Updated April 14, 2021
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
Overview
visit the [test site] to confirm that it has been irreversibly
North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and
dismantled,” but this has not yet occurred.
missile programs despite UN Security Council sanctions
and high-level diplomatic efforts. North Korea is observing
Nuclear Material Production
a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range
and Warheads
missile testing. Recent ballistic missile tests and an October
North Korea reportedly continues to produce fissile
2020 military parade suggest that North Korea is continuing
material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for
to build a nuclear warfighting capability designed to evade
weapons. North Korea restarted its plutonium production
regional ballistic missile defenses. Such an approach likely
facilities after it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in
reinforces a deterrence and coercive diplomacy strategy—
2009, and is operating at least one centrifuge enrichment
lending more credibility as it demonstrates capability—but
plant at its Yongbyon nuclear complex. During the
it also raises questions about crisis stability and escalation
September 2018 North-South Korea Pyongyang Summit,
control. Congress may choose to examine U.S. policy in
the North stated it would “permanently disable” the
light of these advances.
Yongbyon facilities if the United States took
“corresponding measures.” U.S. officials have said that
In the April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration by North and
other clandestine enrichment facilities likely exist. News
South Korea and the June 2018 U.S.-North Korea Joint
reports in August 2017 said that one component of the
Statement, Kim Jong Un pledged to improve relations and
intelligence community (IC), the U.S. Defense Intelligence
“work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean
Agency (DIA), estimated a stockpile of up to 60 nuclear
Peninsula.” However, the Director of National Intelligence
warheads. Some experts have estimated that North Korea
(DNI) said in his 2019 threat assessment to Congress that
could produce enough nuclear material for an additional
“North Korea is unlikely to give up all of its nuclear
seven warheads per year.
weapons and production capabilities, even as it seeks to
negotiate partial denuclearization steps to obtain key US
According to the U.S. IC, North Korea aims to develop a
and international concessions.” Trump and Kim held a
nuclear warhead that is “miniaturized,” or sufficiently
second summit in 2019 but were unable to reach agreement.
lightweight and small enough to mount on a long-range
ballistic missile. As of July 2017, a DIA assessment and
North Korean statements describe North Korea’s nuclear
some outside observers believed North Korea had achieved
arsenal as a deterrent to U.S. “nuclear war threats.” The
the level of miniaturization required to fit a nuclear device
U.S. intelligence community’s 2021 annual threat
on weapons ranging across the spectrum of its missiles,
assessment said North Korean leaders view nuclear
from short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to
weapons as “the ultimate deterrent against foreign
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).
intervention.” Kim Jong Un said at the 2016 Workers’ Party
Congress that “nuclear weapons of the DPRK can be used
Delivery Vehicles
only by a final order of the Supreme Commander of the
U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions prohibit North
Korean People’s Army [Kim Jong Un] to repel invasion or
Korea’s development of the means of delivering
attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make
conventional and nuclear payloads, in addition to the
retaliatory strikes.”
nuclear weapons themselves. UNSC resolutions ban “all
ballistic missile tests” by North Korea. A ballistic missile is
Nuclear Testing
a projectile powered by a rocket engine until it reaches the
North Korea has tested a nuclear explosive device six times
apogee of its trajectory, at which point it falls back to earth
since 2006. Each test produced underground blasts
using earth’s gravity. They are categorized as short-range,
progressively higher in magnitude and estimated yield.
medium-range, or intercontinental based on the distance
North Korea conducted its most recent test on September 3,
from the launch site they can strike a target. Ballistic
2017. A North Korean press release stated it had tested a
missiles can deliver nuclear and large conventional
hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear warhead) that
payloads at high speed and over great distances.
it was perfecting for delivery on an intercontinental ballistic
missile. In April 2018, North Korea announced that it had
North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and delivery
achieved its goals, would no longer conduct nuclear tests,
systems that possess certain critical features: mobility,
and would close down its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. It
reliability, potency, precision, and survivability. Mobile
dynamited the entrances to two test tunnels in May 2018
weapons have increased survivability compared with fixed
prior to the first Trump-Kim summit in front of a group of
launch sites and static stockpiles. Reliability, potency,
journalists. In an October 2018 meeting with Secretary of
precision, and in-flight maneuverability work together to
State Mike Pompeo, Kim Jong Un “invited inspectors to
maximize the impact of North Korea’s limited quantity of
weapons, launchers, and warheads. A key element to North
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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
Korean missile doctrine, therefore, is continued testing to
launch may have tested a variant of the KN-23, according
develop, ensure, and demonstrate these features.
to observers, and was called a “new-type tactical guided
projectile” by official North Korean press statements.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
North Korea improved its ability to strike the entire
North Korea has committed to expanding the performance
continental United States with an ICBM through a series of
of its precision guided tactical weapons. The newly
tests in 2017. The successful launches of the liquid-
developed KN-24 and KN-25 pose significant threats to
propellant, multistage Hwasong-14 (U.S. designated KN-
South Korea and U.S. assets on the peninsula. The KN-24
20) and Hwasong-15 (U.S. designated KN-22) in July and
is a tactical system with a mobile launcher, solid propellant,
November 2017 demonstrated significant advances in North
and relatively large payload. The KN-24 demonstrates the
Korean missile technology. Despite these improvements,
guidance system and in-flight maneuverability to achieve
reliability of these systems remains uncertain. Without
precision strikes. Outside experts assess that the North
further testing, neither the North Koreans nor others can
Koreans may ultimately intend the KN-24 to serve as a dual
assess whether the missiles will function as designed in
capable system.
combat. The absence of ICBM tests since the only
successful launch of the Hwasong-15 in November 2017
The KN-25 blurs the line between rocket and missile;
may also suggest that the North Korean missile force
however, it achieves the same effect as a traditional SRBM
possesses only a small quantity of these weapons or that it
by delivering destructive effects on a precision target at
is continuing its test moratorium for nontechnical reasons.
significant range thanks to advanced avionics, inertial and
North Korea displayed a larger new Hwasong ICBM at an
satellite guidance systems, and aerodynamic structures. The
October 2020 military parade but has not flight tested it.
KN-25 carries a conventional payload up to 380 km,
Experts debate whether the missile is intended for multiple
allowing it to strike any target in South Korea. Tests in
warheads (MIRV).
2019 and 2020 demonstrate that a crew can launch the four
rockets composing the KN-25 system at 20-second
Short- and Medium-Range Missiles
intervals. Since the KN-25 is a more economical system
In 2019 and 2020, North Korea increased the pace of short-
than traditional SRBMs, the North Koreans may seek to fire
range ballistic missile (SRBM) test launches. There was a
large numbers of these rockets in salvos to overwhelm the
break in testing between March 2020 and 2021, but a
ability of an adversary’s missile defense systems to
March 25 test launch of a short-range system ended the
successfully engage all incoming projectiles. Salvo firing
pause. These launches violate United Nations Security
projectiles gives them the greatest likelihood of
Council resolutions. North Korean SRBMs and medium-
accomplishing their intended effect in the face of even the
range ballistic missiles (MRBM), precision-guided multiple
most advanced missile defense systems.
launch rocket systems (MLRS), and artillery pose the most
acute near-term threats to other nations. Advances in these
The newest crop of North Korean weapons—including the
systems demonstrate the North Korean shift toward solid-
Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15, KN-15, KN-23, KN-24, and
propellants and satellite guidance systems; advances that
KN-25—demonstrates mobility, potency, precision, and has
could carry over to larger, more potent systems like the
characteristics that make the missiles difficult to defeat in
Hwasong series ICBMs. These developments provide the
flight. These traits suggest that the North Korean test
projectiles greater mobility and survivability prior to launch
program may seek to achieve more than a simple political
and greater potency and precision on target.
statement, and that it may be intended to increase the
reliability, effectiveness, and survivability of their ballistic
In the MRBM category, the KN-15 poses the greatest threat
missile force. North Korean tests have demonstrated
to North Korea’s regional adversaries and exhibits
growing success and, coupled with increased operational
advanced technology. Known in North Korea as the
training exercises, suggest a pattern designed to strengthen
Pukguksong-2, the KN-15 is a solid-propellant missile
the credibility of North Korea’s regional nuclear deterrent
capable of striking mainland Japan and carrying a nuclear
strategy.
or conventional payload—known as dual capable. The
North Koreans fire the missile from a tracked vehicle,
The recent advances in North Korea’s ballistic missile test
which gives the system mobility and makes prelaunch
program appear to be directed at developing capabilities to
targeting of the system difficult.
defeat or degrade the effectiveness of missile defenses
deployed in the region: Patriot, Aegis Ballistic Missile
The KN-23 SRBM exemplifies the most notable advance to
Defense (BMD), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
the North Korean inventory in the smaller category of
(THAAD). In addition, North Korea’s progress with
weapons. The May 2019 tests of two KN-23 missiles
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) suggests an
revealed an atypical flight path in which the weapon flew
effort to counter land-based THAAD missile defenses by
much closer to the ground than a traditional ballistic
launching attacks from positions at sea outside the
missile. On terminal approach to its target, the KN-23
THAAD’s radar field of view, although local Aegis BMD
conducted a “pull-up” maneuver, intended to complicate the
systems could likely still track these projectiles. The
ability of ground-based interceptors to destroy the hostile
Pukgugsong-3 SLBM was successfully tested in late 2019.
missile in flight by increasing its speed and angle of attack
In an October 2020 parade, North Korea unveiled a longer-
to the target. The KN-23 can strike any location on the
range SLBM (Pukguksong-4) but has not yet tested the
Korean peninsula with either a conventional or nuclear
weapon.
payload and uses a solid-propellant. A March 25, 2021,
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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs

IF10472
Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation


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