Legal Sidebari

The Insurrection Bar to Office: Section 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment
January 29, 2021
In the aftermath of the events of January 6 in and around the Capitol, there have been calls for
accountability for those who participated, as well as leaders who may have helped instigate it. The breach
of the Capitol resulted in numerous injuries, multiple deaths, and significant property damage. It also
delayed the Congress’s constitutional duty of certifying electoral votes for President-Elect Joseph Biden
and caused Capitol Police and other law enforcement personnel to evacuate the Vice President and
Members of Congress from the House and Senate floors to safer locations. Some observers, historians,
and other commentators are wondering whether the Disqualification Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
might provide a mechanism to disqualify from holding office individuals who participated in or
encouraged the siege, including former and sitting government officials.
Invocation of the Disqualification Clause could raise a number of novel legal questions involving the
activities that could trigger disqualification, the offices to which disqualification might apply, and
mechanisms by which disqualification could be enforced. The Clause has been seldom used, and the few
times it has mainly arose out of the Civil War—a very different context from the events of January 6. It is
therefore unclear how much past precedents provide useful guidance for its application to the events of
January 6. This Legal Sidebar describes the Disqualification Clause, explains to whom it might apply and
what activities could incur a bar on holding office, and discusses possible mechanisms to implement it.
The Disqualification Clause
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No Person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-
President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who,
having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or
as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support
the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of
each House, remove such disability.
In short, Section 3 appears to apply to any covered person who has taken an oath to uphold the
Constitution of the United States and thereafter either (1) engages in insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or (2) gives aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States, unless a supermajority of
Congress “removes such disability.”
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Enacted in the aftermath of the Civil War, it seems specifically designed for the Reconstruction Era, but it
has not expired and may be applicable to modern times as well. Section 3 was for the most part used only
for the short period between its ratification and the 1872 enactment of the Amnesty Act. The Amnesty Act
removed the disqualification from most Confederates and their sympathizers and was enacted by a two-
thirds majority in accordance with the terms of Section 3. The Amnesty Act appears to be retrospective
and apparently would not apply to later insurrections or treasonous acts.
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not expressly require a conviction and historically, one was
not necessary. Reconstruction Era federal prosecutors brought civil actions in court to oust officials linked
to the confederacy, and Congress in some cases took action to refuse to seat Members. Section 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment was last used in 1919 to refuse to seat a socialist congressman accused of having
given aid and comfort to Germany during the First World War, irrespective of the Amnesty Act. The
congressman, Victor Berger, was eventually seated at a subsequent Congress after the Supreme Court
threw out his espionage conviction for judicial bias.
To Whom Does Section 3 Apply?
The bar against office-holding applies to Members of Congress, officers of the United States, members of
state legislatures, and state executive or judicial officers, who previously swore an oath to support the
Constitution of the United States and later break that oath by committing the acts mentioned. The offices
to which such persons are then barred include seats in Congress, membership in the Electoral College,
and any civil or military office under the United States or any state. Although not expressly referenced,
the bar appears historically to have applied to judgeships. There may be an argument that because the
President is not covered explicitly by the provision, the presidency itself is exempt from the
disqualification. In contrast, for example, the Impeachment Clause of the Constitution applies to the
“President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States,” which suggests in that clause, the
President might not be a “civil Officer of the United States.” However, it may be more likely that the
President is included as an officer of the United States (unlike Members of Congress and electors, which
may be why they are expressly included). One scholar notes, the drafting history of Section 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment also suggests the President is covered:
During the debate on Section Three, one Senator asked why ex-Confederates “may be elected
President or Vice President of the United States, and why did you all omit to exclude them? I do not
understand them to be excluded from the privilege of holding the two highest offices in the gift of
the nation.” Another Senator replied that the lack of specific language on the Presidency and Vice-
Presidency was irrelevant: “Let me call the Senator’s attention to the words ‘or hold any office, civil
or military, under the United States.’”
What Activities Trigger the Bar?
Determining who has engaged in either of the two disqualifying activities, that is, engaging in
insurrection or rebellion or giving aid or comfort to an enemy, is likely to be a difficult task given the
scarcity of precedents and lack of clear definitions.
Insurrection and Rebellion
The Constitution does not define “insurrection” or “rebellion.” The Constitution, however, does empower
Congress to call forth the militia “to suppress Insurrection.” It seems to follow that Congress has the
authority to define “insurrection” for that purpose, which it has arguably done through enactment of the
Insurrection Act. Part of that Act authorizes the President to call up the militia and Armed Forces in the
event of “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the
United States [that] make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the

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ordinary course of judicial proceedings. . . .” That language might provide a point of reference for
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. Another part of the Insurrection Act, enacted approximately three
years after the Fourteenth Amendment and thus arguably particularly relevant, authorizes the use of
armed forces in cases where insurrectionists “oppose[] or obstruct[] the execution of the laws of the
United States or impede[] the course of justice under those laws.” Congressional activities, including
fulfilling the constitutional duty of certifying electoral votes, would arguably qualify as an execution of
the laws of the United States. The availability of judicial proceedings to enforce the law, however, may
provide a countervailing consideration.
As the Supreme Court has observed in the context of the Insurrection Act, it is generally up to the
President to determine whether a civil disturbance rises to the level of an insurrection or obstruction of the
laws serious enough to overcome the ability of civil authorities to suppress it. Consequently, a presidential
invocation of the Insurrection Act would likely suffice to establish the existence of an insurrection for
Fourteenth Amendment disqualification purposes. However, presidential invocation of the act might not
be necessary.
Two constitutional powers also arguably authorize Congress to determine the occurrence of an
insurrection by legislation: the militia clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Militia
Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 15, grants Congress the authority to call forth the militia to “suppress
Insurrections.” Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress “the power to enforce [the
Amendment] by appropriate legislation.” A legislative determination that an insurrection occurred
pursuant to one of these constitutional authorities would likely at least be accorded judicial weight in the
event of a prosecution for insurrection or any procedure Congress might put in place to determine
disqualification under Section 3.
Once an insurrection is deemed to have occurred, the question becomes whether a specific person
engaged in it. Section 3 does not establish a procedure for determining who is subject to the proscription
on holding office, instead providing only a process by which the disability may be removed (i.e., by two-
thirds vote in both houses). Congress also has not set forth a procedure for determining who is subject to
the disability imposed by Section 3. Although definitions of insurrection and rebellion for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment would not necessarily be confined by statute, it would appear that a criminal
conviction for insurrection or the “levying war” prong of treason would provide sufficient proof and each
of them contains a bar on holding office. The insurrection statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2383, provides:
Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the
authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any
office under the United States.
The treason statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2381, similarly provides, in relevant part, “[w]hoever, owing allegiance
to the United States, levies war against them . . . is guilty of treason . . . and shall be incapable of holding
any office under the United States.”
Aid or Comfort to the Enemy
One who gives aid or comfort to an enemy of the Constitution of the United States is also disqualified
from holding office under the Fourteenth Amendment. This language appears to mirror that in the
Constitution’s Treason Clause, which defines treason in part as adherence to U.S. enemies, “giving them
aid and comfort.” Scant Supreme Court case law arising out of World War II defining the provision of aid
and comfort indicates that mere association with an enemy is probably insufficient, but that otherwise
innocuous acts may suffice if they are intended to provide material advantage to an enemy. There also is
some indication of how aid or comfort was interpreted under Section 3 soon after its ratification. After the
Civil War, during a hearing to determine whether John D. Young provided aid and comfort to the

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Confederacy and, therefore, was ineligible to be seated in the House of Representatives, the Committee of
Elections was of the “opinion that ‘aid and comfort’ may be given to an enemy by words of
encouragement, or the expression of an opinion, from one occupying an influential position.”
One difficulty in applying the aid or comfort prong to the recent unrest at the Capitol may lie in the proper
definition of “enemy.” The term “enemy” is traditionally understood to encompass citizens of foreign
countries in open hostilities with the United States. During the Civil War, the Supreme Court clarified that
citizens of the Confederacy, while not foreign, may be treated as enemies as well as traitors. During World
War II, the Supreme Court determined that a U.S. citizen who acted as a member of a belligerent invasion
of the United States by joining a group of Nazi saboteurs who landed on shore might be treated as an
enemy. History therefore suggests that an “enemy” is one who owes allegiance to an opposing
government and not merely a U.S. citizen opposing the U.S. government or part thereof. Section 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment refers to aid or comfort of enemies, not insurrectionists or insurgents, so the “aid
or comfort” prong arguably would not be useful to target persons suspected as having provided support to
the instigators of the January 6 unrest. On the other hand, if the reference to enemies of the Constitution
of the United States does include such individuals, as one commenter argues, it may then be important to
determine at which point they became “enemies.”
Implementation
Section 3 does not appear to be self-executing and does not expressly provide a procedure for its
implementation, other than Section 5’s general authority of Congress “to enforce [the Fourteenth
Amendment] by appropriate legislation.” There might be multiple ways the Disqualification Clause could
be implemented, including relying on federal criminal prosecution for insurrection and treason, allowing
private civil enforcement through writs quo warranto, enacting new legislation establishing general
procedures for adjudicating disqualification under Section 3 or for identifying specific disqualified
individuals, or unicameral measures by the House or Senate to exclude or expel individuals from their
respective houses. What follows is a discussion of a sampling of these alternatives and the novel legal
questions they would pose.
As previously mentioned, prosecutions for insurrection under 18 U.S.C. § 2383 or treason under 18
U.S.C. § 2381, if successful, would result in a bar to “holding any office of the United States.”
Consequently, any individuals convicted under those laws for engaging in activities related to the events
of January 6 could be disqualified from holding current or future federal office without any specific
congressional response to the events, and without regard to whether they had previously taken an oath to
uphold the Constitution. A private injured party could also ask a judge to issue a writ of quo warranto to
prevent the seating of, or oust from office, an individual who allegedly engaged in disqualifying activities.
Although it is unclear who would have standing to bring such a suit, it is possible that opposing
candidates or individuals eligible to hold the office in question could survive this constitutional,
prudential inquiry.
Congress could also enact new legislation to enforce Section 3 in the aftermath of January 6, much like it
did in response to the Civil War. Congress initially provided enforcement of Section 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment through enactment of the First Ku Klux Clan Act in 1870. Section 14 of that Act directed the
district attorney in each district in which a potentially disqualified person held office to file a writ of quo
warranto against the office-holder before a judge. Section 15 of the Act made it a misdemeanor for a
person disqualified under the Fourteenth Amendment to hold state or federal office, enforcement of which
required a court conviction. However, after two years, Congress reversed course by providing amnesty
from the disqualification under the First Ku Klux Klan Act through enactment of the Amnesty Act in
1872. The Amnesty Act was passed by more than a two-thirds vote in accordance with the
Disqualification Clause. The Ku Klux Klan Act provisions no longer appear in the U.S. Code, and

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Congress has not since exercised its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact
legislation providing a general procedure for the executive and judicial branches to determine who is
subject to the bar on holding office.
In contrast to general procedural legislation akin to the Ku Klux Klan Act, there is some debate as to
whether Congress can enact a law naming specific individuals subject to disqualification. As is discussed
in another Legal Sidebar, some argue that Congress has that right under Section 3, while others counter
that such a measure might conflict with the constitutional prohibition on Bills of Attainder. The Supreme
Court has described a bill of attainder as “a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment
upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.” It is unclear
whether legislation to implement Section 3 is subject to the constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder
or was instead intended as a constitutional exception to it. Whether disqualification from holding office
constitutes punishment for the purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause is also unclear. Due to these
uncertainties, legislation that specifically identifies individuals for disqualification would likely result in
litigation.
Article I, § 5 of the Constitution provides the House and Senate with near complete control over their own
membership through the distinct constitutional powers of exclusion and expulsion. Either of these powers
could be used to enforce a disqualification under the Fourteenth Amendment, at least with respect to an
individual’s ability to serve in Congress.
An exclusion occurs when either the House or Senate refuses to seat a Member-elect. That power derives
from the Constitution’s charge that “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members. . .” and may be achieved by the vote of a simple majority. An
expulsion, on the other hand, occurs when either chamber removes one of its current Members. That
power derives from the Constitution’s explicit statement that “Each House may . . . with the Concurrence
of two thirds, expel a Member.” As reflected in the provision, an expulsion requires the consent of two-
thirds of the chamber.
The power to expel is much broader in scope than the power to exclude. Both chambers have “almost
unbridled discretion” to determine the type of misconduct that warrants expulsion. The Supreme Court
has suggested, for example, that Congress’s expulsion power “extends to all cases where the offence is
such as in the judgment of the Senate is inconsistent with the trust and duty of a member.” Grounds for
exclusion, however, are limited to those enumerated in the Constitution. In Powell v. McCormack, the
Court established that “the Constitution leaves the [House and Senate] without authority to exclude any
person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly
prescribed in the Constitution.” As shown in the Berger experience discussed above, Congress has
previously viewed Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment as establishing an enumerated constitutional
qualification for holding office, and, consequently, a grounds for possible exclusion.

Author Information

Jennifer K. Elsea

Legislative Attorney

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