Updated June 7, 2021
U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview
The United States maintains sanctions on Russia related to
E.O. 13694, as amended by E.O. 13757 (and codified by
Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, malicious cyber
CRIEEA), against those who engage in cyberattacks
activities and influence operations (including election
(1) against critical infrastructure, (2) for financial or
interference), human rights abuses, use of a chemical
commercial gain, (3) to significantly disrupt the
weapon, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with North
availability of a computer or network, or (4) to interfere
Korea, support to the governments of Syria and Venezuela,
with U.S. election processes and institutions.
and use of energy exports as a coercive or political tool.
E.O. 13848, against foreign persons who have “engaged
Sanctions against Russian individuals, entities, vessels, and
in, sponsored, concealed or otherwise been complicit in
aircraft (hereinafter, persons) may include the blocking of
foreign interference in a United States election.”
assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction; limits on access to the
U.S. financial system, including transactions involving U.S.
CRIEEA, Section 224 (22 U.S.C. 9524), against those
individuals and businesses; and denial of entry into the
who have engaged in activities undermining
United States. The United States also tightly controls
“cybersecurity against any person, including a
exports to Russia’s defense and energy sectors.
democratic institution, or government” on behalf of the
Russian government.
Invasion of Ukraine
Most Russian persons subject to U.S. sanctions are
E.O. 14024, against those responsible for or who have
designated in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion and
engaged in malicious cyber-enabled activities, election
occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and parts of eastern
interference, the undermining of democratic processes
Ukraine. The United States has imposed Ukraine-related
or institutions, and other “harmful foreign activities” on
sanctions on more than 735 persons, including about 75
behalf of the Russian government.
designations for a wider range of malign activities (totals
throughout are current as of the start of June 2021).
Under one or more of these authorities, the United States
has designated about 170 Russian persons, including
A series of executive orders issued in 2014 (E.O. 13660,
Russia’s leading security agency (FSB) and military
13661, 13662, and 13685), based on national emergency
intelligence agency (GRU), as of early June 2021.
authorities and codified by the Countering Russian
Designations also include a network of persons related to
Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA;
Russian financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the Internet
P.L. 115-44, Title II; 22 U.S.C. 9501 et seq.), provides a
Research Agency Prigozhin reportedly financed to conduct
framework for sanctions on those the President determines
influence operations in the United States, and Prigozhin-
have undermined Ukraine’s security, stability, sovereignty,
linked political, security, and economic operations in Africa
or territorial integrity, or have misappropriated state assets.
and elsewhere.
The E.O.s also authorize sanctions on Russian government
officials and persons who operate in the Russian arms
Under Section 231 of CRIEEA (22 U.S.C. 9525), the
sector, other key sectors of the Russian economy, or
United States also has imposed sanctions on foreign entities
occupied Crimea. In addition, they prohibit U.S. business,
engaged in “significant transactions” with Russia’s defense
trade, or investment in occupied Crimea.
or intelligence sectors. The United States has designated
Chinese and Turkish defense agencies and related persons
Sectoral sanctions, in particular, apply to specific entities in
for taking delivery of S-400 surface-to-air missile systems
Russia’s financial, energy, and defense sectors. U.S.
(as well as, in China’s case, Su-35 combat aircraft).
persons are restricted from engaging in specific transactions
with these entities, subject to directives issued by the
Corruption and Human Rights Abuse
Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of
Control. Sectoral sanctions also prohibit U.S. trade related
2012 (P.L. 112-208, Title IV; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) requires
to the development of Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore,
the President to impose sanctions on those he identifies as
or shale oil projects and such projects worldwide in which
having been involved in a “criminal conspiracy” uncovered
specified entities have an ownership interest of at least 33%
by Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky and his subsequent
or a majority of voting interests.
imprisonment and death. The act also requires the President
to impose sanctions on those he finds have committed gross
Malicious Cyber Activities and Influence
violations of internationally recognized human rights
Operations
against individuals fighting to expose the illegal activity of
Sanctions imposed on Russian persons in response to
Russian government officials or seeking to exercise or
malicious cyber activities and influence operations in the
defend human rights and freedoms. As of May 2021, 55
United States or elsewhere are based on four authorities:
persons are designated under the Sergei Magnitsky Act.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview
Fourteen Russian persons have been designated under the
In 2019, the Administration designated a bank jointly
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (P.L.
owned by Russian and Venezuelan state-owned companies
114-328, Title XII, Subtitle F; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) and
for providing support to Venezuela’s state-owned oil
E.O. 13818, which address human rights abuses and
company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. Also subject to U.S.
corruption more broadly. At least nine Russian nationals
sanctions for operating in Venezuela’s oil sector are two
have been publicly denied entry to the United States for
subsidiaries of Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft, a
significant corruption or gross violations of human rights
related individual, and two Russian-flagged vessels and
under authorities stated in Section 7031(c) of annual foreign
their registered owners.
operations appropriations acts. Two Russian officials are
subject to U.S. sanctions for the 2021 imprisonment of
Russia’s Coercive Use of Energy Exports
opposition figure Alexei Navalny.
Fourteen vessels and five entities are subject to U.S.
sanctions for participating in construction of Russia’s Nord
Use of a Chemical Weapon and
Stream 2 natural gas pipeline to Germany, pursuant to the
Weapons Proliferation
Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019, as
The United States has determined that Russia used a
amended (P.L. 116-92, §503; 22 U.S.C. 9526 note). One
chemical weapon in contravention of international law in
designated vessel and its registered owner also are subject
the March 2018 and August 2020 nerve agent attacks on,
to sanctions under Section 232 of CRIEEA (22 U.S.C.
respectively, UK citizen and former Russian GRU officer
9526). In May 2021, the Biden Administration waived new
Sergei Skripal and Russian opposition figure Alexei
sanctions on Nord Stream 2 AG, its chief executive officer,
Navalny. Both findings triggered sanctions under the
and corporate officers ; Nord Stream 2 AG is a Swiss-based
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
company that Russia’s state-owned Gazprom established to
Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act, P.L. 102-182, Title III;
construct and operate the pipeline.
22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.).
Other Sanctions and Restrictions
CBW Act-related sanctions include prohibitions on
Pursuant to the CBW Act and a U.S. Treasury directive
exporting munitions and commercial goods and services
issued under E.O. 14024, U.S. participation in the primary
that are controlled for national security reasons, arms sales,
market for Russian sovereign bonds and lending of funds to
foreign military financing, and other U.S. government
the Russian government are prohibited.
credit guarantee programs. Some restrictions are waived,
including those on foreign aid and transactions related to
The State Department identifies Russia as a government
government space program cooperation. Restrictions on
that fails to meet minimum standards for the elimination of
commercial space cooperation are waived until September
human trafficking; this “Tier 3” designation requires limits
1, 2021. The United States also has designated the GRU,
on aid and U.S. support for multilateral development loans.
the FSB, two GRU officers, three research institutes, and
Defense and foreign operations appropriations also restrict
five Russian government officials for one or both attacks.
assistance to the Russian government.
Under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation
Other Available Sanctions
Act (P.L. 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), state-owned arms
E.O. 14024 establishes sanctions in response to Russian
exporter Rosoboronexport and several other Russian
“harmful foreign activities,” including transnational
defense entities are denied most U.S. government
corruption; the unlawful killing or harming of U.S. persons
procurement contracts, export licenses, and trade in U.S.
or U.S. ally or partner nationals; activities that “undermine
Munitions List-controlled items. Rosoboronexport is
the peace, security, political stability, or territorial integrity
subject to other restrictions, as well.
of the United States, its allies, or its partners”; and the
circumvention of U.S. sanctions. The E.O. targets Russian
North Korea, Syria, Venezuela:
government officials and entities (and officials’ spouses and
Secondary Sanctions
families); persons operating in Russia’s technology, defense
About 20 Russia-related persons are subject to U.S.
and related material, or other sectors; and Russian persons
sanctions for evading U.N. sanctions restricting trade and
who support governments subject to U.S. sanctions or who
financial transactions with North Korea. Designations apply
disrupt energy supplies to Europe or Asia.
to persons trading in oil and oil products, financial services,
and exported labor, as well as for facilitating weapons of
Other Russia-related sanctions authorities exist under
mass destruction programs .
CRIEEA; the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity,
Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014
Rosoboronexport, three Russian banks, and related persons
(P.L. 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.); and the Ukraine
are subject to U.S. sanctions for their support to the Syrian
Freedom Support Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-272; 22 U.S.C.
government. In 2018, the Administration designated four
8921 et seq.). For more, see CRS Report R45415, U.S.
Russian persons as part of “a complex scheme Iran and
Sanctions on Russia, and CRS In Focus IF10962, Russia,
Russia have used to bolster the Assad regime and generate
the Sk ripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions.
funds for Iranian malign activity.” In 2019, the
Administration designated a Russian entity and associated
Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy
persons for serving as a front company in a “scheme to
Legislation
facilitate the [illicit transfer] of jet fuel to Russian forces
operating in Syria.”
Cory Welt, Specialist in Russian and European Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview
IF10779
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10779 · VERSION 9 · UPDATED