Updated January 13, 2021
Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2021
Congress remains concerned about the effects of organized-
The Four-Pillars: FY2011-FY2017
crime-related violence in Mexico on U.S. security interests
In 2011, the U.S. and Mexican governments broadened the
and U.S. citizens’ safety in Mexico. Homicides in Mexico
scope of bilateral efforts under four pillars that prioritized
have reached record levels in each of the last four years as
institution building:
criminal groups have fought for control of smuggling routes
into the United States. President Andrés Manuel López
1. Combating transnational criminal
Obrador is under pressure to improve his security policy.
organizations through intelligence sharing and
law enforcement operations;
Congress has increased oversight of bilateral efforts since
2. Institutionalizing the rule of law while
the November 2019 killing of an extended family of dual
protecting human rights through justice sector
citizens near the Arizona border in Mexico. U.S. arrests of a
reform, forensic equipment and training, and
former Mexican public security minister (December 2019)
police and corrections reform;
and a former defense minister (October 2020) on drug
trafficking-related charges have raised congressional
3. Creating a 21st-century U.S.-Mexican border
concerns about endemic corruption in Mexico. This product
while improving immigration enforcement in
provides an overview of the roughly $3.3 billion
Mexico; and,
appropriated for the Mérida Initiative and assesses
4. Building strong and resilient communities by
Mexico’s security strategy and bilateral security efforts.
piloting approaches to address root causes of
Origins of the Mérida Initiative
violence, reduce drug demand, and build a “culture
of lawfulness” through education programs.
Prior to FY2008, Mexico did not receive large amounts of
Some analysts praised the wide-ranging cooperation
U.S. security assistance, partially due to Mexican sensitivity
about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal affairs.
between the governments. Others criticized the increasing
In
number of priorities they adopted. Experts warned it would
March 2007, then-Mexican President Felipe Calderón asked
be difficult for Mexico to implement an accusatorial justice
for expanded U.S. cooperation to fight criminal
system requiring better evidence collection by police and
organizations and their cross-border trafficking operations.
public trials with oral arguments in only eight years.
In response, the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S.
Mexico’s Congress established the eight-year transition to a
antidrug and rule of law assistance to Mexico (and Central
new justice system in 2008 constitutional reforms .
America), began in October 2007.
U.S. technology and training under pillar one supported
As part of the Mérida Initiative’s emphasis on shared
Mexican intelligence-gathering and information-sharing
responsibility, the Mexican government pledged to tackle
efforts, including biometrics and telecommunications.
corruption. The U.S. government pledged to address drug
Under pillar two, U.S. agencies provided more than $400
demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk
million in training, courtroom infrastructure, and technical
currency to Mexico. Both governments have struggled to
assistance to support Mexico’s transition to an accusatorial
fulfill those commitments. While impunity for public
justice system at the federal and state levels. Pillar three
corruption continues in Mexico, U.S. opioid-related deaths
expanded beyond efforts to modernize the U.S.-Mexican
and methamphetamine demand illustrate challenges in
border to include more than $100 million in training and
addressing U.S. drug consumption.
equipment for securing Mexico’s southern border. Under
Initial Phase: FY2008-FY2010
pillar four, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) implemented $25 million in human rights
Congress appropriated some $1.5 billion, including $420.7
programs and $90 million in crime prevention projects.
million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which
FMF has not been part of the Mérida Initiative since
enabled the purchase of equipment, including aircraft and
helicopters, to support Mexico’s federal security forces
FY2011, but the State Department and the U.S. Department
of Defense coordinate their assistance. Although all U.S.
(military and police). Congress withheld 15% of certain
security assistance to Mexico is subject to human rights
U.S. aid for the Mexican military and police until the State
vetting requirements (known as Leahy Laws), additional
Department submitted an annual report stating that Mexico
human-rights-related aid restrictions only apply to FMF.
was taking steps to meet human rights requirements. U.S.
assistance focused on (1) counternarcotics, border security,
Trump Administration Priorities
and counterterrorism; (2) public security; and (3) institution
President Trump’s executive orders on combatting
building. U.S. assistance and intelligence supported
transnational criminal organizations (E.O. 13773) and
Mexico’s strategy of arresting (and extraditing) kingpins
enhancing border security (E.O. 13767) refocused the
from each of the major drug trafficking organizations. This
Mérida Initiative. Priorities included reducing drug
“kingpin” strategy also fueled violence, as fractured drug
production, improving border interdiction and port security,
trafficking organizations fought to regroup and reorganize.
and combating money laundering. In 2019, President
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Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2021
Trump praised Mexico’s stepped up efforts against illegal
the Mexican government. Although the United States
migration but criticized Mexico’s antidrug performance in
dropped the case and allowed Cienfuegos to return to
his FY2021 “drug majors” determination.
Mexico in November, Mexico enacted a law requiring
López Obrador Administration
foreign law enforcement officials to share any information
they gather with designated Mexican federal authorities and
Inaugurated in December 2018, President López Obrador
Mexican state and local officials to report contacts with
enjoys high approval ratings even though his government
foreign officials. Experts fear the law, if not revised, could
has struggled to address rising homicides, the Coronavirus
severely limit law enforcement cooperation.
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and a deep recession.
Mexico’s security strategy, released in February 2019,
Assessing the Mérida Initiative
includes a focus on addressing the socioeconomic drivers of
Many analysts have observed the need for more reporting
violent crime. Thus far, López Obrador has implemented
on Mérida Initiative outcomes to help Congress oversee the
broad social programs rather than the type of targeted crime
funds it has appropriated. The State Department has pointed
prevention efforts that USAID has endorsed.
to some indicators of success. Those include (1) the
President López Obrador has rejected calls for a “war” on
intelligence-sharing and police cooperation that has helped
transnational criminal organizations, which he asserts
capture and extradite high-profile criminals; (2) the creation
would increase civilian casualties. Nevertheless, López
of national training standards for police, prosecutors, and
Obrador backed constitutional reforms to allow military
judges; and (3) assistance that has helped Mexico receive
involvement in public security for five more years. Those
international accreditation of its prisons, labs, and police
reforms came despite a 2018 Mexico Supreme Court ruling
training institutes.
that prolonged military involvement in public security
Despite those results, escalating violence in Mexico and
violated the Mexican Constitution. Initially, López Obrador
drug overdose deaths in the United States have led many to
resisted the so-called kingpin strategy employed by his two
question the Mérida Initiative’s overall efficacy. For years,
predecessors, although high-level arrests and extraditions
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has urged
increased in early 2020.
U.S. agencies working in Mexico to adopt outcome rather
Instead of bolstering the federal police, which received U.S.
than just output measures. A May 2020 GAO report
equipment and training, President López Obrador secured
asserted that USAID followed “key monitoring practices
congressional approval of a new National Guard (composed
and tracked performance data” for its programs, but the
of mostly military and former federal police). He deployed
State Department did not.
the National Guard to secure oil pipelines, reassert
territorial control in high-crime areas, and secure Mexico’s
Congressional Action
borders. There are concerns about the National Guard
With the bipartisan support of Congress, the Mérida
violating human rights and operating as a branch of the
Initiative has comprised the majority of U.S. foreign aid to
military. Critics have faulted the administration for not
Mexico since FY2008. Congress provided $133 million in
adequately investing in state and local police forces, which
FY2020 for the Mérida Initiative in P.L. 116-94. The
investigate most crimes, including homicide.
FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L.
116-92) required a classified assessment of drug trafficking,
Civil society and the private sector are urging President
human trafficking, and alien smuggling in Mexico.
López Obrador to fulfill his pledges to combat corruption
and impunity. Mexico’s congress approved the creation of
The FY2021 budget request for Mérida Initiative accounts
an independent prosecutor general’s office, but the
was $61.3 million. Congress provided nearly $159 million
individual selected for that post is the president’s close ally.
for Mexico (including $150 million in accounts that fund
Although federal prosecutors have pursued corruption cases
the Mérida Initiative) in the FY2021 Consolidated
against the former head of Petróleos Mexicanos (extradited
Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260). The explanatory
from Spain) and the former social development minister,
statement expanded the withholding requirements on FMF
they have ignored allegations involving López Obrador’s
to include a State Department determination that the
allies thus far. The government has not moved to implement
Mexican government “is implementing credible
the national anti-corruption system established through
counternarcotics and law enforcement strategies.” It also
constitutional reforms in 2017.
included reporting requirements from H.Rept. 116-444,
which require a comprehensive strategy on the Mérida
In August 2019, the Trump Administration agreed to a
Initiative and reports on steps Mexico is taking to meet
Mexican government proposal to create a high-level
human rights standards and address highway crimes. The
security working group, which included the Mérida
FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) requires a report on U.S.
Initiative as one part of bilateral efforts. The working
support to Mexican security forces. See also CRS In Focus
group—as well as requests from the Mexican government
IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, and CRS
to assist in priority programs, such as addressing
In Focus IF10400, Trends in Mexican Opioid Trafficking
disappeared persons—has informed recent projects.
and Implications for U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation.
Nevertheless, the COVID-19 pandemic has hindered
bilateral cooperation.
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
In October 2020, the U.S. arrest of former Defense Minister
Affairs
Salvador Cienfuegos on drug charges surprised and angered
IF10578


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Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2021


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10578 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED

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