Updated July 28, 2021
Insurgency in Northern Mozambique: Nature and Responses
An armed Islamist insurgency in Mozambique—launched
ASWJ occasionally has warned civilians of impending
in 2017 with an attack on several police posts in Cabo
attacks, limited arson to state or large business facilities,
Delgado province, in the country’s north—has burgeoned.
distributed looted food, and preached to locals on the
The insurgency and state security responses to it have
group’s religious precepts. Some reports indicate that
resulted in many serious human rights abuses and killings,
different ASWJ cells may use disparate tactics and levels of
widespread social trauma and property destruction, and
violence, and that some attempt to indoctrinate abductees
massive population displacements, creating a complex
religiously. ASWJ has reportedly recruited by force and by
humanitarian crisis. Insurgent attacks also have prompted
offering payments to fighters; financing micro-
the French energy firm Total to declare force majeure and
entrepreneurs—whom the group then may also extort,
suspend a $20 billion, partially U.S. government-financed
demanding payments or in-kind support, such as
natural gas processing project, one of several major projects
surveillance of urban targets; and, in some cases, by aiding
designed to tap large gas fields discovered offshore in 2010.
those seeking Islamic education abroad.
The insurgents, locally dubbed Al Shabaab (“the youth,”
ASWJ’s military prowess has grown since 2017; it has
also the name of a separate Al Qaeda-linked Somali group),
repeatedly executed complex operations (e.g., concurrent
also are known as Ahlu Sunna Wa-Jamo (“Adherents of the
attacks on multiple targets, multi-pronged assaults on key
Sunnah” or ASWJ; spellings vary) and by other names. In
towns, boat-based maritime assaults on local sea traffic and
2019, ASWJ reportedly pledged allegiance to the Islamic
islands, and cross-border attacks into Tanzania). It
State (IS, also known as ISIS), which often claims and
undertakes espionage and seeks to infiltrate security forces
lauds the group’s attacks and counts it as a member of its IS
and civilian populations, and some ASWJ fighters wear
Central Africa Province (ISCAP), together with affiliates in
state military uniforms and use arms reportedly looted from
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia.
state forces. ASWJ also reportedly uses drones and locally
atypical weapons, suggesting it may have access to illicit
Figure 1. Cabo Delgado
Some observers have
arms trade networks. It also kidnaps for ransom and may
Province, Mozambique
questioned the extent and
receive funds and other aid from abroad, potentially
import of ASWJ-IS ties,
including from other ISCAP affiliates.
but U.N. global terrorism
monitors and U.S. officials
ASWJ controls some territory, and has held the port town
assert that operational
of Mocímboa da Praia since August 2020. In March 2021, it
links exist between them.
attacked Palma, a coastal town, after cutting road links to it,
In March 2021, the State
causing sharp food inflation and shortages. Prior attacks on
Department, labeling
Palma’s outskirts may have been probing actions. The
ASWJ as ISIS-
March attack resulted in mass fatalities, including multiple
Mozambique, designated
beheadings, and threatened a huge nearby natural gas
the group as a Foreign
processing plant being developed by a consortium led by

Terrorist Organization, and
Total. Many Palma residents seeking safety fled to the plant
Source: CRS.
also named as a Specially
site, which ASWJ did not breach. The site is heavily
Designated Global Terrorist a Tanzanian whom officials
protected by state security forces who remained embedded
identified as the group’s leader. These actions ban material
there while the insurgents overran Palma. After the attack,
support to ASWJ and transactions between the group and
Total suspended the project and withdrew its staff, pending
U.S. persons, and freeze any U.S. property it may possess.
the state’s reestablishment of security. State security forces
reportedly looted Palma extensively after the attack.
Tactics. Initially, ASWJ used simple bladed weapons and
some guns, but since 2018, it has become increasingly
Drivers. A confluence of local socioeconomic grievances
well-armed and hit progressively more significant targets.
and religious aims appear to motivate ASWJ, which seeks
ASWJ often attacks security force posts and convoys, state
to supplant the secular state with Islamic Sharia law-based
workers and facilities (e.g., schools and clinics), and
governance. Researchers, however, debate the relative
civilian targets—notably road traffic and poor rural
strength, logic, and linkages between these and other factors
villages. Its fighters often loot and burn food and other
in explaining the insurgency’s evolution, as well as the
property, and injure, kill, or kidnap residents, notably
extent to which ISIS or other foreign influences shape it.
youths and women. The rationale for the group’s attacks
A key source of grievance is the state’s historical
often is unclear, but some, notably a number involving
marginalization of Cabo Delgado, one of Mozambique’s
mass beheadings—a notorious IS tactic—appear intended
poorest regions, and resulting high rates of poverty,
to punish perceived ASWJ foes, such as state workers and
socioeconomic inequality, and youth unemployment. The
persons who resist ASWJ recruitment, including children,
state’s displacement of some coastal villagers and its
or whom ASWJ suspects of cooperating with authorities.
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Insurgency in Northern Mozambique: Nature and Responses
transfer of their traditional lands to the Total gas project,
bribes from those seeking to flee by sea or air, and control
the perceived low share of gas sector jobs given to locals,
much of the food supply into Palma, which they reportedly
disruptions of local livelihoods, and the influence of foreign
sell at high prices.
extractive industry actors also have driven tensions.
Where aid agencies have access, they are providing food,
Local and national elites’ efforts to control valuable local
basic supplies, and, in some areas, psychosocial help for the
natural resources (e.g., land, precious stones, gold, and
many IDPs traumatized by exposure to severe violence.
timber)—through political influence, corrupt dealings, and
Food insecurity is widespread across the province, where
force—also have spurred resentments, as have some
violence and insecurity have damaged or forced 132 health
security forces’ human rights abuses and corruption in the
facilities in the province (about a third) to close, leaving 1.2
context of counterterrorism operations. Some corruption in
million people in urgent need of health aid as of late May,
Cabo Delgado is reportedly tied to illicit trafficking in
U.N. agencies reported. As of mid-June 2021, 9% of a $254
natural resources, persons, and illicit drugs, though the drug
million U.N.-wide humanitarian response plan centered on
trade has moved south as insurgent violence has grown.
Cabo Delgado had been funded. U.S. humanitarian aid for
This may suggest that to date ASWJ has mainly threatened
Mozambique, including $78 million in FY2020, is partly
trafficking activity, rather than exploited it—though ASWJ
allocated to Cabo Delgado.
may be doing so covertly, as some analysts have warned.
Other Responses. Military-led counterinsurgency efforts,
Insurgency: Makeup and Origins
backed by paramilitary police and military contractors, have
had mixed success. Key challenges have included low
Arrests of alleged insurgents, eyewitness accounts, and other
levels of public trust due to abuses by some security
sources suggest that ASWJ is mostly made up of Cabo
personnel, logistical gaps, and a limited capacity to
Delgado locals, including from the largely non-Muslim, inland
concurrently protect key state-controlled sites and remote
Makonde ethnic group (historically supporters of the national
roads, promptly respond to ASWJ attacks, and take
majority political party, FRELIMO), and the coastal, Muslim
offensive action. The government, after initially expressing
Mwani, among others. Mwani often have backed RENAMO,
reservations about inviting direct foreign military
the main opposition party and a former FRELIMO military foe.
intervention, has accepted foreign combat troops and
ASWJ members also reportedly include Tanzanians, other
trainers. In mid-July, the Southern African Development
Mozambicans, and some fighters of various other nationalities.
Community (SADC, which Mozambique currently chairs)
ASWJ reportedly evolved from one or more dissident Muslim
began to deploy a regional intervention force to Cabo
sects that rejected the authority of the state-vetted Islamic
Delgado, though its mandate has not been publicly detailed.
Council, a Wahhabi-oriented social welfare and representative
In early July, Rwanda (a non-SADC state), also deployed
body, in part due to the Council’s FRELIMO links. Sect beliefs
1,000 combat troops to the province under a bilateral
were influenced by East African Islamist preachers and their
agreement. Days after deploying, these troops clashed with
supporters, some of whom reportedly pursued anti-state
insurgents, reportedly killing 30. Meanwhile, U.S. Special
attacks in Tanzania before fleeing to Cabo Delgado, the DRC,
Operations Forces have been training Mozambican marines.
and elsewhere to escape a violent crackdown by Tanzanian
Portuguese paratroopers also are training local military
authorities. Returnees from Islamic study abroad also may
forces and the European Union has approved a military
have introduced violent jihadist precepts. Sect members
training mission slated to deploy in September 2021.
reportedly adopted their own form of dress; rejected secular
Many observers contend that ending the insurgency would
justice, schools, health services, and voting; and had
require programs to increase social cohesion and restore
altercations with the Islamic Council and leaders of the locally
livelihoods and social services, followed by longer-term
predominant Sufi Muslim community. They also advocated for
development investments. The government’s nascent
Sharia law-based governance—as the insurgents continue to
Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN) has
do in their limited, ad hoc messaging (e.g., short social media
developed a plan prioritizing such ends, which the World
videos), in which they also criticize the state and FRELIMO.
Bank is funding with a $100 million grant. The World Bank
also has committed to provide up to $700 million under its
Humanitarian Situation and Responses. As of early June
Prevention and Resilience Allocation facility. One element
2021, roughly 770,000 people had fled insurgency-linked
of ADIN’s plan, the relocation of up to 70,000 IDP families
violence in Cabo Delgado, including 90% of Palma’s prior
to 80 sites, could be complex and potentially contentious.
75,000-person population. As of June 9, about 46% of
U.S. Interests and Responses. The insurgency affects
internally displaced persons (IDPs) were children and about
substantial U.S. interests, notably a $4.7 billion U.S.
93% of IDPs were living in host communities, mostly
Export-Import Bank loan for the Total project and up to
within Cabo Delgado, with the rest in temporary camps,
$1.5 billion in U.S. International Development Finance
according to the International Organization for Migration.
Corporation political risk insurance for a separate planned
Other IDPs remained in flight, often traveling by foot in
ExxonMobil-led gas project. A range of U.S. foreign aid
isolated areas for safety reasons, as has been common after
and security cooperation programs aim to build national
many past attacks. Tanzania has forcibly returned as many
security forces’ capacities, foster economic development,
as 10,000 prospective refugees fleeing the violence thus far
and counter violent extremism. Some of this aid is separate
in 2021. U.N. agencies and other humanitarian actors have
from broader, non-insurgency-specific U.S. bilateral
little or no access to the northeastern half of Cabo Delgado
assistance worth an estimated $536 million in FY2021.
due to insecurity, bureaucratic hurdles, and noncooperation
by officials. Thousands of IDPs have remained near the
Nicolas Cook, Specialist in African Affairs
Total site in Palma. Security forces have reportedly extorted
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Insurgency in Northern Mozambique: Nature and Responses

IF11864


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11864 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED

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