INSIGHTi

Parliamentary Elections in Kazakhstan
January 22, 2021
Kazakhstan, a U.S. partner in areas such as regional security, counterterrorism, and nuclear
nonproliferation, held parliamentary elections on January 10, 2021. According to the official tally, the
ruling Nur Otan party won 71% of the vote, followed by Ak Zhol (11%) and the People’s Party of
Kazakhstan (9%), granting each party 76, 12, and 10 seats, respectively, in the lower house of parliament.
Two other parties, Auyl (5%) and Adal (4%), did not meet the 7% threshold to secure parliamentary
mandates. No opposition parties participated in the elections, and the results yield a seat distribution
broadly similar to the previous convocation of parliament, which included the same three parties. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that the elections “lacked
genuine competition,” noting that the electoral contest highlighted the necessity of the government’s
promised reform program. Kazakhstan’s authoritarian government has touted recent legislative changes as
furthering the democratization and modernization of the country’s political system. Critics argue,
however, that these initiatives remain largely superficial.
Kazakhstan is a presidential republic with power heavily concentrated in the executive. Although
constitutional amendments passed in 2017 devolved some powers to the legislature, the dominant Nur
Otan party is closely aligned with the executive branch. The bicameral parliament comprises a 49-
member Senate, designed to be nonpartisan, in which 34 senators are indirectly elected and 15 are
appointed by the president, and a 107-member lower chamber, the Majilis. Nine Majilis deputies are
selected by the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan (APK), a constitutional body representing the
interests of Kazakhstan’s various ethnic groups. The remaining 98 members are directly elected via a
closed-list proportional system in a single nationwide constituency. Parliamentary seats are allocated to
parties rather than to specific candidates, and party authorities are not bound by the order of their party
list in deciding which candidates will take up a mandate in the Majilis. Of the six parties legally registered
in Kazakhstan, five participated in the January electoral contest; all support the government. The All-
National Social-Democratic Party (OSDP) decided to boycott the elections after Mukhtar Ablyazov, a
fugitive former bank executive and vocal critic of Kazakhstan’s government, called on his supporters to
vote for the party. Ablyazov’s political movement, Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, was banned as
“extremist” in 2018. Analysts speculate that the OSDP wanted to avoid a “toxic” association with
Ablyazov.
These were the first parliamentary elections held since the unexpected 2019 resignation of Kazakhstan’s
longtime leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had served as president since the country became
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11581
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

---

Congressional Research Service
2
independent in 1991. Nazarbayev maintains broad powers as First President and Leader of the Nation,
and he continues to hold key posts such as leader of Nur Otan, head of Kazakhstan’s Security Council,
and chairman of the APK; some analysts contend that significant change is unlikely as long as he remains
entrenched in the political system. Nevertheless, Nazarbayev’s hand-picked successor, Kassym-Jomart
Tokayev, has coupled an emphasis on continuity with promises of systemic reforms aimed at modernizing
Kazakhstan’s political system and improving government accountability. Upon assuming the presidency,
Tokayev announced the advent of a “listening state” that would be responsive to its citizens. The
presidential transition was met with an unprecedented wave of protest and civic activism, including calls
for a parliamentary form of government.
While the government has advanced legislation formally aimed at political modernization, some analysts
see these initiatives as largely cosmetic. In May 2020, Tokayev signed a new law regulating
demonstrations, ostensibly intended to facilitate sanctioned protests. Critics argue, however, that onerous
restrictions and bureaucratic requirements mean that the ability to protest remains “more a privilege than
a right.” Additional legislation formalized the concept of a parliamentary opposition, but critics contend
that Kazakhstan’s lack of political pluralism renders the Majilis a rubber-stamp legislature. Although
legislative amendments decreased the number of members required to register a new political party from
40,000 to 20,000, significant barriers remain in place. No new parties have successfully registered in
Kazakhstan since 2006.
Although the same parties continue to hold seats in parliament, the composition of the chamber has
changed; 70% of Nur Otan’s deputies are new to the Majilis, and 40% are women and/or under 30. The
elections have brought few changes to key government posts, however, with Askar Mamin reappointed as
prime minister and Nurlan Nigmatullin retaining his post as speaker of the Majilis; two cabinet ministers
were replaced. In line with the new legislation formalizing a parliamentary opposition, Ak Zhol and the
People’s Party each received the chairmanship of one of the seven standing committees in the lower
house. Nur Otan’s incoming deputies include Nursultan Nazarbayev’s daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva,
who returns to parliament after leaving her post as speaker of the Senate in May 2020.
Limits on opposition political activity and the detention of hundreds of protestors on election day
highlight enduring human rights concerns in Kazakhstan. In addition to calling attention to pressure on
nongovernmental organizations and disruptions to internet service, international groups criticized the
January 10 kettling of civic activists by police for up to nine hours in freezing temperatures. The OSCE
noted that voting was efficiently administered despite the challenges presented by the ongoing
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, but cited issues with transparency and restrictions on
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental freedoms that impeded citizens’ political participation. New
requirements for election observers reportedly made it more difficult for domestic groups to monitor
polling places, as they are entitled to do by law. Pandemic-related regulations also reportedly served as a
pretext for expelling observers and obstructing independent media coverage.
In a January 15 address to the new parliament, Tokayev announced further reforms with the stated aim of
strengthening human rights protections, expanding civic participation, and promoting the development of
a multi-party system. These initiatives include new human rights legislation and lowering the electoral
threshold for parties to enter the Majilis from 7% to 5%. Nevertheless, Tokayev’s announcement
coincides with ongoing government pressure on independent organizations in what Human Rights Watch
termed a “shocking” and “blatantly unlawful” attack on freedom of association.

---

Congressional Research Service
3
Author Information

Maria A. Blackwood

Analyst in Asian Policy




Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

IN11581 · VERSION 1 · NEW

---