June 24, 2021
Insurgency in Northern Mozambique: Nature and Responses
An armed Islamist insurgency in Mozambique—launched
ASWJ occasionally has warned civilians of impending
in 2017 with an attack on several police posts in Cabo
attacks, limited arson to state or large business facilities,
Delgado province, in the country’s north—has burgeoned.
distributed looted food, and preached to locals on the
The insurgency and state security responses to it have
group’s religious precepts. Some reports indicate that
resulted in many serious human rights abuses and killings,
different ASWJ cells may use disparate tactics and levels of
widespread social trauma and property destruction, and
violence, and that some attempt to indoctrinate abductees
massive population displacements, creating a complex
religiously. ASWJ has reportedly recruited by force, and by
humanitarian crisis. Insurgent attacks also have prompted
offering payments to fighters; financing micro-
the French energy firm Total to declare force majeure and
entrepreneurs—whom the group then may also extort,
suspend a $20 billion, partially U.S. government-financed
demanding payments or in-kind support, such as
natural gas processing project, one of several major projects
surveillance of urban targets; and, in some cases, by aiding
designed to tap large gas fields discovered offshore in 2010.
those seeking Islamic education abroad.
The insurgents, locally dubbed Al Shabaab (“the youth,”
ASWJ’s military prowess has grown since 2017; it has
also the name of a separate Al Qaeda-linked Somali group),
repeatedly executed complex operations (e.g., concurrent
also are known as Ahlu Sunna Wa-Jamo (“Adherents of the
attacks on multiple targets, multi-pronged assaults on key
Sunnah” or ASWJ; spellings vary) and by other names. In
towns, boat-based maritime assaults on local sea traffic and
2019, ASWJ reportedly pledged allegiance to the Islamic
islands, and cross-border attacks into Tanzania). It
State (IS, also known as ISIS), which often claims and
undertakes espionage and seeks to infiltrate security forces
lauds the group’s attacks and counts it as a member of its IS
and civilian populations, and some ASWJ fighters wear
Central Africa Province (ISCAP), together with affiliates in
state military uniforms and use arms reportedly looted from
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia.
state forces. ASWJ also reportedly uses drones and locally-
atypical weapons, suggesting it may have access to illicit
Figure 1. Cabo Delgado
Some observers have
arms trade networks. It also kidnaps for ransom and may
Province, Mozambique
questioned the extent and
receive funds and other aid from abroad, potentially
import of ASWJ-IS ties,
including from other ISCAP affiliates.
but U.N. global terrorism
monitors and U.S. officials
ASWJ controls some territory, and has held the port town
assert that operational
of Mocímboa da Praia since August 2020. In March 2021, it
links exist between them.
attacked Palma, a coastal town, after cutting road links to it,
In March 2021, the State
causing sharp food inflation and shortages. Prior attacks on
Department, labeling
Palma’s outskirts may have been probing actions. The
ASWJ as ISIS-
March attack resulted in mass fatalities, including multiple
Mozambique, designated
beheadings, and threatened a huge nearby natural gas
the group as a Foreign
processing plant being developed by a consortium led by

Terrorist Organization, and
Total. Many Palma residents seeking safety fled to the plant
Source: CRS.
also named as a Specially
site, which ASWJ did not breach. The site is heavily
Designated Global Terrorist a Tanzanian whom officials
protected by state security forces, who remained embedded
identified as the group’s leader. These actions ban material
there while the insurgents overran Palma. After the attack,
support to ASWJ and transactions between the group and
Total suspended the project and withdrew its staff, pending
U.S. persons, and freeze any U.S. property it may possess.
the state’s re-establishment of security. State security forces
reportedly looted Palma extensively after the attack.
Tactics. Initially, ASWJ used simple bladed weapons and
some guns, but since 2018, it has become increasingly well-
Drivers. A confluence of local socio-economic grievances
armed and hit progressively more significant targets. ASWJ
and religious aims appear to motivate ASWJ, which seeks
often attacks security force posts and convoys, state
to supplant the secular state with Islamic sharia law-based
workers and facilities (e.g., schools and clinics), and
governance. Researchers, however, debate the relative
civilian targets—notably road traffic and poor rural
strength, logic, and linkages between these and other factors
villages. Its fighters often loot and burn food and other
in explaining the insurgency’s evolution, as well as the
property, and injure, kill, or kidnap residents, notably
extent to which ISIS or other foreign influences shape it.
youths and women. The rationale for the group’s attacks
A key source of grievance is the state’s historical
often is unclear, but some, notably a number involving
marginalization of Cabo Delgado, one of Mozambique’s
mass beheadings—a notorious IS tactic—appear intended
poorest regions, and resulting high rates of poverty, socio-
to punish perceived ASWJ foes, such as state workers and
economic inequality, and youth unemployment. The state’s
persons who resist ASWJ recruitment, including children,
displacement of some coastal villagers and its transfer of
or whom ASWJ suspects of cooperating with authorities.
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Insurgency in Northern Mozambique: Nature and Responses
their traditional lands to the Total gas project, the perceived
bribes from those seeking to flee by sea or air, and control
low share of gas sector jobs given to locals, disruptions of
much of the food supply into Palma, which they reportedly
local livelihoods, and the influence of foreign extractive
sell at high prices.
industry actors also have driven tensions.
Where aid agencies have access, they are providing food,
Local and national elites’ efforts to control valuable local
basic supplies, and, in some areas, psychosocial help for the
natural resources (e.g., land, precious stones, gold, and
many IDPs traumatized by exposure to severe violence.
timber)—through political influence, corrupt dealings, and
Food insecurity is widespread across the province, where
force—also have spurred resentments, as have some
violence and insecurity have damaged or forced 132 health
security forces’ human rights abuses and corruption in the
facilities in the province (about a third) to close, leaving 1.2
context of counterterrorism operations. Some corruption in
million people in urgent need of health aid as of late May,
Cabo Delgado is reportedly tied to illicit trafficking in
U.N. agencies reported. As of mid-June 2021, 9% of a $254
natural resources, persons, and illicit drugs, though the drug
million U.N.-wide humanitarian response plan centered on
trade has moved south as insurgent violence has grown.
Cabo Delgado had been funded. U.S. humanitarian aid for
This may suggest that to date ASWJ has mainly threatened
Mozambique, including $78 million in FY2020, is partly
trafficking activity, rather than exploited it—though ASWJ
allocated to Cabo Delgado.
may be doing so covertly, as some analysts have warned.
Other Responses. Military-led counterinsurgency efforts,
Insurgency: Makeup and Origins
backed by paramilitary police and military contractors, have
had mixed success. Key challenges include low levels of
Arrests of alleged insurgents, eye-witness accounts, and other
public trust due to abuses by some security personnel,
sources suggest that ASWJ is mostly made up of Cabo
logistical gaps, and a limited capacity to concurrently
Delgado locals, including from the largely non-Muslim, inland
protect key state-controlled sites and remote roads,
Makonde ethnic group (historically supporters of the national
promptly respond to ASWJ attacks, and take offensive
majority political party, FRELIMO), and the coastal, Muslim
action. The government reportedly is wary of inviting direct
Mwani, among others. Mwani often have backed RENAMO,
foreign military intervention, but has accepted foreign
the main opposition party and a former FRELIMO military foe.
training for the military—which also is receiving private
ASWJ members also reportedly include Tanzanians, other
sector training and has acquired several helicopters. U.S.
Mozambicans, and some fighters of various other nationalities.
Special Operations Forces have trained Mozambican
ASWJ reportedly evolved from one or more dissident Muslim
marines, and more such training may follow, potentially
sects that rejected the authority of the state-vetted Islamic
alongside targeted U.S. police training. Portuguese
Council, a Wahhabi-oriented social welfare and representative
paratroopers also are training local military forces; France
body, in part due to the Council’s FRELIMO links. Sect beliefs
and the European Union also may offer security aid; and the
were influenced by East African Islamist preachers and their
Southern African Development Community (SADC, of
supporters, some of whom reportedly pursued anti-state
which Mozambique is a member) has approved a regional
attacks in Tanzania before fleeing to Cabo Delgado, the DRC,
intervention force, but not publicly announced its mandate.
and elsewhere to escape a violent crackdown by Tanzanian
The government also has discussed security cooperation
authorities. Returnees from Islamic study abroad also may
with Rwanda, a non-SADC state.
have introduced violent jihadist precepts. Sect members
Many observers contend that ending the insurgency would
reportedly adopted their own form of dress, rejected secular
require programs to increase social cohesion and restore
justice, schools, health services, and voting, and had
livelihoods and social services, followed by longer-term
altercations with the Islamic Council and leaders of the locally
development investments. The government’s nascent
predominant Sufi Muslim community. They also advocated for
Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN) has
sharia law-based governance—as the insurgents continue to
developed a plan prioritizing such ends, which the World
do in their limited, ad hoc messaging (e.g., short social media
Bank is funding with a $100 million grant. The World Bank
videos), in which they also criticize the state and FRELIMO.
also has committed to provide up to $700 million under its
Prevention and Resilience Allocation facility. One element
Humanitarian Situation and Responses. As of early June
of ADIN’s plan, the relocation of up to 70,000 IDP families
2021, roughly 770,000 people had fled insurgency-linked
to 80 sites, could be complex and potentially contentious.
violence in Cabo Delgado, including 90% of Palma’s prior
U.S. Interests and Responses. The insurgency affects
75,000-person population. As of June 9, about 46% of
substantial U.S. interests, notably a $4.7 billion U.S.
internally displaced persons (IDPs) were children and about
Export-Import Bank loan for the Total project and up to
93% of IDPs were living in host communities, mostly
$1.5 billion in U.S. International Development Finance
within Cabo Delgado, with the rest in temporary camps,
Corporation political risk insurance for a separate planned
according to the International Organization for Migration.
ExxonMobil-led gas project. A range of U.S. foreign aid
Other IDPs remained in flight, often traveling by foot in
and security cooperation programs aim to build
isolated areas for safety reasons, as has been common after
Mozambican security forces’ capacities, foster economic
many past attacks. Tanzania has forcibly returned as many
development, and counter violent extremism. Some of this
as 10,000 prospective refugees fleeing the violence thus far
aid is separate from broader, non-insurgency-specific U.S.
in 2021. U.N. agencies and other humanitarian actors have
bilateral assistance worth an estimated $536 million in
little or no access to the northeastern half of Cabo Delgado
FY2021.
due to insecurity, bureaucratic hurdles, and noncooperation
by officials. Thousands of IDPs have remained near the
Nicolas Cook, Specialist in African Affairs
Total site in Palma. Security forces have reportedly extorted
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Insurgency in Northern Mozambique: Nature and Responses

IF11864


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