June 23, 2021
Ukrainian Armed Forces
In 2014, the Ukrainian military, which observers noted had
lower (around 2.5% of GDP). Ukraine’s 2021 defense
been weakened by years of neglect and underfunding, faced
budget is 117.6 billion hryvnia ($4.2 billion), 127 million
Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and
hryvnia ($4.6 million) less than 2020’s budget.
invasion of eastern Ukraine. Since that time, the Ukrainian
Additionally, Ukraine’s defense budget allocations are split
armed forces have made considerable improvements; they
between funds necessary to maintain the military and funds
have undertaken efforts to adopt NATO standards and
to support its ambitious reform program.
received significant NATO and U.S. assistance. Many of
these reforms began out of the experience of defending
Ukraine inherited a sprawling defense industry from the
against Russian aggression. Reforms range from the tactical
Soviet Union, producing a wide range of products,
to the strategic levels and include both political measures
including tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft, radars and
(e.g., increasing transparency, countering corruption, and
electronics, missiles, and ships. Defense conglomerate
ensuring civilian control over the military) and military
Ukroboronprom oversees the defense industry, which
reforms (e.g., modernizing equipment, reforming command
comprises over 130 state-run companies. In recent years,
and control, and increasing professionalization).
Ukrainian officials have made reforming Ukroboronprom
and increasing transparency key goals, including passing a
Significant hurdles remain, however, and the reform
new law, On Defense Procurement, in July 2020 to
process is complicated by Ukraine’s Soviet legacy, the
implement NATO standards in defense procurement.
continued Russian occupation of parts of Ukraine, and the
Despite some progress, significant challenges remain with
threat of further Russian aggression. Members of Congress
regard to corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and political
have expressed interest in understanding Ukraine’s military
infighting, and low transparency.
capabilities to help guide policymaking to support
Ukraine’s defense of its territorial integrity and its
Command and Control
aspirations for eventual NATO membership. (For more,
Command and control has been a central reform focus.
see, CRS Report R45008, Uk raine: Background, Conflict
Ukraine now requires the defense minister to be a civilian, a
with Russia, and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt.)
key NATO requirement. Some observers see continued
threats to civilian control of the military, as former general
Key Policy and Strategy Documents
Andriy Taran replaced Andriy Zagorodnyuk, the first
Multiple military and national security documents lay out
civilian and pro-reform defense minister, in 2020.
Ukraine’s military strategy, reforms, and defense policy.
Ukraine’s 2016 Strategic Defense Bulletin outlined priority
The military also has shifted toward a command system
reforms to achieve NATO standards, and its subsequent
more in line with NATO standards. Currently, the military
State Program for the Development of the Armed Forces
reports to the commander in chief of the armed forces.
(2017-2020) outlined implementation steps. In 2018,
Under the commander in chief, reforms split responsibilities
Ukraine continued the reform process with the Law on
between the chief of the general staff, responsible for
National Security, which created a framework to coordinate
strategic and force planning, and the commander of the
and simplify Ukraine’s defense planning and to implement
joint forces staff, responsible for operations. The shift
civilian control over the military.
toward NATO-style command and control is an ongoing
process, as many officers appear to remain influenced by
Ukraine updated its National Security Strategy and its
their Soviet and post-Soviet military training despite an
Military Security Strategy in 2020 and 2021, respectively,
increase in NATO training and educational opportunities.
laying out the country’s security and defense policies and
objectives. The National Security Strategy defines the main
Figure 1. Ukrainian Military Command Structure
principles of Ukraine’s national security, which include
identifying Russia as a long-term threat to its national
security and developing closer relations with the European
Union, NATO, and the United States. Ukraine’s March
2021 Military Security Strategy replaced its 2015 Military
Doctrine.
Budget and Defense Industry
The 2018 Law on National Security required that at least
5% of gross domestic product (GDP) be spent on security,

with 3% of the total going to defense. Economic realities,
Source: Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.
however, often mean defense spending in real terms is
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Ukrainian Armed Forces
Army
also recently deployed the new domestically produced
In 2014, Ukraine’s defense minister said the country had
Neptune coastal defense system, which includes a new anti-
6,000 combat-ready troops. Today, Ukraine’s army
ship missile.
numbers around 145,000-150,000 troops and has
significantly improved its capabilities, personnel, and
Air Force
readiness. The army is the largest component of Ukraine’s
Like Ukraine’s navy, its air force suffered significant losses
military and includes mechanized, armored, missile and
during Russia’s invasion. Russia captured or shot down
artillery, army aviation, and air defense units. The army
multiple fighters, fighter-bombers, helicopters, and
continues to implement reforms in line with NATO
transport aircraft during the conflict. These losses weakened
standards but remains heavily influenced by its Soviet
the air force, which previously had suffered from years of
legacy. Ongoing reform priorities include modernizing
neglect, underfunding, and a lack of training. Most of
equipment, training, and improving personnel management.
Ukraine’s planes and air defense systems are over 30 years
old.
Despite a large defense industry and stockpiles of
weaponry, much of Ukraine’s equipment is outdated or in
In 2020, the air force launched an expansive modernization
need of significant repair. Since 2014, Ukraine has sought
plan, Vision 2025, which committed 320 billion hryvnia
to modernize its tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery
($12 billion) to purchasing new multi-role fighters, trainer
systems. Most equipment are heavily upgraded versions of
jets, transport aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (including
legacy systems. The army als o continues to improve
Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones), and air defense systems.
training at both the individual and unit levels, which was a
This figure, however, is an ambitious projection (three
significant weakness in 2014. NATO and U.S. support are
times Ukraine’s annual defense budget) and likely will be
crucial to training efforts, although most training is limited
revised given Ukraine’s defense budget realities.
to the battalion level. The United States also supplies large
amounts of lethal and nonlethal weaponry.
Air Assault and Special Operations
Forces
Ukraine operates a mix of conscript and professional
Ukraine’s air assault brigades played a key role combatting
soldiers on contracts. By law, conscripts cannot serve on
Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine. Considered elite
the frontlines but have the opportunity to sign short or long-
troops, air assault units originally were light infantry under
term contracts upon the expiration of their terms of service.
the army’s command. Out of necessity and experience,
Ukraine has sought to create a professional
Ukraine’s air assault forces increased in size and
noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, based on NATO
transitioned into an independent command with heavier
standards. Low salaries, lack of educational opportunities,
equipment.
and a shortage of housing (especially for families) arguably
contribute to a high turnover rate and limit the retention of
Analysts generally agree that the creation of Ukraine’s
professional soldiers and NCOs.
special operations forces is one of the most significant
improvements since 2014, despite the small size of the
Navy
force. Formed with U.S. and NATO assistance, Ukraine’s
Ukraine’s navy lost 70% of its vessels and numerous
special operations forces operate along NATO standards
officers after Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea
and principles; Ukraine’s 140th Special Operations Forces
region. In the aftermath, Ukraine’s political and naval
Center passed NATO certification in 2019, allowing it to
leadership debated reforming the navy back into a balanced
deploy as part of the NATO Response Force.
fleet, a traditional mix of large and small vessels, or a
“mosquito fleet,” focusing on smaller vessels.
National Guard
Due to the conventional military’s limitations, Ukraine
In 2018, the Ukrainian navy adopted the Strategy of the
relied on volunteer battalions to help combat Russia’s 2014
Naval Forces of Uk raine Until 2035 and selected the
invasion of eastern Ukraine. These battalions operate as
mosquito fleet strategy, citing Russia’s dominant naval
light infantry, with some limited armor and artillery
position in the Black Sea and Ukraine’s limited resources to
capabilities, in support of the regular military. Observers
procure larger vessels. Additionally, due to advances in ship
raised concerns regarding government control, since
design and missile technology, Ukraine’s leadership argued
oligarchs, politicians or political parties, and some right-
that smaller vessels could accomplish maritime deterrence
wing extremist groups created or funded most battalions.
and defend Ukraine’s coastline and maritime zone. Progress
These concerns led Ukraine to consolidate all volunteer
has been slow, however, with a combination of Ukrainian
battalions under the command of the National Guard,
naval and defense industry interests advocating for a larger-
created in 2014 within the Interior Ministry. Observers
vessel fleet. To date, the United States has supplied 5
remain concerned about Ukrainian government oversight
Island-class patrol ships and 8 Mark VI patrol boats (with
and the independence of some battalions.
an option to purchase 16).
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
In addition, the navy includes two Marine Infantry brigades
Affairs
and numerous coastal defense units, equipped with artillery
and anti-ship missile capabilities. Marine Infantry are
IF11862
considered elite units, with one brigade permanently
deployed outside of Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov. Ukraine
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Ukrainian Armed Forces


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