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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)

Background

According to the Army, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Family of Vehicles (FoV) is an Army-led, joint-service program designed to replace a portion of each service's light tactical wheeled vehicle fleets. The JLTV FoV consists of two variants: the four-seat Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) (**Figure 1**) and the two-seat Combat Support Vehicle (CSV) (**Figure 2**). The CTV is to support the General Purpose, Heavy Gun Carrier, and Close Combat Weapon Carrier missions. The CSV is to support the Utility/Shelter Carrier mission. The JLTV is transportable by a range of lift assets, including rotary-wing aircraft. Its maneuverability enables activities across the spectrum of terrain, including urban areas, while providing inherent and supplemental armor against direct fire and improvised explosive device threats.

Current Program Status

The JLTV is currently being produced by Oshkosh Defense, headquartered in Oshkosh, WI. In August 2015, the Army awarded Oshkosh a \$6.7 billion low-rate initial production (LRIP) contract to procure the initial 16,901 vehicles for the Army and Marines. In June 2019, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology) approved Army JLTV full-rate production (FRP). The Army plans for a follow-on full-rate production contract to be awarded to a single vendor in the fourth quarter of FY2022. It is planned to be a competitive five-year contract with five one-year options, with an expected value of \$12.3 billion, for about 30,000 JLTVs and 10,000 JLTV trailers. The Army began fielding LRIP JLTVs to units in April 2019, and Marine Corps units received their first LRIP JLTVs in February 2019.

Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) is a programmatic decision made when manufacturing development is completed and there is an ability to produce a small-quantity set of articles. It also establishes an initial production base and sets the stage for a gradual increase in production rate to allow for Full-Rate Production (FRP) upon completion of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).

Full-Rate Production (FRP) is a decision made that allows for government contracting for economic production quantities following stabilization of the system design and validation of the production process.

JLTV CTV

Figure 1. JLTV Combat Tactical Vehicle Variant (CTV)



Source: <https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-tactical-vehicle/>, accessed December 30, 2020.

JLTV CSV

Figure 2. JLTV Combat Support Vehicle Variant (CSV)



Source: <https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-tactical-vehicle/>, accessed December 30, 2020.

JLTV Service Procurement Objectives

According to the Joint Program Office, as of December 2020, the JLTV Authorized Acquisition Objective for each Service was

- Army: 88,811;
- Marine Corps: 15,390;
- Air Force: 408; and
- Navy: 120.

Budgetary Information

Table 1. FY2022 DOD JLTV Budget Request

Funding Category	Total Request (\$M)	Total Request (Qty)
RDT&E USA	2.6	—
RDT&E USMC	2.0	—
Procurement USA	603.9	2,744
Procurement USAF	97.4	158
Procurement USN	27.4	14
Procurement USMC	322.0	883

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, May 2021, p. 3-2.

Notes: RDT&E = Research, Development, Test & Evaluation; \$M = U.S. Dollars in Millions; Qty = FY2022 Procurement Quantities.

Foreign Military Sales

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notes approved JLTV sales to the United Kingdom (\$1.035 billion for 2,747 JLTVs) and Lithuania (\$170.8 million for 500 JLTVs).

Potential Issues for Congress

Has the JLTV Become a Major Bill Payer for Army Modernization?

With the Army's decision to reduce JLTV funding from FY2021 by \$336.6 million in FY2022 and corresponding reductions in procurement quantities, some may question if the JLTV has become a major bill payer for Army modernization, by reducing its procurement objective and/or by extending the overall procurement timeline, thereby pushing costs further into the future. As it stands at present, there appears to be a degree of program uncertainty, as well as questions concerning the validity of the Army's original requirements and plans for the JLTV.

Some defense experts have speculated that the Marine Corps might cut its JLTV buy, as the JLTV might prove to be too heavy for the Marines' planned pivot to a more expeditionary form of warfare. If this becomes the case, and the Army reduces its JLTV buy to fund modernization, there could be appreciable programmatic impacts of interest to policymakers.

What Is the Future of JLTV Procurement?

The Army's current modernization strategy is primarily focused on six modernization priorities that do not include the JLTV. With the Marine Corps downsizing per its March 2020 Force Design Initiative and adoption of a more expeditionary posture (possibly requiring fewer JLTVs), original JLTV procurement plans for the two major service customers might no longer be relevant. Despite the Army's intent to lower costs by competing a follow-on contract with another vendor by FY2022, slowing production rates and extended procurement timelines can act to increase costs. In addition, different versions of the JLTV produced by another vendor could result in additional operations and maintenance costs that can result from a mixed fleet of vehicles. Taken collectively, these issues might merit DOD and policymakers examining the future of JLTV procurement to help determine the current requirement for JLTVs, as well as whether decisions to extend procurement and recompute future production will result in increased programmatic costs.

For a more detailed historical discussion of the JLTV Program, see CRS Report RS22942, *Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress*, by Andrew Feickert.

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