INSIGHTi
El Salvador: Authoritarian Actions and
U.S. Response

Updated August 3, 2021
On May 1-2, 2021, the newly seated National Assembly of El Salvador, now dominated by President
Nayib Bukele’s New Ideas party, dismissed the five magistrates on the Constitutional Chamber of the
Supreme Court and the attorney general and replaced them with al ies of the president. The dismissals,
enforced by the police, reportedly occurred in retaliation for the attorney general’s investigations of
corruption
in Bukele’s Cabinet and court rulings that Bukele violated the constitution in ruling by decree
during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Since May 2021, government harassment
of civil society, independent media, and the opposition has increased, prompting U.S. concern.
Biden Administration officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about democracy
in El Salvador, which is located in the “Northern Triangle” region of Central America. On May 2,
Secretary of State Antony Blinken cal ed President Bukele to express concern about the dismissals and
democratic backsliding. High-level visits, including that of U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) Administrator Samantha Power; the reprogramming of U.S. foreign aid from supporting
government agencies to supporting civil society; and two State Department reports to Congress
identifying Bukele officials as corrupt have reiterated U.S. concerns. On May 19, the House Foreign
Affairs Committee reported H.Res. 408, urging the Salvadoran government to respect the country’s
democratic institutions.
Democratic Backsliding
On June 1, 2019, Bukele, a businessperson and former mayor of San Salvador, took office for a five-year
presidential term after winning a first-round victory as an outsider standing for the Grand Al iance for
National Unity (GANA) party. His New Ideas party was not yet eligible to field candidates. Born in 1981,
Bukele is the first president to come of age political y after the 1980-1992 civil conflict and the first
presidential candidate in 30 years to win without support from the conservative National Republican
Al iance (ARENA) party or the leftist Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) party.
Bukele has governed as a populist, using social media to communicate with supporters, make policy
declarations, purge officials, and attack opponents. Through 2020, Bukele battled with the legislature and
the Supreme Court over funds he sought for his security plan and his aggressive enforcement of a
pandemic quarantine. In February 2020, Bukele ordered the military to surround the legislature in an
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effort to intimidate legislators into approving an anti-crime bil . He ignored and criticized Supreme Court
rulings for him to respect constitutional rights and legislative decisions during the pandemic. Although
Bukele remained popular, critics warned about his authoritarian tendencies and possible ties to organized
crime. In February 2021, New Ideas and its al ies won a supermajority in parliamentary elections.
Legislature Removed Checks on Presidential Power
On May 1, 2021, the National Assembly deputies elected in February took office. Unlike the outgoing
legislature, the 84-seat National Assembly is now dominated by New Ideas (56 seats), GANA (5 seats),
and al ied parties (3 seats). New Ideas deputies hastily presented charges against and dismissed the
Constitutional Court magistrates for inhibiting the government’s pandemic response. On May 2,
legislators dismissed the attorney general for having ties to ARENA. The Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the European Union have criticized
the legislature’s actions for violating judicial independence.
Since May, Bukele, the legislature, and the attorney general (who reportedly worked for a U.S.-sanctioned
subsidiary of Venezuela’s state oil company) have shut down investigations into corruption in the Bukele
government while harassing and arresting government opponents. Bukele ended cooperation with an
Organization of American States-supported international commission against impunity. The National
Assembly passed a law granting immunity from prosecution to anyone involved in pandemic spending
and created a commission to investigate corruption in past governments; the commission has resulted in
arrest orders for former FMLN officials, including former President Salvador Sánchez Cerén. The Bukele
government has deported foreign journalists, threatened civil society groups with lawsuits, and sought to
limit international support for government critics. The legislature has supported Bukele’s controversial
policy proposals, including initiatives to adopt bitcoin as a form of legal tender and to double the size of
the army. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has expressed concerns about El Salvador’s decision to
adopt bitcoin due to the currency’s vulnerability to money laundering but has continued negotiations for a
roughly $1 bil ion loan to the country.
U.S. Policy Actions and Concerns
The Biden Administration has made combating corruption a key part of its national security strategy and
its strategy to address the root causes of migration from Central America. Special Envoy for the Northern
Triangle Ricardo Zúñiga expressed U.S. concerns with Bukele during a May visit, as have USAID
Administrator Power and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland. In May, the State
Department declassified, pursuant to P.L. 116-260, a report to Congress on corrupt Northern Triangle
officials that listed five current and former Salvadoran politicians. In July, the State Department released a
list of officials subject to visa restrictions for corruption or undemocratic actions pursuant to Section 353
of P.L. 116-260; the list included 14 Salvadoran officials, including Bukele’s Cabinet chief, legal adviser,
and labor minister.
Many in Congress are monitoring events in El Salvador and U.S. policy responses. Congress is assessing
the Biden Administration’s $861 mil ion FY2022 request for assistance to Central America. The House-
passed version of the FY2022 State and Foreign Operations appropriations measure (H.R. 4373) would
provide $860.6 mil ion in assistance for Central America but would withhold 75% of any assistance to
those countries’ central governments until nine conditions are met. H.Rept. 117-84, accompanying H.R.
4373,
recommends providing $95 mil ion in development assistance for El Salvador but no foreign
military financing. Congress is likely to oversee USAID’s recent shift in funds to support civil society, the
use of visa restrictions and potential y financial sanctions on Salvadoran officials, human rights
conditions, and the status of El Salvador’s IMF loan negotiations.
See CRS Report R43616, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke.


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Author Information

Clare Ribando Seelke

Specialist in Latin American Affairs




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