INSIGHTi
Colombia: Challenges for U.S. Policymakers
in 2021
March 9, 2021
Colombia’s close al iance with the United States has been forged over 20 years from an enduring security
and counternarcotics partnership initiated under Plan Colombia and Peace Colombia. These strategies
helped end a five-decade internal armed conflict that kil ed some 260,000 Colombians and displaced
mil ions. Targeted violence stil grips the country, complicated by a steep economic contraction of 6.8%
due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
Many Members of Congress continue to focus on priority aspects of the U.S.-Colombia relationship:
close collaboration on security and countering il icit drugs that are destined mainly for the U.S. market;
trade, energy, and other forms of cooperation; and Colombia’s human rights record and social investment
policies to foster post-conflict stability. Il icit cultivation of coca peaked in 2019 but remains at
historical y high levels, and Colombian cocaine is one driver of an overdose crisis in the United States.
Colombia presents a paradox for some observers. On the one hand, Colombia’s reckoning with its long,
drug-fueled conflict continues to divide the country. On the other hand, Colombia’s innovation in
addressing its security chal enges, such as receiving nearly 2 mil ion Venezuelans fleeing their crises-
ridden country, points to Colombia’s continued capacity for regional leadership.
Peace Accord Developments and Human Rights Concerns
Colombia’s 2016 peace treaty with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) resulted in the
demobilization of 13,000 insurgents and the transformation of the FARC from a leftist guerril a army to a
political party. The party, now cal ed Comunes, temporarily holds guaranteed seats in Congress. The
peace accord also established a transitional justice court, cal ed the JEP by its Spanish acronym, to
identify and punish crimes committed during the conflict. Often hindered by controversy, the JEP
produced in early 2021 two significant indictments of grave human rights crimes:
 In late January, the JEP ruled that eight top former FARC leaders, including two sitting in
the Colombian Congress and the FARC’s former supreme leader, were guilty of war
crimes related to kidnapping and hostage abuse. The accused former combatants
indicated they would accept the charges, affording them access to alternative sentencing
of 8 years rather than a 20-year prison sentence under “regular” justice.
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 In February, a JEP investigation concluded the Colombian Armed Forces (mainly the
Army) had kil ed 6,400 Colombian civilians, who were then falsely presented as enemies
kil ed in combat. These so-cal ed false positive murders were double the number
recognized in prior military and civilian court cases. The JEP’s initial finding is that the
murders took place mainly from 2002 to 2008, when U.S. foreign assistance was at its
highest.
President Iván Duque, elected in 2018 from the conservative Democratic Center party, campaigned as a
peace accord critic, although he embraced consolidating “peace with legality.” Many Colombians have
protested what they view as his government’s lackadaisical peace accord compliance, while others have
questioned the former FARC’s role in Colombia’s democracy. Anti-violence efforts by the Duque
Administration, including protecting social leaders after the FARC’s demobilization, have received
external criticism. Since the peace deal was ratified, nearly 260 demobilized FARC fighters, al egedly
under government protection, have been kil ed. In its 2020 annual report, the U.N. High Representative
for Human Rights found 133 social leaders—including human rights defenders and ethnic Colombians,
such as indigenous and Afro-Colombian leaders—were kil ed in 2020, among 500 murdered since the
peace accord was signed. In addition, the U.N. report found 292 people died in massacres in 2020,
following a steady rise in mass kil ing events in recent years.
An additional chal enge for Colombia is that it has taken in more than 1.7 mil ion refugees and migrants
who have fled Venezuela since 2018. In February 2021, the Duque Administration unveiled a program for
Venezuelans living in Colombia, offering a decade of temporary protection with access to health care,
work permits, and other social services and, according to the government’s decree, a path to citizenship.
Hailed by many humanitarian leaders as a major innovation to address migration crises regional y and
global y, others cautioned the Colombian government’s surprising move could imperil the Duque
government if citizen demands for health and economic assistance fail to be met as Colombia attempts to
recover from the pandemic.
U.S. Policy and the 117th Congress
Congress has provided about $12 bil ion in bilateral aid to help implement Plan Colombia and its
successor strategies since FY2000. Congress general y has supported such aid, though, at times, it has
diverged on whether U.S. assistance should be weighted toward counternarcotics and security or toward
development, peace, and human rights. Congress appropriated more than $461 mil ion for bilateral aid to
Colombia for FY2021 in the omnibus legislation for foreign operations (P.L. 116-260), marking the
highest level of bilateral assistance appropriated in a decade,
The Trump Administration’s focus in U.S.-Colombian relations was largely on containing impacts from
Venezuela and reducing drug flows. In August 2020, the Trump Administration announced a new U.S.-
Colombian initiative to bring funding from several U.S. agencies to leverage investment in rural, marginal
areas to spur Colombia’s post-pandemic recovery. Several policy analysts predict Colombia’s relations
with the United States under the Biden Administration likely wil remain close. However, U.S. policy may
be shaped by Biden’s stated regional aims of democratic strengthening through building the rule of law
and protecting human rights, potential y opening areas of tension.
Some Members of Congress are focused on Colombia’s regional role in security and drug interdiction, as
wel as its leadership in coping with the failing state of Venezuela on its northern border. Others remain
concerned about human rights and delayed peace accord compliance, especial y surrounding the
government’s efforts to establish a comprehensive state presence in rural zones to curb criminal and
armed group expansion, including dissident guerril a groups. Congressional oversight of U.S. assistance
to Colombia’s antidrug efforts may consider the effectiveness of traditional measures, such as a planned
restart of widespread aerial eradication of coca, or alternative approaches, such as prioritizing voluntary

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eradication and alternative development, which some analysts maintain is the only strategy to sustainably
lower drug supply.
For more, see CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations.


Author Information

June S. Beittel

Analyst in Latin American Affairs



Disclaimer
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