
 
 
Updated June 8, 2021
Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies
Both U.S. national strategy documents and Congress’s own 
Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) to assess U.S. 
bipartisan Future of Defense Task Force Report have 
competitiveness in AI and offer recommendations to 
identified a number of emerging technologies that could 
Congress. NSCAI released its final report in March 2021. 
have a disruptive impact on U.S. national security in the 
years to come. These technologies include 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) are a class 
  artificial intelligence, 
 
of weapon systems capable of independently identifying a 
lethal autonomous weapons, 
target and employing an onboard weapon system to engage 
  hypersonic weapons, 
and destroy the target without manual human control. 
  directed-energy weapons, 
 
LAWS may use computer algorithms and sensor suites to 
biotechnology, and 
 
classify an object as hostile, make an engagement decision, 
quantum technology. 
and guide a weapon to the target. This capability could 
As these technologies continue to mature, they could hold 
enable the system to operate in communications-degraded 
significant implications for congressional oversight, U.S. 
or -denied environments where traditional systems may not 
defense authorizations and appropriations, military concepts 
be able to operate. 
of operations, and the future of war.   
LAWS are not yet in widespread development, and some 
Artificial Intel igence  
senior military and defense leaders have expressed concerns 
about the ethics of ever fielding such systems. For example, 
Although there is no official U.S. government definition of 
in 2017 testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
artificial intelligence (AI), AI generally refers to a computer 
Committee, then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
system capable of human-level cognition. AI is currently 
General Paul Selva stated, “I do not think it is reasonable 
being incorporated into a number of military applications, 
for us to put robots in charge of whether or not we take a 
including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; 
human life.” Currently, there are no domestic or 
logistics; cyber operations; command and control; and 
international legal prohibitions on the development or use 
semi-autonomous and autonomous vehicles. As it develops, 
of LAWS; however, international discussions—held 
AI could enable new concepts of operations, such as 
primarily under the auspices of the United Nations 
swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which uninhabited 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons—are 
vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task), that 
ongoing. Approximately 30 countries have called for a 
could present both challenges and opportunities for the U.S. 
preemptive ban on the systems due to ethical 
military.  
considerations, while others have called for political 
Recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role 
declarations on or formal regulation of their development 
of AI in enabling increasingly realistic photo, audio, and 
and use. DOD Directive 3000.09 establishes U.S. 
video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.” 
guidelines for the development and fielding of LAWS to 
Adversaries could potentially deploy this AI capability as 
ensure that they comply with “the law of war, applicable 
part of their information operations in a “gray zone” 
treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of 
conflict. Deep fake technology could be used against the 
engagement.” 
United States and its allies to generate false news reports, 
influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt 
Hypersonic Weapons  
to blackmail diplomats. Some have suggested that AI could 
Hypersonic weapons—which fly at speeds of at least Mach 
be used to create full digital “patterns-of-life,” in which an 
5 (five times the speed of sound)—are in development in a 
individual’s digital footprint is mapped against other 
number of countries, including the United States. There are 
personal information, such as spending habits and job 
two categories of hypersonic weapons: 
history, to create comprehensive behavioral profiles of 
  Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are launched from a 
servicemembers, suspected intelligence officers, 
rocket before gliding to a target. (When HGVs are 
government officials, and private citizens. Similar to deep 
mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon 
fakes, this information could, in turn, be used for targeted 
system is often referred to as a hypersonic boost-glide 
influence operations or blackmail. 
weapon.) 
To coordinate defense-wide AI efforts, the Pentagon 
  Hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM) are powered by 
established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC, 
pronounced “jake”) in June 2018 under the Department of 
high-speed engines throughout the duration of their 
Defense’s (DOD’
flight. 
s) Chief Information Officer. In addition, 
the FY2019  National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 115-
In contrast to ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not 
232, §1051) established a National Security Commission on 
follow a ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to 
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Defense Primer:  Emerging  Technologies 
their destination, making defense against them difficult. 
be less restrained in both researching and applying 
Currently, no such defense against hypersonic weapons 
biotechnology, particularly as it relates to human 
exists, and experts disagree on the affordability and 
performance modification and biological weapons. 
technological feasibility of hypersonic missile defense 
options. These options could include interceptor missiles, 
Quantum Technology  
hypervelocity projectiles, laser guns, and electronic attack 
Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum 
systems. 
physics into technological applications. The Defense 
Science Board (DSB), an independent Department of 
According to open-source reporting, Russia fielded its first 
Defense (DOD) board of scientific advisors, has concluded 
HGV—the Avangard—in December 2019. Similarly,  some 
experts believe that China’s DF
that three applications of quantum technology hold the most 
-ZF HGV became 
promise for DOD: quantum sensing, quantum computers, 
operational as early as 2020. The United States is unlikely 
and quantum communications. 
to field an operational HGV system before 2023. Although 
HCM technology is less mature than HGV technology, 
Of these, the DSB states, quantum sensing is the most 
some reports suggest that Russia could field an HCM as 
mature and is currently “poised for mission use.” Quantum 
early as 2023. Other countries—including France, 
sensing could provide alternative positioning, navigation, 
Australia, India, Germany, and Japan—also have research 
and timing options that could in theory allow militaries to 
programs in hypersonic weapons.  
continue to operate at full performance in GPS-denied 
environments. Quantum sensors could also be used in an 
Directed-Energy Weapons 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance role. While 
DOD defines directed-energy (DE) weapons as those using 
quantum computers are in a comparatively early stage of 
concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather than kinetic 
development, they could enable advances in machine 
energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy 
learning, a subfield of AI. Quantum computers could also 
equipment, facilities, and/or personnel.” DE weapons—
potentially decrypt classified or controlled unclassified 
often colloquially referred to as “lasers”—could be used by 
information stored on encrypted media, allowing 
ground forces in counter rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-
adversaries to gain access to sensitive information about 
RAM) or short-range air defense (SHORAD) missions. 
U.S. military or intelligence operations. Finally, quantum 
They could offer low costs per shot and nearly limitless 
communications, which are in a nascent stage of 
magazines that, in contrast to existing conventional 
development, could theoretically enable the secure 
systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of 
networking of quantum military sensors, computers, and 
defending against missile salvos and swarms of uninhabited 
other systems. Military applications of quantum 
vehicles. Theoretically, DE weapons could also provide 
technologies could be constrained, however, by the fragility 
options for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-
of quantum states, which can be disrupted by minute 
of-light travel time; however, as in the case of hypersonic 
movements, changes in temperature, or other environmental 
missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability and 
factors. 
technological feasibility of this application.   
Potential Issues for Congress 
High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons, a subset of DE 
  What is the appropriate balance of funding across these 
weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic means of disabling 
and other emerging technologies, given the potential 
electronics, communications systems, and improvised 
military utility and technological maturity of each? 
explosive devices in the event of a conflict. In addition, the 
U.S. military has explored using HPM in a nonlethal “heat 
  Some analysts have argued that DOD should develop a 
ray” system for crowd control; however, the system was 
technology strategy to establish long-term priorities 
recalled—likely due to ethical and operational 
across these and other emerging technologies. What 
considerations.   
impact would such a strategy have on Congress’s 
ability to conduct oversight or evaluate budget 
Biotechnology  
requests? 
Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological 
  Some reports indicate that both DOD and defense 
applications. A number of developments in biotechnology 
industry have difficulty recruiting and retaining 
hold potential implications for national security. As a 2018 
personnel with expertise in emerging technologies. In 
Government Accountability Office report notes, the 
addition, analysts have noted that the development of 
Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and 
many emerging technologies requires experts from a 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, all assess 
number of disparate fields  (e.g., development of 
that biotechnologies, such as the low-cost gene-editing tool 
quantum technology could require experts in quantum 
CRISPR-Cas9, have the potential to “alter genes or create 
information science, machine learning, materials 
DNA to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such 
science, and other fields). What measures, if any, 
biotechnologies could be used to enhance [or degrade] the 
should the United States take to ensure that the 
performance of military personnel. The proliferation of 
emerging technology workforce is  sufficient to support 
synthetic biology—used to create genetic code that does not 
U.S. competitiveness and military superiority?   
exist in nature—may increase the number of actors that can 
create chemical and biological weapons” and could 
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and 
additionally enable the creation of adaptive camouflage, 
Global Security   
cloaking devices, or lighter, stronger, and—potentially—
self-healing body and vehicle armor. U.S. adversaries may 
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