Updated June 23, 2021
Algeria
More than two years after nationwide protests forced
Figure 1. Algeria at a Glance
longstanding President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to step down,
questions remain about the future of Algeria’s political
system and state-centric economy, which revolves around
oil and gas exports. President Abelmadjid Tebboune (75), a
former prime minister, was elected in late 2019 to succeed
Bouteflika, but some observers question his legitimacy and
influence within the complex elite networks known in
Algeria as le pouvoir (“the powers that be”). Tebboune won
nearly 60% of the vote but turnout was under 40%; his
reputed patron, army chief of staff General Ahmed Gaïd
Salah, died soon after; and the president spent months in
hospitals abroad after contracting COVID-19 in late 2020.
President Tebboune has pledged reforms and a “new
Algeria,” but structural changes have proven elusive. A new
constitution adopted by referendum in late 2020 did not
significantly alter the political system or expand civil
Source: CIA World Factbook, IMF; 2020 estimates unless noted
liberties. In any case, core aspects of Algeria’s
governance—such as the influence wielded by top figures
Political Context. Algeria remained comparatively stable
in the state security apparatus and energy sector—are not
between 2011 and 2018 amid turmoil elsewhere in North
directly rooted in constitutional prerogatives. In early 2021,
Africa, but the prospect of an uncertain leadership transition
President Tebboune dissolved the lower house of
loomed. Elected in 1999 as a decade of conflict with
parliament and called legislative elections for June 12, a
Islamist militants was winding down, President Bouteflika
year ahead of schedule. Turnout, at 23%, was historically
oversaw national reconciliation initiatives along with
low, reflecting apparent voter apathy and calls for a boycott
infrastructure and living standard improvements funded by
from some opposition parties and the protest movement.
oil and gas revenues. Official decisionmaking was often
The National Liberation Front (FLN), the largest party
opaque and subject to apparent factional disputes, while the
under Bouteflika, again won a plurality of seats, though its
rise of an oligarchic business class spurred corruption
share (26%) has declined in recent cycles.
concerns. Despite signs of advanced illness, Bouteflika was
reelected in 2014 and sought reelection in 2019. Observers
The largely leaderless protest movement, known as the
perceived an elite impasse over who might succeed him, as
hirak (“movement”), began in February 2019 and initially
members of the politically dominant “revolutionary
bridged regional, ethno-linguistic, class, and ideological
generation”—who participated in Algeria’s anticolonial war
divisions. Protests withered in 2020 amid the COVID-19
against France—age and pass away.
pandemic, pressure from authorities, fatigue among many
citizens, and internal disputes over tactics and goals.
The leading parties in parliament are the FLN, which led
Smaller numbers of protesters have gathered since early
the fight for independence and was the sole legal party for
2021 to express continued demands for more accountable
decades (105 out of 407 seats), the Islamist Movement of
and transparent governance. Authorities have oscillated
Society for Peace (64 seats), and the National Rally for
between conciliatory moves—such as prisoner releases and
Democracy (57 seats), considered close to the military.
offers of dialogue—and repression, including mass arrests
None backed Tebboune in the 2019 election. The
and the prosecution of prominent organizers and journalists
opposition is diverse and divided, comprising leftist,
for crimes such as “harming national unity.” In May 2021,
Islamist, Berber-led, and regionally focused parties. Some
the government announced a ban on unauthorized
analysts argue that Islamism has been discredited in Algeria
demonstrations, expanding existing restrictions on freedom
due to armed Islamists’ role in the 1990s conflict, or
of assembly.
alternately due to some Islamists’ accommodation with the
state. The Islamic Salvation Front, whose electoral gains in
COVID-19. As of June 2021, Algeria had reported fewer
1991 sparked a military coup and the subsequent conflict,
cumulative COVID-19 cases per capita than neighboring
remains banned. Religiously conservative Salafist social
Morocco or Tunisia, but also had given far fewer tests per
movements have grown in prominence in recent decades.
capita. The country has seen a gradual third wave of cases
since April 2021. Algeria has received vaccine doses
Terrorism and Counterterrorism
through the multilateral COVAX initiative and bilaterally
Cells linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) are
from China and Russia. Some COVID-related lockdown
reportedly active in some areas, but the pace of terrorist
measures, including travel restrictions, remain in place. The
attacks has decreased continuously since the early 2000s.
pandemic has worsened preexisting economic strains.
State security forces have conducted frequent
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Algeria
counterterrorism operations and bolstered their presence in
the 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya, and maintains
border regions over the past decade amid wars in Libya and
relations with the Asad government in Syria. Algeria
Mali. The government runs de-radicalization programs and
decried the Trump Administration’s decision in late 2020 to
seeks to control the content of religious sermons.
recognize Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the disputed
territory of Western Sahara; Algeria hosts and backs the
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) originated as a
Polisario Front, which seeks independence for the territory,
faction in Algeria’s 1990s conflict, but the group has
and recognizes the Polisario’s self-declared Sahrawi Arab
conducted few attacks in North Africa in recent years as its
Democratic Republic (SADR) as a state.
center of gravity has moved south and east. The most recent
large attack linked to the group within Algeria was in 2013,
Leaders’ skepticism of Western powers and NATO are a
when an AQIM splinter faction mounted an assault on a
legacy of the country’s history of French settler colonialism
natural gas plant in which 39 foreigners (including three
(1830-1962) and the long armed struggle for independence.
Americans) were killed. In 2017, the same splinter faction
Algeria’s defense budget (about $10 billion/year) is the
joined with AQIM’s southern wing and two Malian allies to
largest in Africa by far, although Algerian policy has long
form the Malian-led Group for Supporting Islam and
eschewed foreign deployments. The 2020 constitution
Muslims (aka JNIM). In June 2020, AQIM’s longtime
newly authorizes the president to deploy troops abroad with
leader, an Algerian reportedly based in northeast Algeria,
parliamentary approval, with uncertain implications.
was killed in northern Mali in a U.S.-assisted French
Algeria mediated Mali’s 2015 peace accord and backed
military strike. There have been few IS-linked attacks since
U.N.-led political talks in Libya that produced a unity
the beheading of a French tourist in 2014.
government the same year. However, often distrustful
The Economy and Energy Sector
relations with neighboring states, along with elite
Algeria has the world’s 11th- and 16th-largest proven
preoccupations with internal issues, have hindered the
reserves of natural gas and oil, respectively, and was the
country’s regional influence. Relations with Morocco
10th-largest natural gas producer as of 2019. It is also
remain tense due to disaccord over Western Sahara as well
estimated to have the world’s 3rd-largest recoverable shale
as a regional rivalry.
gas reserves. State-owned enterprises reportedly comprise
U.S. Relations
over half of the formal economy, led by the national oil and
The State Department characterizes Algeria as “a
gas company, Sonatrach. Most of Algeria’s natural gas
strategically located and capable partner” with which the
exports go to Europe, by pipeline or ship. China is the top
United States seeks to expand security cooperation, increase
source of Algeria’s imports and a key player in the
economic links, and build person-to-person ties. Successive
infrastructure and construction sectors.
U.S. Administrations have praised U.S.-Algeria counter-
High global energy prices prior to 2014 allowed Algeria to
terrorism cooperation (notably information sharing and
accrue sizable foreign reserves, which financed its large
coordination in multilateral forums) and coordination on
military and social programs that arguably assuaged dissent.
regional crises, while expressing concerns about Algeria’s
The subsequent price drop, along with stagnant exploration
challenging business environment. Although Algerian
and production, led to fiscal deficits, diminishing foreign
purchases of U.S. military equipment have grown in recent
reserves, and concerns about the sustainability of Algeria’s
years, the country’s overwhelming reliance on Russia for its
economic model. Even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic,
defense acquisitions has also sparked friction. Secretary of
which further depressed global energy prices, the IMF had
State Antony Blinken spoke with Algerian Foreign Minister
criticized Algeria’s reliance on deficit spending in the face
Sabri Boukadoum in April 2021, but Biden Administration
of debt payment arrears, rising unemployment, and
engagement with Algeria has otherwise been limited to
“slowing growth.” (Algeria has little external debt and does
date. In 2019, the Trump Administration hosted a U.S.-
not borrow from the IMF.)
Algeria Strategic Dialogue that had last convened in 2015.
Algerian leaders have long called for greater diversification
U.S. bilateral aid is limited ($2 million in FY2020
and foreign investment, but there have been few reforms in
appropriations) and highly focused on security. Additional
recent years to encourage such outcomes. A law requiring
funds are often allocated via regional or global programs,
at least 51% local ownership of investments was amended
e.g., to promote economic growth, strengthen civil society,
in 2020 to limit its scope, but it still applies to “strategic
and counter violent extremism. Some U.S. aid and arms
sectors,” i.e., energy, mining, defense, and pharmaceuticals.
sales are subject to restrictions under the Trafficking
Limits on capital flows and currency exchange further
Victims Protection Act of 2000, due to Algeria’s
inhibit foreign investment and private sector growth, as do
designation as Tier 3 (worst-performing), but successive
bureaucratic red tape, the absence of a modern financial
Presidents have issued a waiver under the act. Algeria
market, and an underdeveloped stock exchange and banking
participates in, but is not a top focus of, the State
system. Weak infrastructure links to neighboring countries
Department-led Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism
constrain trade; the border with Morocco has been closed
Partnership. Congress has not explicitly authorized the
since 1994. Algeria has applied to join the World Trade
Defense Department to aid Algeria in securing its border
Organization (WTO) but has yet to qualify.
with Libya, as it has for Tunisia and Egypt.
Foreign Policy and Regional Issues
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
Algeria’s foreign policy emphasizes sovereignty and
Sarah R. Collins, Research Assistant
noninterference. Its positions have often diverged from
those of the United States. For example, Algeria has close
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ties to Russia and China, is highly critical of Israel, opposed
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Algeria
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11116 · VERSION 16 · UPDATED