Updated February 1, 2021
U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes
Introduction
December 4, 2018. The official did not specify the
Beginning in 2017, the United States has submitted a series
proposed speed value. The proposal also included a method
of proposals to the Missile Technology Control Regime
for determining the speed of such a UAS, a feature not
(MTCR) partners that would relax the regime’s export
contained in the current MTCR annex, and a definition of
guidelines for certain Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).
“cruise missile.” The proposed changes would not have
Advocates of altering the guidelines to ease such exports
applied to cruise missiles or affect current MTCR treatment
argue that increasing competition from foreign UAS
of either complete production facilities or technology for
manufacturers is undermining the competitive advantage of
the development and production of complete systems.
their U.S. counterparts. Other observers have emphasized
Then-Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford noted
the need to maintain the MTCR’s standards, which are
during a July 24, 2020, event that the United States has
widely regarded as effective. For more information on the
“repeatedly … made technical changes and various other
MTCR, see CRS Report RL33865, Arms Control and
adjustments to our reform proposal in response to issues
Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements.
raised and ideas that were suggested by our MTCR
The MTCR, according to its website, “seeks to limit the
partners.” The proposed changes were a part of a broader
risks of proliferation of” nuclear, biological, and chemical
Donald Trump Administration UAS export policy
weapons (NBC weapons) “by controlling exports of goods
announced in April 2018 that replaced a similar 2015
and technologies that could make a contribution to delivery
Obama Administration measure.
systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.”
Established in 1987 by the United States and six other
On July 24, 2020, the Trump Administration announced a
countries, the MTCR, which holds several meetings per
new UAS export policy similar to the March 2018 proposal
year and currently consists of 35 partner countries, is an
described above. The new policy treats “a carefully selected
informal voluntary arrangement whose partners agree to
subset of MTCR Category I UAS, which cannot travel
apply common export policy guidelines to an annex
faster than 800 kilometers per hour, as Category II” and
containing two categories of controlled items. Partner
thereby overcomes the MTCR’s “strong presumption of
countries implement these guidelines pursuant to national
denial” for these systems. A January 12, 2021, final rule
legislation and regularly exchange information on relevant
from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry
export licensing issues, including denials of technology
and Security (BIS) implements the relevant changes to U.S.
transfers. The MTCR guidelines apply to both armed and
dual-use licensing procedures. BIS’s annual report to
unarmed UAS.
Congress for FY2020, noting the cancellation of all 2020
MTCR meetings, explains that the United States adopted
According to the MTCR, Category I items are the most
this policy unilaterally because there were “no venues for
sensitive and include complete UAS “capable of delivering
further progress in the MTCR in the foreseeable future.”
a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km,
Ford stated on July 24, 2020, that the United States would
their major complete subsystems … and related software
“keep promoting” the above-described U.S. proposal to the
and technology,” as well as “specially designed” production
MTCR.
facilities for these UAS and subsystems. Partner
governments should have “a strong presumption to deny”
Category I UAS Exporters
such transfers, regardless of their purpose, but may transfer
such items on “rare occasions.” The guidelines prohibit
The United States has exported MTCR Category I UAS to
France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom; all of
exports of production facilities for Category I items.
these governments are MTCR partners. Press and
Regime partners have greater flexibility with respect to
nongovernmental expert reports also name China and the
authorizing exports of Category II items, which include less
United Arab Emirates (UAE) as exporters of MTCR
sensitive and dual-use missile related components. This
Category I UAS. China is not an MTCR partner but agreed
category also includes complete UAS, regardless of
in 1992 to adhere to the MTCR guidelines. The UAE is not
payload, capable of ranges of at least 300 km, as well as
an MTCR partner; the government has no policy
other UAS with certain characteristics.
concerning Category I UAS exports, a UAE government
Details
representative told CRS on December 26, 2018, adding that
the country needs no such policy because it does not
The United States first tabled a white paper concerning this
produce or export such systems.
aspect of UAS exports during the 2017 MTCR Plenary
meeting. A U.S. proposal submitted during the March 2018
Potential Threat
MTCR Technical Experts Meeting would have provided
Experts have expressed concern for at least 25 years that
Category II treatment for a certain subset of UAS with a
“maximum speed value,” as well as associated parts and
UAS proliferation would enable the spread of NBC
weapons; specifically, some observers have argued that
components, a Department of State official told CRS on
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U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes
hostile actors could convert some types of UAS into cruise
“responsibility for taking all steps necessary to ensure that
missiles or incorporate UAS technology into such missiles.
the item is put only to its stated end-use.” Moreover, a
RAND reports from 2014 and 2018 have downplayed this
government is only to authorize transfers of items that
risk, however. Whether any country is acquiring or
“could contribute to [an NBC] delivery system” if the
attempting to acquire UAS for developing or producing
government receives “appropriate assurances from the
cruise missiles is unclear. Some observers have also warned
[recipient] government” that the recipient will use the items
that hostile governments or nonstate actors could use UAS
only for their stated purpose and will refrain from
for disseminating chemical and biological agents.
modifying, replicating, or retransferring the items without
the exporting government’s prior consent.
The proliferation implications of the new U.S. policy are
uncertain. The January 2021 BIS rule explains that the
Other multilateral regimes restrict the export of
UAS subject to the new policy are “widely used in
technologies that could enable the development of NBC
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
payloads for UAS. For example, the Nuclear Suppliers
missions and various commercial and other applications not
Group (NSG) governs nuclear-related exports, and the
involving” NBC delivery. Faster delivery vehicles are
Wassenaar Arrangement performs a similar function with
widely regarded as more effective, but the potential effects
respect to conventional arms and certain dual-use goods and
of the proposal’s speed component on NBC weapons
technologies. The Australia Group is the analogous
proliferation is unclear. Furthermore, relaxing MTCR UAS
organization for technologies relevant to chemical and
controls could set a negative precedent, according to at least
biological weapons.
one expert. Former State Department official Vann Van
Diepen warned in a February 2018 speech that “changes
U.S. Controls
made to MTCR Category I controls on non-cruise-missile
In addition to the controls implemented as part of U.S.
UAVs” could legitimize a future MTCR decision to relax
membership in the multilateral groups described above, the
controls on conventionally armed Category I ballistic and
United States imposes a number of other restrictions on
cruise missiles, given these missiles’ “increasing role in
UAS exports. The State Department administers export
conventional military operations.”
controls on military UAS and other defense articles; the
statutory basis for this system is the Arms Export Control
Other MTCR Constraints on
Act (AECA; P.L. 94-329). Section 71(a) of that law
Proliferation
requires the Secretary of State to maintain a list of all items
The MTCR guidelines state that governments should
on the MTCR annex that are not controlled pursuant to U.S.
consider six factors when considering requests for the
dual-use controls. The AECA also restricts the uses to
export of MTCR annex items: (1) concerns about NBC
which U.S.-origin defense articles may be put and prohibits
proliferation; (2) the “capabilities and objectives of the
transfers of such items to third parties without U.S.
missile and space programs of the recipient state”; (3) the
government permission. For example, Section 38(a)(2)
“significance of the transfer in terms of the potential
requires that the executive branch “take into account”
development” of NBC delivery systems; (4) the
whether such an export would “contribute to an arms race
“assessment of the end use of the transfers,” including the
or regional instability” or “aid in” NBC weapons
government assurances described below; (5) the
development. The Export Controls Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-
“applicability of relevant multilateral agreements”; and (6)
232, Subtitle B, Part I) provides broad, detailed legislative
the “risk of controlled items falling into the hands of
authority for the President to implement controls on the
terrorist groups and individuals.”
export of dual-use items, including dual-use UAS and
related components. U.S. regulations on dual-use exports
The MTCR guidelines provide other mechanisms for
contain catch-all controls with respect to UAS.
preventing UAS exports from contributing to NBC
weapons proliferation. For example, the guidelines stipulate
The U.S. government also implements regulations to ensure
that a strong presumption of denial applies to transfers of
that recipients of U.S.-origin UAS use the items for their
any item on the MTCR annex or any unlisted missile if the
declared purpose. According to an April 2018 State
partner government “judges, on the basis of all available,
Department fact sheet, the United States will transfer
persuasive information” that the items “are intended to be
military UAS “only with appropriate technology security
used for” NBC delivery. Moreover, partner governments’
measures.” Both the State and Commerce Departments
export controls must require authorization for the transfer of
conduct end-monitoring to determine whether recipient
unlisted items in cases where the government has informed
countries are using exported items appropriately. Some
an exporter that such items “may be intended, in their
military UAS “may be subject to enhanced end-use
entirety or part, for use in connection with [NBC] delivery
monitoring,” as well as “additional security conditions,” the
systems … other than manned aircraft.” These restrictions
fact sheet says. According to the Defense Security
are known as “catch-all” controls.
Cooperation Agency, articles subject to such monitoring
“are accompanied by specialized physical security and
In addition, the MTCR guidelines state that, in cases where
accountability notes.” U.S. transfers of MTCR Category I
the exporting government does not judge the proposed
UAS also “shall require periodic consultations with” the
Category I UAS transfer as intended for NBC delivery, the
U.S. government with respect to the systems’ use,
government is to obtain “binding government-to-
government undertakings” from the recipient state that
according to the State Department fact sheet.
“[n]either the items nor replicas nor derivatives thereof will
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
be retransferred without” the exporting government’s
consent. The exporting government must also assume
IF11069
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U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11069 · VERSION 8 · UPDATED

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