Updated January 13, 2021
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
pandemic. The Cuban government reports the economy
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
contracted 11% in 2020. Cuba announced some economic
isolating the Cuban government.
reforms in July 2020 and, on January 1, 2021, eliminated its
dual currency system, a major reform that has been long
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift
debated. Economists maintain the currency reform will
away from sanctions and toward engagement and the
have high costs initially but should boost productivity and
normalization of relations. Changes included the rescission
development over the longer term.
of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international
terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of diplomatic
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic appears to
relations (July 2015); and an easing of restrictions on travel,
have been effective. As of January 12, 2021, the country
remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and
reported 155 deaths, with a mortality rate of 1.37 per
financial services (2015 and 2016), accomplished through
100,000 people (among the lowest in the hemisphere),
amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
according to Johns Hopkins University. Cuba has provided
(CACR), administered by the Treasury Department, and the
international assistance for pandemic response by sending
Export Administration Regulations, administered by the
over 3,700 medical professionals to almost 40 countries.
Commerce Department. The restoration of relations led to
increased government-to-government engagement, with
Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the
over 20 bilateral agreements and numerous dialogues.
government sharply restricting freedoms of expression and
other basic rights. As of January 4, 2021, the human rights
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
group Cuban Prisoners Defenders listed 138 political
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back efforts to
prisoners, with 74 imprisoned for reasons of conscience. A
normalize relations. By 2019, the Administration had
November 2020 government crackdown on the San Isidro
largely abandoned engagement and had increased sanctions
Movement, a civil society group opposed to the
to pressure the Cuban government on human rights and for
government’s restrictions on artistic expression, spurred a
its support of the Venezuelan government of Nicolás
protest by several hundred Cubans, many young artists, and
Maduro. In 2020, the Administration significantly increased
galvanized international attention on human rights in Cuba.
restrictions on travel and remittances.
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
Cuban Political and Economic Developments. In April
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
2018, Miguel Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice
2017 that introduced new sanctions, including restrictions
president, succeeded Raúl Castro as president. Castro
on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
continues to head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021.
military. The State Department issued a list of “restricted
The selection of Díaz-Canel, now 60 years old, reflected the
entities” in 2017, which has been updated several times,
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several
most recently January 8, 2021. The “Cuba restricted list”
years ago and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban
includes 231 entities and subentities, including 2 ministries,
revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government.
5 holding companies and 55 of their subentities, 111 hotels,
While in power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to
2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and
implement significant economic policy changes, moving
41 entities serving defense and security sectors. Since 2019,
toward a more mixed economy with a stronger private
the Administration has imposed additional increasingly
sector, but his government’s slow, gradualist approach did
strong sanctions. In addition to those noted below, it has
not produce major economic improvements.
highlighted allegations of coercive labor practices in Cuba’s
foreign medical missions .
In 2019, Cuba adopted a new constitution with such
changes as an appointed prime minister to oversee
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
government operations; limits on the president’s tenure
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
(two five-year terms) and age (60, beginning first term);
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
and market-oriented economic reforms, including the right
that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July 2019, it
to private property and foreign investment promotion. The
sanctioned Cuba’s state-run oil import/export company.
new constitution also ensured the state’s dominance over
the economy and the Communist Party’s predominant role.
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by Venezuela’s
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
economic crisis, which has reduced Venezuela’s support for
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
Cuba; increased U.S. economic sanctions, which have hurt
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
Cuba’s nascent private sector; and the economic decline
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
certified as not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism
of the confiscation. Previous Administrations had
efforts for the first time since 2015. On January 11,
suspended, at six-month intervals, the right to file such
2021, the Secretary designated the government of Cuba
lawsuits. To date, 32 lawsuits have been filed against
as a state sponsor of international terrorism (the
U.S. and foreign companies, including cruise ship
previous such designation for Cuba was rescinded in
operators, airlines, travel booking companies, and
2015). The State Department cited Cuba’s harboring
hotels; several lawsuits have been dismissed.
from justice of several U.S. fugitives since the 1970s
and of 10 leaders of Colombia’s National Liberation
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. On travel, in
Army (a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization),
June 2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-
who had traveled to Cuba in 2017 to engage in peace
to-people educational travel and the Commerce
talks with the Colombian government. The new
Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private
determinations likely will have little effect, insomuch as
and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from
the economic sanctions required by each decision are, in
going to Cuba. The Transportation Department
large part, redundant to other U.S. sanctions already in
suspended commercial flights to cities other than
effect. A terrorism designation, however, requires the
Havana in December 2019; charter flights to cities other
Commerce Department to place Cuba on its most
than Havana in January 2020; and private charter flights
restrictive export licensing list, which could impede
to Havana in October 2020. In September 2020, the
transactions related to technology. Some sectors,
Treasury Department prohibited U.S. travelers from
seeking to avoid any perception of sanctions violations,
staying at over 400 hotels and privately owned
may become more risk averse in transactions with Cuba,
residences identified by the State Department as owned
or controlled by the Cuban government or by a
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
prohibited government official or Communist Party
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy
member (or close relative).
community members suffered a series of unexplained
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues
On remittances, in September 2019, the Treasury
between late 2016 and May 2018. The State Department
Department capped family remittances to $1,000 per
maintains the investigation into the health incidents has not
quarter per Cuban national and eliminated the category
reached a conclusion regarding the cause or source of the
of donative remittances. In June and September 2020,
injuries. On December 5, 2020, the National Academies of
the State Department added to its “Cuba restricted list”
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine publicly released a
two Cuban companies that facilitate the processing of
report concluding the most plausible mechanism for the
remittances. In October 2020, the Treasury Department
source of the health symptoms was directed pulsed radio
prohibited, effective November 26, the processing of
frequency energy. Some analysts and observers have raised
remittances through entities on the “Cuba restricted
the possibility of Russia’s involvement.
list.” This resulted in Western Union—the major
financial services company used for transmitting
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress continued to
remittances to Cuba—ceasing its operations in Cuba
fund Cuba democracy assistance and U.S.-government
until a solution can be found to keep its services open.
sponsored broadcasting to Cuba: $20 million for democracy
programs and $29.1 million for broadcasting in FY2019
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
(P.L. 116-6), and $20 million for democracy programs and
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn
$20.973 million for broadcasting in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94,
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to
Division G). For FY2021, the Administration requested $10
process certain funds transfers originating and
million for democracy programs and $12.973 million for
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019,
broadcasting; in P.L. 116-260 and its explanatory statement,
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to
Congress provided $20 million for Cuba democracy
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de
programs and $12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting, and it
minimis rule (from 25%) requiring a third country-based
allowed for the transfer of up to $7 million from the U.S.
company exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10%
Agency for Global Media’s Buying Power Maintenance
U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed
Account to help manage the cost of Office of Cuba
licensing requirements for the export of certain donated
Broadcasting reform begun in 2019.
items to organizations controlled by the Cuban
government or Communist Party and items for
In other action, P.L. 116-94 (Division J) included benefits
telecommunications infrastructure.
for State Department employees and dependents injured
while stationed in Cuba. The FY2021 National Defense
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa
Authorization Act (P.L. 116-283, §1110) extended such
restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross
benefits to personnel of other federal agencies. The Senate
violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela.
approved S.Res. 454 in June 2020, calling for the
Further visa restrictions were imposed on Cuba’s
unconditional release of a Cuban democracy activist.
Interior Minister (November 2019) and Cuba’s defense
minister (January 2020) for human rights violations.
Also see CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the
116th Congress, and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S.
Terrorism Designations. In May 2020, the Secretary of
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.
State (pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export
Control Act) added Cuba to the annual list of countries
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
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