deaths, with a mortality rate over 27 per
largely abandoned engagement and significantly increased
100,000 people, according to Johns Hopkins University.
sanctions, particularly on travel and remittances, to pressure
Cuba has developed two vaccines and, as of August 5,
Cuba on human rights and for its support of the Venezuelan
2021, had fully vaccinated 24% of its population, far from
government of Nicolás Maduro.
its goal of having 70% vaccinated by the end of August.
The Biden Administration has been conducting a review of
Beginning in November 2020, the government cracked
policy toward Cuba. The White House press secretary said
down strongly on the San Isidro Movement (MSI), a civil
on March 9, 2021, that although a Cuba policy shift was not
society group opposed to restrictions on artistic expression.
among the President’s top priorities, the Administration was
Motivated by the repression of the MSI, in February 2021, a
“committed to making human rights a core pillar” of policy
group of well-known Cuban hip-hop recording artists
and would review policy decisions made in the prior
released a song and music video, Patria y Vida, critical of
administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as
the government that became an instant hit.
a state sponsor of terrorism. Sanctions imposed under the
Trump Administration remain in place. In May, the State
On July 11, 2021, widespread anti-government
Department renewed Cuba’s designation as a country not
demonstrations broke out in Havana and in cities and towns
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. On July
throughout the country, with thousands of Cubans
1, it cited Cuba for labor abuses associated with its foreign
protesting shortages of food and medicine, daily blackouts,
medical missions and continued to rank Cuba as Tier 3, the
and slow progress on COVID-19 vaccinations and chanting
worst ranking, in its 2021 Traffick ing in Persons report.
“freedom,” a reference to the country’s authoritarian
system. The government responded with harsh measures,
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
After Cuba’s July 11 protests, President Biden and other
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts for the
Administration officials expressed solidarity with the
first time since 2015. In May 2021, Secretary of State
protesters and strongly criticized the Cuban government for
Antony Blinken also included Cuba on the annual list. In
its repressive response. As part of the Administration’s
January 2021, pursuant to several laws, Pompeo designated
policy of holding the Cuban government accountable for its
the Cuban government as a state sponsor of international
repressive actions, on July 22 and 30, the Treasury
terrorism, citing Cuba’s harboring of several U.S. fugitives
Department imposed targeted sanctions on several Cuban
and members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army.
officials and entities (see below). As part of the
Administration’s efforts to engage the international
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel
community on Cuba, on July 26, the State Department
Between late 2016 and May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy
joined with 20 countries to condemn the Cuban
Havana community members suffered a series of
government’s mass arrests and detention of protestors.
unexplained injuries , including hearing loss and cognitive
Among other actions, the Administration established a
issues. The State Department maintains the investigation
working group to identify the most effective ways to get
into the injuries has not reached a conclusion regarding the
remittances directly to the Cuban people, held engagement
cause or source. In December 2020, the National
sessions with members of the Cuban American community,
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
and began reviewing plans to increase staffing at the U.S.
released a report concluding the most plausible mechanism
Embassy in Havana to facilitate consular services and
for the source of the health symptoms was directed pulsed
engagement with civil society.
radio frequency energy. In June 2021, the Secretary of State
said the National Security Council was leading a
Selected U.S. Sanctions Imposed Since 2017
government-wide review. On June 7, the Senate passed S.
Restrictions on Transactions with the Cuban Military.
1828, which would provide additional authority to U.S.
In 2017, the State Department published a list of entities
agencies to provide financial support to those serving
controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security
abroad who experience traumatic brain injuries.
services with which direct financial transactions would
disproportionately benefit those services or personnel at the
117th Congress: Legislative Initiatives
expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise. Last
Congress has begun consideration of the Administration’s
updated in January 2021, this “Cuba restricted list” includes
FY2022 request of $20 million for Cuba democracy and
231 entities (ministries, hotels, and numerous businesses).
human rights programming (same as appropriated annually
since FY2014) and $12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba. In
(same as appropriated in FY2021). On July 28, the House
2019, Treasury imposed sanctions on several shipping
approved its version of the foreign operations
companies and vessels that transported Venezuelan oil to
appropriations bill, H.R. 4373 (H.Rept. 117-84), which
Cuba and Cuba’s oil import-export company.
would fully fund both programs at the requested amounts.
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. Since 2019, the
In April and May 2021, the Senate approved two Cuba
United States has imposed an array of restrictions on travel
human rights resolutions: S.Res. 37, expressing solidarity
and remittances. On travel, these have included eliminating
with the MSI, and S.Res. 81, honoring Las Damas de
people-to-people educational travel, prohibiting cruise ships
Blanco, a woman-led nonviolent human rights group. After
and private and corporate aircraft from going to Cuba,
the July 11 protests, the Senate passed S.Res. 310 on
suspending commercial flights to cites other than Havana,
August 3, expressing solidarity with Cubans demonstrating
and prohibiting U.S. travelers from staying at over 400
peacefully, condemning the government’s repression, and
hotels and private residences identified by the State
calling for the release of those detained. On July 30, the
Department as owned or controlled by the Cuban
Senate approved S. 2045, which would rename the street in
government. On remittances, Treasury capped family
front of the Cuban Embassy after a Cuban democracy
remittances to $1,000 per quarter per Cuban national;
activist, Oswaldo Payá, who died in 2012.
eliminated donative remittances; and prohibited the
processing of remittances through entities on the “Cuba
Among introduced bills, H.R. 198 would permit Cuban
restricted list,” which resulted in Western Union ceasing its
nationals to play professional baseball in the United States;
operations in Cuba in November 2020.
H.R. 287 and S. 689 would prohibit the rescission of
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism until
Targeted Human Rights Sanctions. Since 2019, the State
Cuba satisfies certain conditions; H.R. 2684 would
Department has imposed visa restrictions on three high-
establish a Cuban family reunification parole program; S.
ranking Cuban officials and their immediate family
249 and H.R. 3625 would lift economic sanctions; S. 1694
members. Since 2020, the Treasury has imposed financial
would lift trade restrictions; and S. 2138 would allow
sanctions on the head of a military holding company; the
certain Cuban medical personnel working in third countries
interior ministry; and, since the July 11 protests, on the
admission into the United States.
defense minister, a special national brigade, and the police
force (and two of its leaders) for suppressing the protests.
Also see CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the
116th Congress and Through the Trump Administration,
Terrorism Designations. In May 2020, then-Secretary of
and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on
State Pompeo (pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act)
Travel and Remittances.
included Cuba in the annual list of countries certified as not
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

IF10045
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 89 · UPDATED

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