July 6, 2021
An Introduction to Oversight of Offices of Inspector General
“Who watches the watchers?” is a question that is
The Integrity Committee is a body within CIGIE created
frequently posed when people consider the role of oversight
under Section 11(d) of the IG Act and tasked with receiving
bodies, including offices of inspector general (OIGs).
and reviewing allegations of wrongdoing against IGs and
However, the organization of OIGs may pose unique
OIG staff. Investigative reports of the Integrity Committee
challenges that make it more difficult to conduct oversight
are provided to both the appropriate congressional
of their activities. In particular, the level of independence
committees and the President (or agency head if that
from agency leaders that allows inspectors general (IGs) to
official appoints the agency’s IG).
conduct their audits and investigations with less risk of
actual or perceived interference also makes it more difficult
The IG community also conducts regular peer reviews in
to identify and remedy issues that arise within an OIG by
which OIGs evaluate each other’s procedures and recent
limiting their supervision by senior agency officials.
work to determine compliance with government audit,
investigation, and inspection standards. These reviews
While oversight of OIGs may create specific challenges for
provide regular opportunities for OIGs to receive expert
Congress and other stakeholders, the efficient and effective
evaluations of their activities.
operation of OIGs, like the agencies and officials they
oversee, is important to the successful operation of the
Other Oversight Offices
government.
In addition to reviews within the IG community, other
federal entities may also oversee OIGs in some
Congress has grappled with the organizational challenge of
circumstances. The Government Accountability Office
IG oversight through the Inspector General Act (IG Act) of
(GAO), in particular, has the authority to investigate the
1978 (5 U.S.C. App.). While Section 3(a) of the act states
operations of OIGs and to improve their effectiveness and
that each IG “shall report to and be under the general
compliance with laws, regulations, and best practices for
supervision of the establishment” in which they serve, it
audits and investigations. For instance, in April 2021, GAO
also states that agency leadership may not “prevent or
published a preliminary report on its review of the
prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out,
Department of Homeland Security OIG at the request of the
or completing any audit or investigation.” In practice, these
House Committee on Homeland Security and appeared at a
provisions mean that OIGs typically operate with less
hearing on the subject before the committee (GAO-21-
supervision from agency leaders than other officials do.
452T).
While the overall focus of the IG Act is oriented toward
Under Section 4(b) of the IG Act, OIGs are also required to
independence for IGs, particularly from those officials who
comply with GAO auditing standards. GAO may conduct
they oversee, it does contain several discrete provisions,
compliance reviews to ensure that each OIG is adhering to
which are discussed throughout this In Focus, that facilitate
those standards and make recommendations related to the
or require specific forms of oversight of OIGs.
operations of OIGs.
This In Focus details how the IG Act addresses oversight of
In addition, officials within OIGs may be subject to the
OIGs and provides information on government
jurisdiction of the Office of Government Ethics and the
organizations that have formal and informal oversight roles
Office of Special Counsel in some circumstances. Potential
with regard to the IG community, including the IG
violations of federal criminal law may be reviewed by the
community itself, other oversight offices, the President,
Department of Justice.
agency leaders, and Congress.
The President
The Inspector General Community
One of Congress’s principal design decisions in the creation
A consistent form of oversight of OIGs comes from the
of OIGs has been to provide a relatively high degree of
inspector general community itself. The Council of
independence from the President and agency leaders. When
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) is
Presidents have been perceived to act against that
composed of inspectors general and certain other oversight
expectation of independence, even when they are acting in a
officials who are tasked with, among other things,
manner allowed under the IG Act, they have typically b een
increasing the “professionalism and effectiveness” of OIGs.
met with bipartisan criticism in Congress. For more
CIGIE conducts oversight of particular OIG through two
information, see CRS In Focus IF11546, Removal of
principle mechanisms: its Integrity Committee and OIG
Inspectors General: Rules, Practice, and Considerations
peer reviews.
for Congress, by Ben Wilhelm.
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An Introduction to Oversight of Offices of Inspector General
Nonetheless, regardless of past practice and stakeholder
responsibility for overseeing OIGs and ensuring that they
expectations, the President does have authority to remove
are accountable ultimately falls upon Congress.
presidentially appointed IGs so long as he or she provides
written notice, including reasons for acting, to Congress 30
Congress does not have a direct role in the selection or
days before the removal of the IG (IG Act §3(b)).
removal of IGs aside from the exercise of the Senate’s
Advice and Consent authority for presidentially appointed
Thus, while a President can remove an IG that he or she
IGs and the establishment of general qualification criteria
believes is not performing to the standards of the IG
for IG nominees through the legislative process.
community or the IG Act, such an action could risk pulling
attention away from the justifications for the removal and
Nonetheless, Congress can directly impact OIGs through
placing focus on the broader issue of IG independence.
the appropriations process and its authority to amend
Nonetheless, there may be circumstances in which the
statutes to alter the organization and authority of OIGs.
presidential removal of an IG would be considered justified
Further, Congress’s ability to conduct hearings, request
by other IG community stakeholders.
investigations, and publicly comment on the activities of
OIGs can be another important tool for ensuring that OIGs
For instance, one possible example of such a situation is
operate in an effective manner that is consistent with the
illustrated by an April 14, 2021, letter from the CIGIE
expectations of policymakers.
Integrity Committee to President Joe Biden recommending
that he consider “substantial disciplinary action, up to and
In addition, Congress is a principal stakeholder for the IG
including removal” for Federal Housing Finance Authority
community and regularly relies upon OIGs to identify
IG Laura Wertheimer. This recommendation was based on
compliance issues in agencies; conduct independent, expert
allegations of official misconduct reported to and
reviews of complex or controversial topics; and issue
investigated by the Integrity Committee. IG Wertheimer
recommendations that can help Congress and agencies
announced on June 29, 2021, that she would resign from
resolve identified problems.
her position on July 30, 2021.
Congress, therefore, occupies an unusual position as both a
Agency Leadership
regular user of OIG work products and a body that can
While OIGs are under the “general supervision” of their
oversee OIG performance. This combination may mean that
agency leadership, agency officials are not supposed to play
Congress brings its own perspective on the effectiveness of
a role in OIG decisions about investigations and audits,
OIGs that not only includes compliance with legal and
except that they are to be kept informed of the findings and
professional standards but also extends to broader questions
recommendations arising from the work of their agency’s
about OIG priorities and the value of their work. Of course,
OIG (IG Act §4(a)(5)). As a practical matter, the
agencies and Presidents might also have their own views on
relationship between agency and OIG leaders might be
the performance of OIGs, but they have fewer tools at their
complex, but OIGs typically operate without direct
disposal than Congress does to make changes to the
interference. This arrangement is supported by the ability of
operations and authority of OIGs.
an OIG to report to Congress on any agency leadership
attempt to interfere with its work.
Finally, Congress may also be the best positioned
stakeholder to take a long-term, institutional view of the IG
Despite this general limit on agency capacity to oversee
community, because a robust and effective IG community
OIGs, there are two notable exceptions.
can enhance the effectiveness of Congress as it performs
both its legislative and oversight functions.
First, IGs who serve in a Designated Federal Entity (DFE)
as defined in Section 8G of the IG Act are appointed by and
Further Reading
can be removed by the leadership of the agency they
Charles A. Johnson and Kathryn E. Newcomer, U.S.
oversee rather than by the President. Removal of an IG by
Inspectors General: Truth Tellers in Turbulent Times
the head of a DFE is subject to the same notice requirement
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2020), pp.
as removal by the President, and a removal action might
121-162.
lead to the same concerns as removal by the President.
CRS Report R45450, Statutory Inspectors General in the
Second, while the issue of IG jurisdiction is separate from
Federal Government: A Primer, by Ben Wilhelm.
oversight of OIGs, it should be noted that some agency
heads (including, for example, the Secretary of Defense and
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10476, Presidential Removal of
the director of the Central Intelligence Agency) have the
IGs Under the Inspector General Act, by Todd Garvey.
authority, with notification to Congress, to prevent OIGs
from looking at specific issues related to national security
Ben Wilhelm, Analyst in Government Organization and
and other matters that might require secrecy.
Management
Congress
IF11869
While each of the entities discussed above plays a role in
the oversight of OIGs, it may be the case that the primary


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An Introduction to Oversight of Offices of Inspector General


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
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