Updated March 26, 2021
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
stronger private sector; his government’s slow, gradualist
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
approach did not produce major economic improvements.
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
isolating the Cuban government.
In 2019, Cuba adopted a new constitution that introduced
some political and market-oriented economic reforms but
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift
continued the state’s dominance over the economy and the
away from sanctions and toward engagement and the
Communist Party’s predominant political role.
normalization of relations. Changes included the rescission
of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by Venezuela’s
terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of diplomatic
economic crisis, which has reduced Venezuelan financial
relations (July 2015); and an easing of restrictions on travel,
support; increased U.S. economic sanctions, which have
remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and
hurt Cuba’s nascent private sector; and the economic
financial services (2015 and 2016), accomplished through
decline associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019
amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,
(COVID-19) pandemic. The Cuban government reports the
administered by the Treasury Department, and the Export
economy contracted 11% in 2020. On January 1, 2021,
Administration Regulations, administered by the Commerce
Cuba eliminated its dual currency system, a major reform
Department. The restoration of relations led to increased
that was long debated. Economists maintain the currency
government-to-government engagement, with over 20
reform will have high costs initially but should boost
bilateral agreements and numerous dialogues.
productivity and development over the longer term.
President Trump unveiled his Administration’s Cuba policy
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic initially kept
in 2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back efforts
cases and deaths low, but both began to increase in late
to normalize relations. By 2019, the Administration had
2020. As of March 25, 2021, the country reported 408
largely abandoned engagement and, from 2019 to January
deaths and almost 70,000 cases. Cuba has been conducting
2021, significantly increased sanctions (see discussion
final trials for two vaccine candidates that it developed, but
below)—especially on travel and remittances—to pressure
some critics maintain the government should have acquired
the Cuban government on human rights and for its support
vaccines from abroad while developing its own vaccines.
of the Venezuelan government of Nicolás Maduro.
Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the
Although many observers expect the Biden Administration
government sharply restricting freedoms of expression and
to shift U.S. policy to focus again on engagement, sanctions
other basic rights. As of March 1, 2021, the human rights
imposed under the Trump Administration remain in place.
group Cuban Prisoners Defenders reported 135 political
During the U.S. election campaign, Biden said he would
prisoners, with 69 imprisoned for reasons of conscience. A
reverse Trump Administration policies that harmed the
November 2020 government crackdown on the San Isidro
Cuban people without advancing democracy and human
Movement, a civil society group opposed to restrictions on
rights. The White House press s ecretary said on March 9
artistic expression, spurred a protest by several hundred
that although a Cuba policy shift was not among the
Cubans, many young artists, and focused international
President’s top priorities, the Administration was
attention on the poor human rights situation.
“committed to making human rights a core pillar” of policy
and “committed to carefully reviewing policy decisions
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
made in the prior administration, including the decision to
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
designate Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.”
2017 that introduced new sanctions, including restrictions
on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
Cuban Political and Economic Developments. In April
military. The State Department issued a list of “restricted
2018, Vice President Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl
entities” in 2017, which was updated several times, most
Castro as president. Castro continued to head the Cuban
recently January 8, 2021. The “Cuba restricted list”
Communist Party (PCC) but is scheduled to step down at
includes 231 entities and subentities (ministries, holding
the next party congress, scheduled for April 16-19, 2021.
companies, hotels, stores, and a wide variety of companies).
The selection of Díaz-Canel, now 60 years old, reflected the
The Administration imposed a series of sanctions, discussed
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several
below, and initiated a campaign highlighting allegations of
years ago and marked the first time since the 1959 Cuban
coercive labor practices in Cuba’s medical missions abroad.
revolution that a Castro was not in charge of the

government. While in power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
Castro began to implement significant economic policy
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
changes, moving toward a more mixed economy with a
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July 2019, it
2020 for human rights violations. Treasury imposed
sanctioned Cuba’s state-run oil import/export company.
financial sanctions on the head of GAESA, a military

holding company, in September 2020 and on the
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
Ministry of the Interior and its minister in January 2021.
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
Terrorism Designations. In May 2020, the Secretary of
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
State (pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
Control Act) added Cuba to the annual list of countries
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
certified as not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
efforts, the first time since 2015. On January 11, 2021,
of the confiscation. Previous Administrations had
the Secretary designated the Cuban government a state
suspended, at six-month intervals, the right to file such
sponsor of international terrorism (the previous such
lawsuits. To date, 36 lawsuits have been filed against
designation was rescinded in 2015). He cited Cuba’s
U.S. and foreign companies, including cruise ship
harboring of several U.S. fugitives since the 1970s and
operators, airlines, travel booking companies, and
of 10 leaders of Colombia’s National Liberation Army
hotels; several lawsuits have been dismissed.
(a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization), who

had traveled to Cuba in 2017 to engage in peace talks
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In June
with the Colombian government. The economic
2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-to-
sanctions associated with the terrorism designation are,
people educational travel and the Commerce
in large part, redundant to other U.S. sanctions already
Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private
in effect. Nevertheless, a terrorism designation, requires
and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from
the Commerce Department to place Cuba on its most
going to Cuba. The Transportation Department
restrictive export licensing list, which could impede
suspended commercial flights to cities other than
transactions related to technology. Some sectors,
Havana in December 2019; charter flights to cities other
seeking to avoid any perception of sanctions violations,
than Havana in January 2020; and private charter flights
may become more risk averse in transactions with Cuba.
to Havana in October 2020. In September 2020,
Treasury prohibited U.S. travelers from staying at over
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel. Between late 2016
400 hotels and privately owned residences identified by
and May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy Havana community
the State Department as owned or controlled by the
members suffered a series of unexplained injuries,
Cuban government or by a prohibited government
including hearing loss and cognitive issues. The State
official or PCC Party member (or close relative).
Department maintains the investigation into the injuries has

not reached a conclusion regarding the cause or source. On
In September 2019, Treasury capped family remittances
December 5, 2020, the National Academies of Sciences,
to $1,000 per quarter per Cuban national and eliminated
Engineering, and Medicine released a report concluding the
the category of donative remittances. In 2020, the State
most plausible mechanism for the source of the health
Department added to its “Cuba restricted list” two
symptoms was directed pulsed radio frequency energy.
Cuban companies that facilitate the processing of
remittances. In November 2020, Treasury prohibited the
117th Congress. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
processing of remittances through entities on the “Cuba
reported two human rights resolutions on March 24, 2021:
restricted list.” This resulted in Western Union—the
S.Res. 37 would express solidarity with the San Isidro
major financial services company used for transmitting
Movement, condemn attacks against artistic freedoms, and
remittances to Cuba—to cease its operations in Cuba.
call for the repeal of laws that violate freedom of expression

and the release of arbitrarily detained artists, journalist, and
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
activists; and S.Res. 81 would honor Las Damas de Blanco,
2019, Treasury ended the use of U-turn transactions that
a woman-led nonviolent human rights group, and call for
had allowed banking institutions to process funds
the release of all political prisoners in Cuba.
transfers originating and terminating outside the United
States. In October 2019, the Commerce Department
Other bills introduced to date are H.R. 287 and S. 689,
restricted Cuba’s access to leased commercial aircraft;
which would prohibit the rescission of Cuba’s designation
reimposed a 10% de minimis rule (from 25%) requiring
as a state sponsor terrorism list until Cuba satisfies certain
a third country-based company exporting goods to Cuba
conditions in the LIBERTAD Act (P.L. 104-114); S. 249,
with more than 10% U.S.-origin content to apply for a
which would lift sanctions and call for negotiations on
license; and imposed licensing requirements for
property claims and human rights; and H.R. 198, which
exporting certain donated items to organizations
would waive certain prohibitions with respect to Cuban
controlled by the Cuban government or PCC and items
nationals coming to the United States to play organized
for telecommunications infrastructure.
professional baseball.
Targeted Human Rights Sanctions. The State
Also see CRS Insight IN11611, Cuba: Challenges for U.S.
Department imposed visa restrictions on Raúl Castro in
Policymakers in 2021; CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S.
September 2019 for human rights violations in Cuba and
Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the Trump
Venezuela. Further visa restrictions were imposed on
Administration; and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S.
Cuba’s Interior Minister in November 2019 (until his
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.
death in 2020) and Cuba’s defense minister in January
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

IF10045
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 82 · UPDATED