

INSIGHTi
Changes to Postal Regulatory Commission
Administration in the Postal Service Reform
Act of 2021
June 2, 2021
The Postal Service Reform Act of 2021 (H.R. 3076 and the similar, but not identical, S. 1720) includes a
number of provisions that would alter the authority and operations of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and
the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC). The chair of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform,
Representative Carolyn Maloney, a co-sponsor of H.R. 3076, has described the legislation as “crucial to
help the Postal Service get on a sustainable financial path for the future and ensure that the Postal Service
is transparent with Congress and the American People.” Discussion of the legislation has focused on the
finances of USPS but has also highlighted other changes, such as the provision of paid leave for postal
employees.
This Insight discusses two provisions of the legislation that would affect the operations of the PRC and
certain aspects of its relationship to USPS. The Insight begins with a brief summary of relevant aspects of
the PRC’s organization and authority and then proceeds to describe and analyze Sections 205 and 209 of
the Postal Service Reform Act, as introduced in the House.
Postal Regulatory Commission
The PRC (previously named the Postal Rate Commission) was established by the Postal Reorganization
Act of 1970 as an independent agency with oversight authority and reporting obligations covering certain
aspects of USPS including rate setting and performance. This role often puts the PRC at the center of
discussions about USPS services, finances, and sustainability. The authority of the PRC was changed in
2006 by the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA; P.L. 109-435), which adjusted PRC’s
role in the ratemaking process and granted it additional authority, including the power to issue subpoenas.
The PAEA also established additional independence for the PRC by ensuring that the agency’s budget
request is included in a transparent manner in the President’s budget and providing the agency with its
own inspector general (IG) to conduct USPS audits, investigations, and other oversight.
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Section 205—Budget Submission Process
Section 205 would amend the review and submission process for the PRC’s budget. Under current law
(39 U.S.C. §504(d)), the PRC, which is supported by the Postal Service Fund, is required to prepare and
submit a budget request each year. When USPS submits its budget request to the Office of Management
and Budget as part of the development of the President’s budget, it is required to include the PRC’s
request. The President is then required to submit that request to Congress as part of the budget. The
President is al owed to offer recommendations related to PRC’s budget but may not revise the request.
Prior to the passage of the PAEA in 2006, the PRC’s budget request was submitted to the USPS Board of
Governors and incorporated into the USPS budget but was not reported separately in the President’s
budget.
The Postal Service Reform Act of 2021 would add an additional step to this process by providing the
board an opportunity to revise the budget request. Specifical y, Section 205 would amend Title 39,
Section 504(d), of the U.S. Code by specifying that, beginning in FY2022, PRC must submit an annual
budget to the board by September 1 of each year. Submission of the request to the board would begin a
30-day window in which the board could, by “unanimous written decision,” adjust the total funding
request. The provision does not authorize the board to “adjust any activity proposed to be funded by the
budget.” If the board does adjust the total funding request, the PRC itself al ocates that adjustment across
its budget.
These new provisions would not change the process for the later steps in the budget submission process
for PRC, including the requirement that the budget submitted to Congress by the President include the
PRC’s approved request without revision. While these changes would give USPS a more active role in
deciding the PRC’s overal budget, the bil is designed to retain transparency to Congress, which can
exercise its own judgment on the PRC’s budget, and leaves final decisions on al ocation to the PRC.
Section 209—Inspector General
Section 209 would amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act) by placing the PRC under the
oversight jurisdiction of the IG for USPS and eliminating the separate Office of Inspector General for the
PRC. As noted, that office was established by PAEA in 2006. Currently, the PRC IG is appointed by the
PRC’s commissioners and can be removed only by a two-thirds majority of that group.
The PRC Office of Inspector General consists of an IG and two other employees, according to its most
recent semi-annual report to Congress. While, according to one 2002 Government Accountability Office
review, smal er Offices of Inspector General may face certain chal enges due to their size, and
consolidation may impact the independence of those IGs, they may offer certain advantages, including
their relationship with the agencies they oversee and the level of attention for the activities of those
agencies compared to what a larger agency’s Office of Inspector General might provide.
Past actions by Congress have resulted in the elimination of certain statutory Offices of Inspector General.
These historical examples followed the dissolution of agencies (e.g., the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Panama Canal Commission) as wel as the reorganization and consolidation of
agency functions (e.g., the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s consolidation into the Department
of Homeland Security and the reorganization of the duties of the U.S. Information Agency into the
Department of State).
While there is not a single method for weighing the costs and benefits of IG consolidation, Congress may
consider the nature of the work produced by the PRC IG and whether the USPS IG wil be able to provide
similar or enhanced oversight of the PRC.
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Author Information
Ben Wilhelm
Analyst in Government Organization and Management
Disclaimer
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