
 
Updated January 25, 2021
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a 
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by Venezuela’s 
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy 
economic crisis, which has reduced Venezuela’s support for 
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at 
Cuba; increased U.S. economic sanctions, which have hurt 
isolating the Cuban government.  
Cuba’s nascent private sector; and the economic decline 
associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift 
pandemic. The Cuban government reports the economy 
away from sanctions and toward engagement and the 
contracted 11% in 2020. On January 1, 2021, Cuba 
normalization of relations. Changes included the rescission 
eliminated its dual currency system, a major reform that 
of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international 
was long debated. Economists maintain the currency reform 
terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of diplomatic 
will  have high costs initially but should boost productivity 
relations (July 2015); and an easing of restrictions on travel, 
and development over the longer term.   
remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and 
financial services (2015 and 2016), accomplished through 
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic appears to 
amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 
have been effective, although the number of cases and 
administered by the Treasury Department, and the Export 
deaths began to increase in late 2020. As of January 23, 
Administration Regulations, administered by the Commerce 
2021, the country reported 194 deaths and over 21,000 
Department. The restoration of relations led to increased 
cases. Cuba has provided international assistance for 
government-to-government engagement, with over 20 
pandemic response by sending over 3,700 medical 
bilateral agreements and numerous dialogues. 
professionals to almost 40 countries.  
President Trump unveiled his Administration’s Cuba policy 
Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the 
in 2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back efforts 
government sharply restricting freedoms of expression and 
to normalize relations. By 2019, the Administration had 
other basic rights. As of January 4, 2021, the human rights 
largely abandoned engagement and, from 2019 to January 
group Cuban Prisoners Defenders listed 138 political 
2021, significantly increased sanctions (see discussion 
prisoners, with 74 imprisoned for reasons of conscience. A 
below)—especially on travel and remittances—to pressure 
November 2020 government crackdown on the San Isidro 
the Cuban government on human rights and for its support 
Movement, a civil society group opposed to the 
of the Venezuelan government of Nicolás Maduro. 
government’s restrictions on artistic expression, spurred a 
protest by several hundred Cubans, many young artists, and 
Most observers expect the Biden Administration to shift 
galvanized international attention on human rights in Cuba.  
U.S. policy toward Cuba back to focusing on engagement 
and away from the numerous sanctions imposed in recent 
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump 
years. During the U.S. election campaign, President Biden 
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June 
said he would reverse Trump Administration policies, 
2017 that introduced new sanctions, including restrictions 
maintaining they harmed the Cuban people without 
on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban 
advancing democracy and human rights. 
military. The State Department issued a list of “restricted 
entities” in 2017, which was updated several times, most 
Cuban Political and Economic Developments. In April 
recently January 8, 2021. The “Cuba restricted list” 
2018, Vice President Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl 
includes 231 entities and subentities (ministries, holding 
Castro as president, although Castro continues to head the 
companies, hotels, stores, and a wide variety of companies). 
Cuban Communist Party (PCC) until at least April 2021. 
The Administration imposed a series of sanctions and other 
The selection of Díaz-Canel, now 60 years old, reflected the 
actions, discussed below, and initiated a campaign 
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several 
highlighting allegations of coercive labor practices in 
years ago and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban 
Cuba’s foreign medical missions.  
revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government. 
While in power from 2006 to 2018,  Raúl Castro began to 
  Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba. 
implement significant economic policy changes, moving 
Since April 2019,  the Treasury Department has imposed 
toward a more mixed  economy with a stronger private 
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels 
sector; his government’s slow, gradualist approach did not 
that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July 2019, it 
produce major economic improvements. 
sanctioned Cuba’s state-run oil import/export company. 
In 2019, Cuba adopted a new constitution that introduced 
  Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective 
some political and market-oriented economic reforms but 
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file 
continued the state’s dominance over the economy and the 
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property 
Communist Party’s predominant political role. 
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
Cuba:  U.S.  Policy  Overview  
104-114).  Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national, 
  Terrorism Designations. In May 2020, the Secretary of 
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time 
State (pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export 
of the confiscation. Previous Administrations had 
Control Act) added Cuba to the annual list of countries 
suspended, at six-month intervals, the right to file such 
certified as not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism 
lawsuits. To date, 32 lawsuits have been filed against 
efforts, the first time since 2015. On January 11, 2021, 
U.S. and foreign companies, including cruise ship 
the Secretary designated the Cuban government a state 
operators, airlines, travel booking companies, and 
sponsor of international terrorism (the previous such 
hotels; several lawsuits have been dismissed. 
designation was rescinded in 2015). He cited Cuba’s 
harboring of several U.S. fugitives since the 1970s and 
  Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In June 
of 10 leaders of Colombia’s National Liberation Army 
2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-to-
(a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization), who 
people educational travel and the Commerce 
had traveled to Cuba in 2017 to engage in peace talks 
Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private 
with the Colombian government. The new 
and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from 
determinations likely will  have little effect, insomuch as 
going to Cuba. The Transportation Department 
the economic sanctions required by each decision are, in 
suspended commercial flights to cities other than 
large part, redundant to other U.S. sanctions already in 
Havana in December 2019; charter flights to cities other 
effect. A terrorism designation, however, requires the 
than Havana in January 2020; and private charter flights 
Commerce Department to place Cuba on its most 
to Havana in October 2020. In September 2020, 
restrictive export licensing list, which could impede 
Treasury prohibited U.S. travelers from staying at over 
transactions related to technology. Some sectors, 
400 hotels and privately owned residences identified by 
seeking to avoid any perception of sanctions violations, 
the State Department as owned or controlled by the 
may become more risk averse in transactions with Cuba. 
Cuban government or by a prohibited government 
official or PCC Party member (or close relative). 
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel. Between late 2016 
 
and May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy Havana community 
On remittances, in September 2019, Treasury capped 
members suffered a series of unexplained injuries , 
family remittances to $1,000 per quarter per Cuban 
including hearing loss and cognitive issues. The State 
national and eliminated the category of donative 
Department maintains the investigation into the health 
remittances. In June and September 2020, the State 
injuries has not reached a conclusion regarding the cause or 
Department added to its “Cuba restricted list” two 
source. On December 5, 2020,  the National Academies of 
Cuban companies that facilitate the processing of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine publicly released a 
remittances. In November 2020, Treasury prohibited the 
report concluding the most plausible mechanism for the 
processing of remittances through entities on the “Cuba 
source of the health symptoms was directed pulsed radio 
restricted list.” This resulted in Western Union—the 
frequency energy. Some analysts and observers have raised 
major financial services company used for transmitting 
the possibility of Russia’s involvement.  
remittances to Cuba—ceasing its operations in Cuba 
until a solution can be found to keep its services open. 
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress continued to 
fund Cuba democracy assistance and U.S.-government 
  Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September 
sponsored broadcasting to Cuba: $20 million for democracy 
2019, Treasury ended the use of U-turn transactions that 
programs and $29.1 million for broadcasting in FY2019 
had allowed banking institutions to process funds 
(P.L. 116-6),  and $20 million for democracy programs and 
transfers originating and terminating outside the United 
$20.973  million for broadcasting in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94, 
States. In October 2019, the Commerce Department 
Division G). For FY2021  (P.L. 116-260  and its explanatory 
restricted Cuba’s access to leased commercial aircraft; 
statement), Congress provided $20 million for democracy 
reimposed a 10% de minimis rule (from 25%) requiring 
programs and $12.973 million for broadcasting, and it 
a third country-based company exporting goods to Cuba 
allowed for the transfer of up to $7 million to support Cuba 
with more than 10% U.S.-origin content to apply for a 
broadcasting reform. Both P.L. 116-94 and P.L. 116-260 
license; and imposed licensing requirements for 
also contained numerous Cuba reporting requirements.  
exporting certain donated items to organizations 
controlled by the Cuban government or PCC and items 
In other action, P.L. 116-94  (Division J) included benefits 
for telecommunications infrastructure.  
for State Department employees and dependents injured 
while stationed in Cuba. The FY2021 National Defense 
  Targeted Human Rights Sanctions. The State 
Authorization Act (P.L. 116-283,  §1110) extended such 
Department imposed visa restrictions on Raúl Castro in 
benefits to personnel of other federal agencies. The Senate 
September 2019 for human rights violations in Cuba and 
approved S.Res. 454 in June 2020, calling for the 
Venezuela. Further visa restrictions were imposed on 
unconditional release of a Cuban democracy activist.  
Cuba’s Interior Minister in November 2019 (until his 
death in 2020) and Cuba’s defense minister in January 
Also see CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 
2020 for human rights violations. Treasury imposed 
116th Congress and Through the Trump Administration; 
financial sanctions on the head of GAESA, a military 
and CRS Report RL31139,  Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on 
holding company, in September 2020 and on the 
Travel and Remittances. 
Ministry of the Interior and its minister in January 2021. 
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs  
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Cuba:  U.S.  Policy  Overview  
 
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