

# U.S. Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

**Tomas F. Husted, Coordinator**  
Analyst in African Affairs

**Alexis Arieff**  
Specialist in African Affairs

**Lauren Ploch Blanchard**  
Specialist in African Affairs

**Nicolas Cook**  
Specialist in African Affairs

May 20, 2020

Congressional Research Service

7-....

[www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov)

R46368



# U.S. Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

**Overview.** Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees U.S. assistance to sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa”), which received over a quarter of U.S. aid obligated in FY2018. Annual State Department- and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered assistance to Africa increased more than five-fold over the past two decades, primarily due to sizable increases in global health spending and more incremental growth in economic and security assistance. State Department and USAID-administered assistance allocated to African countries from FY2019 appropriations totaled roughly \$7.1 billion. This does not include considerable U.S. assistance provided to Africa via global accounts, such as emergency humanitarian aid and certain kinds of development, security, and health aid. The United States channels additional funds to Africa through multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations and World Bank.

**Objectives and Delivery.** Over the past decade, roughly 70-75% of annual U.S. aid to Africa has sought to address health challenges, notably relating to HIV/AIDS, malaria, maternal and child health, and nutrition. Much of this assistance has been delivered via disease-specific initiatives, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI). Other U.S. aid programs seek to foster agricultural development and economic growth; strengthen peace and security; improve education access and social service delivery; bolster democracy, human rights, and good governance; support sustainable natural resource management; and address humanitarian needs. What impacts the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic may have for the scale and orientation of U.S. assistance to Africa remains to be seen.

**Aid to Africa during the Trump Administration.** The Trump Administration has maintained many of its predecessors’ aid initiatives that focus wholly or largely on Africa, and has launched its own Africa-focused trade and investment initiative, known as Prosper Africa. At the same time, the Administration has proposed sharp reductions in U.S. assistance to Africa, in line with proposed cuts to foreign aid globally. It also has proposed funding account eliminations and consolidations that, if enacted, could have implications for U.S. aid to Africa. Congressional consideration of the Administration’s FY2021 budget request is underway; the Administration has requested \$5.1 billion in aid for Africa, a 28% drop from FY2019 allocations. Congress has not enacted similar proposed cuts in past appropriations measures.

**Selected Considerations for Congress.** Policymakers, analysts, and advocates continue to debate the value and effectiveness of U.S. assistance programs in Africa. Some Members of Congress have questioned whether sectoral allocations are adequately balanced given the broad scope of Africa’s needs and U.S. priorities in the region. Concern also exists as to whether funding levels are commensurate with U.S. interests. Comprehensive regional- or country-level breakouts of U.S. assistance are not routinely made publicly available in budget documents, complicating estimates of U.S. aid to the region and congressional oversight of assistance programs.

In addition to authorizing and appropriating U.S. foreign assistance, Congress has shaped U.S. aid to Africa through legislation denying or placing conditions on certain kinds of assistance to countries whose governments fail to meet standards in, for instance, human rights, debt repayment, or trafficking in persons. Congress also has restricted certain kinds of security assistance to foreign security forces implicated in human rights abuses. Some African countries periodically have been subject to other restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, including country-specific provisions in annual aid appropriations measures restricting certain kinds of assistance. Congress may continue to debate the merits and effectiveness of such restrictions while overseeing their implementation.

**R46368**

May 20, 2020

**Tomas F. Husted,**  
**Coordinator**

Analyst in African Affairs  
-redacted-@crs.loc.gov

**Alexis Arieff**

Specialist in African Affairs  
-redacted-@crs.loc.gov

**Lauren Ploch Blanchard**

Specialist in African Affairs  
-redacted-@crs.loc.gov

**Nicolas Cook**

Specialist in African Affairs  
-redacted-@crs.loc.gov

For a copy of the full report,  
please call 7-.... or visit  
[www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov).

## Contents

Introduction .....	1
Recent Assistance Trends and Key Rationales .....	3
U.S. Assistance to Africa: Objectives and Delivery.....	4
Select Assistance Provided through Global Accounts and Programs.....	8
Assistance Administered by Other U.S. Federal Departments and Agencies .....	10
U.S. Aid to Africa During the Trump Administration .....	11
The FY2021 Assistance Request for Africa.....	13
Select Issues for Congress .....	14
Outlook .....	17

## Figures

Figure 1. Map of Africa.....	2
Figure 2. U.S. Aid to Africa, Select State Department and USAID Accounts .....	3
Figure 3. U.S. Assistance to Africa in FY2019, by Program Area.....	4
Figure 4. Health Assistance to Africa in FY2019 by Program Area.....	5
Figure 5. Title 22 Security Assistance to Africa FY2015-FY2019, Selected Accounts .....	7
Figure 6. Emergency Food Assistance to Africa, Select Programs .....	9
Figure 7. Allocated and Requested Aid to Africa in FY2016-FY2021, Select Accounts .....	13
Figure 8. U.S. Aid to Africa, Top Recipients, Recent Allocations vs. FY2021 Request .....	14

## Appendixes

Appendix A. U.S. Assistance to Africa, by Country .....	19
Appendix B. MCC Programs in Africa: A Snapshot.....	28

## Contacts

Author Contact Information.....	29
---------------------------------	----

## Introduction

This report is intended to serve as a primer on U.S. foreign assistance to sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa”) to help inform Congress’ authorization, appropriation, and oversight of U.S. foreign aid for the region. It focuses primarily on assistance administered by the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which administer the majority of U.S. aid to the region. It covers recent funding trends and major focus areas of such assistance, select programs managed by other U.S. agencies and federal entities, and the Trump Administration’s FY2021 aid budget request for Africa. In addition to discussing aid appropriations, this report notes a range of legislative measures that have authorized specific assistance programs or placed conditions or restrictions on certain types of aid, or on aid to certain countries. Select challenges for congressional oversight are discussed throughout this report. For more on U.S. engagement in Africa, see also CRS Report R45428, *Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement*.

**Definitions.** Unless otherwise indicated, this report discusses State Department- and USAID-administered assistance allocated for African countries or for regional programs managed by the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs (AF), USAID’s Bureau for Africa (AFR), and USAID regional missions and offices in sub-Saharan Africa. It does not comprehensively discuss funding allocated to African countries via global accounts or programs, which publicly available budget materials do not disaggregate by country or region.<sup>1</sup> Except as noted, figures refer to actual allocations of funding appropriated in the referenced fiscal year (hereafter, “allocations”).<sup>2</sup>

### COVID-19 in Africa: Emergent Implications for U.S. Assistance<sup>3</sup>

This report does not specifically address the implications of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic for U.S. assistance to Africa, as the consequences of the pandemic for the scale and orientation of U.S. aid to the region remain to be seen. While the impacts of COVID-19 continue to unfold across the region, several factors may inhibit African countries’ capacities to respond to the virus. Many countries have limited disease surveillance and response capabilities, owing in part to shortages of health equipment and personnel. Limited access to safe water may hinder handwashing and other hygienic measures. Physical distancing is a challenge in the high-density settlements where millions of Africans live, as well as in humanitarian settings such as displacement camps.

COVID-19’s economic impacts also are likely to be substantial in Africa, where many countries rely on commodity exports or tourism—sectors expected to be hard-hit by the pandemic. Several initial analyses have projected that Africa will face an economic contraction in 2020, which would mark the first regional recession in over two decades.<sup>4</sup> Africa’s oil export-dependent countries, including regional powerhouse Nigeria, face a second threat: a concurrent global oil price collapse initially linked to an oil production competition between Saudi Arabia and Russia. That the pandemic is unfolding simultaneously in developed countries and in other developing regions may limit the availability of donor funds that could help African countries address health and economic challenges.

How the COVID-19 pandemic may affect U.S. assistance to Africa remains to be seen.<sup>5</sup> As of early May, the State Department and USAID had announced approximately \$269 million in health, humanitarian, and economic and governance aid to support African responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>6</sup> This assistance includes funding for

<sup>1</sup> In this report, “global” funds refer to those not allocated by country or region in State Department Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJs), which provide information on the planned allocation of appropriated foreign assistance. See also CRS In Focus IF11515, *U.S. Foreign Assistance: Budget Development and Execution*, by Nick M. Brown.

<sup>2</sup> “Actual” allocations represent a final plan for the use of appropriated funding, though agencies may continue to transfer or reprogram assistance, subject to availability and legislative authorities.

<sup>3</sup> See CRS In Focus IF11532, *Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Impact in Africa*, coordinated by Alexis Arieff.

<sup>4</sup> World Bank, *Africa’s Pulse Vol. 21*, April 2020; McKinsey & Company, *Tackling COVID-19 in Africa*, April 2020.


<sup>5</sup> See also CRS Report R46319, *Novel Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19): Q&A on Global Implications and Responses*, coordinated by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther and CRS In Focus IF11496, *COVID-19 and Foreign Assistance: Issues for Congress*, by Nick M. Brown, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern.

<sup>6</sup> State Department, “Update: The United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19,” May 19, 2020.

public health information campaigns, laboratory capacity, disease surveillance, water and sanitation, and infection control in healthcare facilities in Africa, along with economic support and education programs. The Administration also has pledged to donate ventilators to several African countries; those deliveries are underway.

In addition to assistance provided on a bilateral basis, the United States provides substantial funding to multilateral organizations involved in regional responses to COVID-19, such as United Nations (U.N.) agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the African Development Bank (AfDB). Congressional authorization and appropriation measures will continue to shape U.S. foreign assistance as the pandemic unfolds.

**Figure 1. Map of Africa**



**Source:** General reference map created by CRS. Boundaries may not be authoritative. Mauritius is not shown.




## Recent Assistance Trends and Key Rationales

Africa has received a growing share of annual U.S. foreign assistance funding over the past two decades: the region received 37% of State Department- and USAID-administered aid obligations in FY2018, up from 28% of global obligations in 2008 and 16% in 1998.<sup>7</sup> U.S. aid to Africa grew markedly during the 2000s as Congress appropriated substantial funds to support the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which the George W. Bush Administration launched in 2003. Development and security aid to Africa also increased during that period, albeit to a lesser extent (see **Figure 2**). Assistance for Africa plateaued during the Obama Administration, fluctuating between \$7.0 billion and \$8.0 billion in annual allocations, excluding emergency humanitarian assistance and other funding allocated from global accounts and programs. Africa received roughly \$7.0 billion in annual U.S. aid allocations in the first three years of the Trump Administration, despite the Administration's repeated proposals to curtail aid to the region.<sup>8</sup>

Over the past decade, roughly 70% of U.S. assistance to African countries has supported health programs, notably focused on HIV/AIDS, malaria, nutrition, and maternal and child health. U.S. assistance also seeks to encourage economic growth and development, bolster food security, enhance governance, and improve security.

**Figure 2. U.S. Aid to Africa, Select State Department and USAID Accounts**



**Source:** CRS, based on State Department Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJs) for FY2003-FY2021.

**Notes:** CSD=Child Survival and Disease Programs; CSH=Child Survival and Health Programs; DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; GHP=Global Health Programs; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; PKO=Peacekeeping Operations. Calculations do not include funding allocated from global accounts or programs.

As discussed below, African countries also receive assistance administered by other federal agencies. The United States channels additional funding to Africa through multilateral bodies, such as U.N. agencies and international financial institutions like the World Bank.

<sup>7</sup> CRS calculation based on obligations data from USAID's Foreign Aid Explorer. Elsewhere in this report, figures refer to allocations of funding appropriated in the referenced fiscal year unless otherwise noted.


<sup>8</sup> CRS calculations based on State Department Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJs) for FY2019-2021.

Policymakers, analysts, and advocates continue to debate the value and design of assistance programs in Africa. Proponents of such assistance often contend that foreign aid advances U.S. national interests in the region, or that U.S. assistance (e.g., to respond to humanitarian need) reflects U.S. values of charity and global leadership.<sup>9</sup> Critics often allege that aid has done little to improve socioeconomic outcomes in Africa overall, that aid flows may have negative unintended consequences (such as empowering undemocratic regimes), or that other countries should bear more responsibility for providing aid to the region.<sup>10</sup> Assessing the effectiveness of foreign aid is complex—particularly in areas afflicted by conflict or humanitarian crisis—further complicating such debates.<sup>11</sup> Selected considerations concerning U.S. aid to Africa and issues for Congress are discussed in further detail below (see “Select Issues for Congress”).

## U.S. Assistance to Africa: Objectives and Delivery

U.S. assistance seeks to address a range of development, governance, and security challenges in Africa, reflecting the continent’s size and diversity as well as the broad scope of U.S. policy interests in the region. State Department- and USAID-administered assistance for Africa totaled roughly \$7.1 billion in FY2019, not including funding allocated to Africa via global accounts and programs (see “Select Assistance Provided through Global Accounts and Programs,” below).

**Figure 3. U.S. Assistance to Africa in FY2019, by Program Area**



**Source:** CRS calculation based on FY2019 sectoral data provided by USAID, February 2020.

**Notes:** Funding allocated from global or functional programs, including emergency humanitarian assistance, is not included. International food assistance provided under Title II of the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480) is also excluded, whether provided for humanitarian or development purposes.


<sup>9</sup> For more on the rationales and objectives of U.S. foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213, *Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy*, by Marian L. Lawson and Emily M. Morgenstern.

<sup>10</sup> For a critical assessment of foreign assistance in Africa, see, for example, Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009).

<sup>11</sup> CRS Report R42827, *Does Foreign Aid Work? Efforts to Evaluate U.S. Foreign Assistance*, by Marian L. Lawson.

**Health.** At \$5.3 billion, health assistance comprised 75% of U.S. aid to Africa in FY2019.<sup>12</sup> The majority of this funding supported HIV/AIDS programs (see **Figure 4**), with substantial assistance provided through the global President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—a State Department-led, interagency effort that Congress first authorized during the George W. Bush Administration and reauthorized through 2023 under P.L. 115-305.<sup>13</sup> Programs to prevent and treat malaria, a leading cause of death in Africa, constituted the second-largest category of health assistance; such funding is largely provided through the USAID-led President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), which targeted 24 countries in Africa (out of 27 globally) as of 2019.<sup>14</sup>

**Figure 4. Health Assistance to Africa in FY2019 by Program Area**



**Source:** CRS calculation based on FY2019 sectoral data provided by USAID, February 2020.

Beyond disease-specific initiatives, U.S. assistance has supported health system strengthening, nutrition, family planning and reproductive health, and maternal and child health programs. The United States also has supported global health security efforts, including pandemic preparedness and response activities, notably through the U.S.-supported Global Health Security Agenda.<sup>15</sup> In recent years, USAID and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) led robust U.S. responses to two Ebola outbreaks on the continent, in West Africa (2014-2016) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, 2018-present).<sup>16</sup>

**Agriculture and Economic Growth.** U.S. support for economic growth in Africa centers on agricultural development assistance. USAID agriculture programs seek to improve productivity by strengthening agricultural value chains, enhancing land tenure systems and market access road infrastructure, promoting climate-resilient farming practices, and funding agricultural research. Nearly 60% of U.S. agricultural assistance to Africa in FY2019 benefitted the eight African focus countries<sup>17</sup> under Feed the Future (FTF)—a USAID-led, interagency initiative launched by the Obama Administration that supports agricultural development to reduce food insecurity and enhance market-based economic growth.<sup>18</sup> (There are 12 FTF focus countries worldwide; the

<sup>12</sup> CRS calculation based on FY2019 sectoral data provided by USAID, February 2020.

<sup>13</sup> See CRS In Focus IF11018, *Global Trends in HIV/AIDS*, by Sara M. Tharakan and CRS In Focus IF10797, *PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities*, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.

<sup>14</sup> Implementing a proposal made by the Obama Administration, the Trump Administration has launched new PMI programs in Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, and Sierra Leone, and expanded an existing program in Burkina Faso. PMI, “Where we work,” at <https://www.pmi.gov/where-we-work>.

<sup>15</sup> See CRS In Focus IF10022, *The Global Health Security Agenda (2014-2019) and International Health Regulations (2005)*, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.

<sup>16</sup> See CRS Report R45933, *Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak: Democratic Republic of Congo*, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther and Alexis Arieff; CRS Report R44507, *Status of the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa: Overview and Issues for Congress*, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther, Susan B. Epstein, and Bolko J. Skorupski.

<sup>17</sup> Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda.

<sup>18</sup> See CRS Report R44216, *The Obama Administration’s Feed the Future Initiative*, by Marian L. Lawson, Randy Schnepf, and Nicolas Cook.



initiative supports additional countries under “aligned” and regional programs.) The Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195, reauthorized through 2023 in P.L. 115-266) endorsed an approach to U.S. agricultural and food assistance similar to FTF.

Other U.S. economic assistance programs support trade capacity-building efforts, economic policy reforms and analysis, microenterprise and other private sector strengthening, and infrastructure development. Since the early 2000s, USAID has maintained three sub-regional trade and investment hubs focused on expanding intra-regional and U.S.-Africa trade, including by supporting African exports to the United States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, Title I, P.L. 106-200, as amended) trade preference program.<sup>19</sup> USAID also coordinates Prosper Africa, an emerging Trump Administration trade and investment initiative (see **Text Box**).

### **The Administration’s Prosper Africa Initiative<sup>20</sup>**

Prosper Africa seeks to double U.S.-Africa trade, spur U.S. and African economic growth, and encourage U.S. commercial interest and investment in African markets. As of early 2020, a “deal team” within each U.S. embassy in Africa had been established to help link U.S. firms to trade and investment opportunities in Africa, enable African firms to access similar opportunities in the United States, and facilitate private sector access to U.S. trade assistance, financing, and insurance services. USAID’s sub-regional trade and investment hubs are expected to support the initiative through trade capacity-building and related activities. Prosper Africa seeks to marshal the resources and capabilities of various U.S. trade promotion agencies, such as the Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank, the Trade and Development Agency (TDA), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC, established in the BUILD Act, Division F of P.L. 115-254).<sup>21</sup>

Prosper Africa is at an early stage of implementation, and its impact on U.S.-Africa trade remains to be seen. In addition, the extent to which Prosper Africa differs from past U.S. trade assistance efforts focused on Africa may be debated. Trade capacity-building has been an enduring focus of USAID’s trade and investment hubs, which have long supported efforts to expand African exports. The Obama Administration’s Trade Africa initiative, which the Trump Administration discontinued, was a trade hub-led effort to bolster intra-regional trade and integration, with an initial focus on East Africa. The Obama Administration also launched Doing Business in Africa (DBIA), an effort to increase U.S. business exposure to African markets and U.S. trade promotion programs. DBIA is now defunct apart from the DBIA President’s Advisory Council, a board of private sector actors that offers advice on strengthening U.S.-Africa commercial ties. The Administration has portrayed Prosper Africa as a “one-stop shop” to connect U.S. and African entrepreneurs with the broad range of U.S. trade and investment support programs.<sup>22</sup>

Electrification is another focus of U.S. economic assistance in Africa. Power Africa, a USAID-led initiative that the Obama Administration launched in 2013, seeks to enhance electricity access through technical assistance, grants, financial risk mitigation tools, loans, and other resources—accompanied by trade promotion and diplomatic and advisory efforts. Facilitating private sector contracts is a key focus of the initiative, which aims to build power generation facilities capable of producing 30,000 megawatts of new power and establish 60 million new power connections by 2030.<sup>23</sup> A sub-initiative, Beyond the Grid, supports off-grid electricity access. Power Africa involves a range of U.S. federal entities in addition to USAID, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), DFC, Ex-Im Bank, TDA, and Departments of State, Energy, Commerce, and Agriculture. The Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-121) made it U.S. policy to aid electrification in Africa through an approach similar to that of Power Africa.

<sup>19</sup> See CRS In Focus IF10149, *African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)*, by Brock R. Williams.

<sup>20</sup> See CRS In Focus IF11384, *The Trump Administration’s Prosper Africa Initiative*, by Nicolas Cook and Brock R. Williams.

<sup>21</sup> See CRS In Focus IF11436, *U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)*, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Nick M. Brown; CRS In Focus IF10017, *Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank)*, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar; and CRS In Focus IF10673, *U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA)*, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.


<sup>22</sup> See, e.g., Department of Commerce, “Prosper Africa,” available at <https://www.trade.gov/prosper-africa>.

<sup>23</sup> For more on Power Africa, see USAID, “Power Africa,” available at <https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica>.

**Peace and Security.** The State Department administers a range of programs to build the capacity of African militaries and law enforcement agencies to counter security threats, participate in international peacekeeping and stabilization operations, and combat transnational crime (e.g., human and drug trafficking). State Department security assistance authorities are codified in Title 22 of the *U.S. Code*. Congress appropriates funds for Title 22 programs in annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations, though the Department of Defense (DOD) implements several of these programs. (For information on DOD security cooperation, see “Assistance Administered by Other U.S. Federal Departments and Agencies.”)

The Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account is the primary vehicle for State Department-administered security assistance to African countries (**Figure 5**). Despite its name, PKO supports not only peacekeeping capacity-building, but also counterterrorism, maritime security, and security sector reform. (A separate State Department-administered account, Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities [CIPA], funds U.S. assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping budgets.) In recent years, the largest PKO allocation for Africa has been for the U.N. Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which supports an African Union stabilization operation in that country.<sup>24</sup> PKO funding also supports two interagency counterterrorism programs in Africa: the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP, in North-West Africa), and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT, in East Africa).

**Figure 5. Title 22 Security Assistance to Africa FY2015-FY2019, Selected Accounts**



**Source:** State Department, CBJs for FY2017-2021.

**Notes:** FMF=Foreign Military Financing; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; PKO=Peacekeeping Operations. Funding allocated from global programs not included.

The Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account funds counterterrorism training and other capacity-building programs for internal security forces, as well as other activities such as landmine removal. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds support efforts to combat transnational crime and strengthen the rule of law, including through judicial reform and law enforcement capacity-building. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program offers training for foreign military

<sup>24</sup> Successive Administrations have requested assistance for UNSOS through the CIPA account, but Congress has appropriated such funds via PKO.

personnel at facilities in the United States and abroad, and seeks to build military-to-military relationships, introduce participants to the U.S. judicial system, promote respect for human rights, and strengthen civilian control of the military. The United States provides grants to help countries purchase defense articles and services through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account.

USAID also implements programs focused on conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution. Such assistance seeks to prevent mass atrocities, support post-conflict transitions and peace building, and counter violent extremism, among other objectives. Congress appropriates funding for such programs as economic assistance, as opposed to security assistance.

**Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG).** State Department- and USAID-administered DRG programs seek to enhance democratic institutions, improve government accountability and responsiveness, and strengthen the rule of law. Activities include supporting African electoral institutions and political processes; training political parties, civil society organizations, parliaments, and journalists; promoting effective and accountable governance; bolstering anti-corruption efforts; and strengthening justice sectors. U.S. assistance also provides legal aid to human rights defenders abroad and funds programs to address particular human rights issues and enable human rights monitoring and reporting.

**Education and Social Services.** U.S. basic, secondary, and higher education programs seek to boost access to quality education, improve learning outcomes, and support youth transitions into the workforce. Some programs specifically target marginalized students, such as girls and students in rural areas or communities affected by conflict or displacement. Youth development activities also include the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), which supports young African business, science, and civic leaders through training and mentorship, networking, and exchange-based fellowships.<sup>25</sup> USAID supports four YALI Regional Leadership Centers on the continent—in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and South Africa—which offer training and professional development programs. Additional U.S. assistance programs enhance access to, and delivery of, other social services, such as improved water and sanitation facilities.

**Environment.** Environmental assistance programs in Africa focus on biodiversity conservation, climate change mitigation and adaptation, countering wildlife crime, and natural resource management. In recent years, the largest allocation of regional environmental assistance has been for the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE). Implemented by USAID and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, CARPE promotes conservation, sustainable resource use, and climate change mitigation in Central Africa's Congo Basin rainforest, with a present focus on landscapes in DRC, the Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic (CAR).<sup>26</sup> Congress has shown enduring interest in international conservation initiatives and efforts to curb wildlife trafficking and other environmental crime, including in Africa.<sup>27</sup>

## Select Assistance Provided through Global Accounts and Programs

As noted, the discussion above does not account for U.S. development, security, or health assistance allocated to African countries via global accounts and programs—funds that are not broken out by region or country in public budget documents. This includes situation-responsive assistance, such as emergency humanitarian aid and certain kinds of governance support, which is appropriated on a global basis and allocated in response to emerging needs or opportunities.

<sup>25</sup> For more information, see YALI, “About YALI,” at <https://yali.state.gov/>.

<sup>26</sup> For more information, see CARPE, “About,” at <https://carpe.umd.edu/content/development-objectives>.


<sup>27</sup> For more, see CRS Insight IN11227, *Foreign Assistance for International Conservation*, by Pervaze A. Sheikh and Lucas F. Bermejo; CRS In Focus IF10601, *Transnational Crime Issues: Global Trends Overview*, by Liana W. Rosen.

Notably, it also includes certain security assistance programs through which some African countries have received considerable funding in recent years. Gaps in region- and country-level aid data may raise challenges for congressional oversight (see “Select Issues for Congress”).

**Emergency Assistance.** As of early 2020, there were U.S.- or U.N.-designated humanitarian crises in Burkina Faso, CAR, DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and the Lake Chad Basin (including parts of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria). The United States administers humanitarian aid to Africa under various authorities. Key accounts and programs include:

- USAID-administered Food for Peace (FFP) assistance authorized under Title II of the Food for Peace Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-480, commonly known as “P.L. 480”), which primarily provides for the purchase and distribution of U.S. in-kind food commodities.<sup>28</sup> African countries consistently have received a majority of annual FFP Title II emergency assistance in recent years.
- USAID-administered International Disaster Assistance (IDA), which funds food and nonfood humanitarian assistance—including the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP), which funds market-based food assistance, including cash transfers, food vouchers, and food procured locally and regionally.<sup>29</sup>
- State Department-administered Migration and Refugees Assistance (MRA) assistance for refugees and vulnerable migrants.

**Figure 6. Emergency Food Assistance to Africa, Select Programs**



**Source:** USAID, *Emergency Food Security Program Report* and *International Food Assistance Report*, FY2014-FY2018.

<sup>28</sup> Congress appropriates funds for FFP Title II programs via agriculture appropriations. USAID also administers nonemergency food assistance authorized under FFP Title II, which supports countries to transition from emergency food assistance to agricultural development. In FY2019, FFP nonemergency programs operated in eight African countries. See CRS Report R45422, *U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview*, by Alyssa R. Casey and CRS Report R45879, *International Food Assistance: Food for Peace Nonemergency Programs*, by Emily M. Morgenstern.

<sup>29</sup> Congress authorized EFSP in the Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195) and reauthorized it in the Global Food Security Reauthorization Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-266).

## Assistance Administered by Other U.S. Federal Departments and Agencies

While the State Department and USAID administer the majority of U.S. foreign assistance to Africa, other federal departments and agencies also manage or support aid programs in the region. For example, the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, and the Treasury conduct technical assistance programs and other activities in Africa, and may help implement some State Department- and USAID-administered programs on the continent.

Other U.S. federal entities involved in administering assistance to Africa notably include:

**The Department of Defense (DOD).** In addition to implementing some State Department-administered security assistance programs, DOD is authorized to engage in security cooperation with foreign partner militaries and internal security entities for a range of purposes.<sup>30</sup> The majority of this assistance has been provided under DOD's "global train and equip" authority, first established by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of FY2006 (P.L. 109-163). In the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328), Congress codified and expanded the "global train and equip" authority under 10 U.S.C. 333 ("Section 333"), consolidating various capacity-building authorities that it had granted DOD on a temporary or otherwise limited basis. Section 333 authorizes DOD to provide training and equipment to foreign military and internal security forces to build their capacity to counter terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, and transnational crime, and to bolster maritime and border security and military intelligence.

Comprehensive regional- or country-level funding data for DOD security cooperation programs are not publicly available, complicating approximations of funding for African countries. A CRS calculation based on available congressional notification data suggests that Kenya, Uganda, Niger, Chad, Somalia, and Cameroon have been the top African recipients of cumulative DOD global train and equip assistance over the past decade.<sup>31</sup> Congress has authorized additional DOD security cooperation programs in Africa under global or Africa-specific authorities (e.g., to help combat the Lord's Resistance Army rebel group in Central Africa between FY2012 and FY2017).

**Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).**<sup>32</sup> Authorized by Congress in 2004, the MCC supports five-year development "compacts" in developing countries that meet various governance and development benchmarks. MCC recipient governments lead the development and implementation of their programs, which are tailored to address key "constraints to growth" identified during the compact design phase. The MCC also funds smaller, shorter-term "threshold programs" that assist promising candidate countries to become compact-eligible.

As shown in **Appendix B**, the MCC has supported 32 compacts or threshold programs in 22 African countries since its inception, valued at roughly \$8.0 billion in committed funding. There are seven ongoing compacts and threshold programs in the region. The MCC has suspended or terminated compacts with some African governments for failing to maintain performance against selection benchmarks: it terminated engagement in Madagascar and Mali due to military coups, and suspended development of a second compact for Tanzania in 2016 due to a government

<sup>30</sup> For more on U.S. security assistance to Africa prior to the FY2017 consolidation of security cooperation authorities, see Testimony of Lauren Ploch Blanchard, CRS Specialist in African Affairs, before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, *U.S. Security Assistance in Africa*, 114<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., June 4, 2015.

<sup>31</sup> CRS calculation based on DOD notifications to Congress of planned security cooperation activities. Top African recipients of recent DOD global train and equip assistance play key roles in U.S.-backed counterterrorism efforts.

<sup>32</sup> See CRS Report RL32427, *Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues*, by Nick M. Brown.



crackdown on the political opposition.<sup>33</sup> In late 2019, the MCC cancelled a \$190 million tranche of funding under Ghana's second compact over concerns with the Ghanaian government's termination of a contract with a private energy utility.<sup>34</sup>

**The Peace Corps.**<sup>35</sup> The Peace Corps supports American volunteers to live in local communities abroad and conduct grassroots-level assistance programs focused on agriculture, economic development, youth engagement, health, and education. As of September 2019, 45% of Peace Corps Volunteers were serving in sub-Saharan Africa—by far the largest share by region.<sup>36</sup> Conflict and other crises in Africa have episodically led the Peace Corps to suspend programming over concern for volunteer safety, with recent conflict-related suspensions in Mali (in 2015) and Burkina Faso (2017) and temporary suspensions in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone during the 2014-2016 West Africa Ebola outbreak. In 2019, the Peace Corps announced that it would resume operations in Kenya after suspending activities in 2014 due to security concerns. The Peace Corps ceased all activities and recalled all volunteers worldwide in March 2020 due to COVID-19.

**African Development Foundation (USADF).** A federally funded, independent nonprofit corporation created by Congress in the African Development Foundation Act of 1980 (Title V of P.L. 96-533), the USADF seeks to reduce poverty by providing targeted grants worth up to \$250,000 that typically serve as seed capital for small-scale economic growth projects. The USADF maintains a core focus on agriculture, micro-enterprise development, and community resilience. It prioritizes support for marginalized, poor, and often remote communities as well as selected social groups, such as women and youth—often in fragile or post-conflict countries. USADF also plays a role in selected multi-agency initiatives, such as Power Africa and YALI.

## U.S. Aid to Africa During the Trump Administration

In 2018, the Trump Administration identified three core goals of its policy approach toward Africa: expanding U.S. trade and commercial ties, countering armed Islamist violence and other forms of conflict, and imposing more stringent conditions on U.S. assistance and U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region.<sup>37</sup> The Administration also has emphasized efforts to counter “great power competitors” in Africa, namely China and Russia, which it has accused of challenging U.S. influence in the region through “predatory” economic practices and other means.<sup>38</sup> Other stated policy objectives include promoting youth development and strengthening investment climates on the continent.<sup>39</sup> Budget requests and other official documents, such as USAID country strategies, have asserted other priorities broadly similar to those pursued by past Administrations, such as boosting economic growth, investment, and trade, enhancing democracy and good governance, promoting socioeconomic development, and improving health outcomes.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>33</sup> MCC, “MCC Statement on Decision of Board of Directors to Suspend Partnership with Tanzania,” March 28, 2016.

<sup>34</sup> MCC, “MCC Statement Regarding Termination of the Private Sector Concession by the Government of Ghana,” October 23, 2019.

<sup>35</sup> See also CRS Report RS21168, *The Peace Corps: Overview and Issues*, by Nick M. Brown.

<sup>36</sup> Peace Corps, *Agency Financial Report: FY2019*, November 2019.

<sup>37</sup> White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration's New Africa Strategy,” December 13, 2018.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy, “The Trump Administration and U.S. Africa Policy: What has been accomplished and what lies ahead?” Remarks at the Wilson Center, March 3, 2020.

<sup>40</sup> See, for example, State Department, CBJ for FY2020; and USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategies

The Administration has expressed skepticism of U.S. foreign aid globally, and to certain African countries in particular. For instance, then-National Security Advisor John Bolton pledged in 2018 to curtail aid to African countries whose governments are corrupt and to direct assistance toward states that govern democratically, pursue transparent business practices, and “act as responsible regional stakeholders [...and] where state failure or weakness would pose a direct threat to the United States and our citizens.”<sup>41</sup> These objectives do not appear to have been revoked since Bolton’s departure from the White House in September 2019. Whether the Administration’s budget proposals for aid to Africa have reflected such pledges is debatable, however, as discussed below (“The FY2021 Assistance Request for Africa: Overview and Analysis”).

The Trump Administration has maintained several assistance initiatives focused substantially or exclusively on Africa—including PEPFAR, the PMI, Feed the Future, Power Africa, and YALI, among others—and, as noted above, has launched Prosper Africa, a new Africa-focused trade and investment initiative. At the same time, the Administration has proposed to sharply reduce U.S. assistance to Africa (and globally), even as Congress has provided assistance for Africa at roughly constant levels in recent fiscal years (see **Figure 7**). The Trump Administration also has proposed changes to the manner in which the United States delivers assistance which, if enacted, could have implications for U.S. aid to Africa. These include:

- **Changes to humanitarian assistance.** As part of a consolidation of humanitarian aid accounts, the Administration has repeatedly proposed to eliminate FFP Title II aid, through which African countries received \$1.2 billion in emergency food assistance in FY2019.<sup>42</sup> The FY2021 budget request would merge the four humanitarian accounts—FFP Title II, International Disaster Assistance (IDA), Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA), and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA)—into a single International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account. Budget documents assert that the consolidation would enhance the flexibility and efficiency of humanitarian assistance.<sup>43</sup>
- **Changes to bilateral economic assistance.** The Administration has repeatedly proposed to merge a number of bilateral economic assistance accounts—including Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid, through which African countries received a cumulative \$1.5 billion in FY2019—into a new Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) account. The Administration has consistently requested far less in ESDF than prior-year combined allocations for the subsumed accounts. Budget documents contend the consolidation would improve efficiency.<sup>44</sup>
- **Cutting Foreign Military Financing for Africa.** Unlike previous Administrations, the Trump Administration has not requested FMF for African countries, with the exception of Djibouti, which hosts the only enduring U.S. military installation in Africa.<sup>45</sup>
- **Eliminating the USADF.** The Administration annually has proposed to eliminate the USADF and create a grants office within USAID that would assume responsibility for the agency’s work. In successive budget requests, the Administration has included one-time closeout funding for the agency (e.g., \$4.7 million for FY2021).

---

(CDCS), available at <https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/planning/country-strategies-cdcs>.

<sup>41</sup> White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton...” op. cit.

<sup>42</sup> USAID response to CRS query, February 2020.


<sup>43</sup> State Department, CBJ for FY2021.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Djibouti also hosts China’s only overseas military base. The State Department CBJ for FY2021 describes the \$5 million FMF request for Djibouti as aiming to bolster bilateral ties and “counter malign influences in the region.”

To date, Congress has maintained the existing account structures for the delivery of humanitarian aid and economic assistance and continued to appropriate operating funds to the USADF—most recently under P.L. 116-94 at a level of \$33 million for FY2020. Consideration of the President’s FY2021 budget request, released in February 2020, is underway.

**Figure 7. Allocated and Requested Aid to Africa in FY2016-FY2021, Select Accounts**



**Source:** State Department, CBJs for FY2017-FY2021; FY2019 data provided to CRS by USAID, February 2020.

**Notes:** Security assistance calculations include proposed funding for UNSOS. Calculations do not include funding allocated from global programs or functional accounts.

## The FY2021 Assistance Request for Africa

**Overview.** The Administration’s FY2021 budget request includes \$5.2 billion in aid for Africa, an increase from its FY2020 request (\$5.0 billion) but 28% below FY2019 allocations (\$7.1 billion).<sup>46</sup> These totals do not include emergency humanitarian aid or funding allocated to African countries from global accounts and programs. Funding for Africa would fall sharply from FY2019 levels across most major funding accounts, including Global Health Programs (which would see a 22% drop), PKO (23%), INCLE (46%), and IMET (16%).<sup>47</sup> Non-health development assistance would see the largest decline from FY2019 levels: the request would provide \$797 million in ESDF for Africa, down 48% from \$1.5 billion in allocated ESF and DA in FY2019. The request includes \$75 million in ESDF for Prosper Africa, up from \$50 million requested in FY2020. Separate proposed decreases in U.S. funding for U.N. peacekeeping missions, most of which are in Africa, could have implications for stability and humanitarian operations.<sup>48</sup>

**Analysis.** Overwhelmingly weighted toward health assistance, with the balance largely dedicated to traditional development and security activities, the FY2021 request aligns with long-standing U.S. priorities in the region—while at the same time proposing significant cuts to U.S. assistance

<sup>46</sup> State Department, CBJ for FY2021. FY2020 and FY2021 figures include funds requested for the U.N. Support office in Somalia (UNSOS), which successive Administrations have requested under the CIPA account, but Congress generally has appropriated to Somalia’s bilateral aid budget via the PKO account.


<sup>47</sup> PKO calculation includes proposed funding for UNSOS requested through CIPA.

<sup>48</sup> See CRS In Focus IF10597, *United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping*, by Luisa Blanchfield.

across all major sectors. Congress has not enacted similar proposed reductions in previous appropriations measures; several Members specifically have raised concerns over the potential ramifications of such cuts for U.S. influence and partnerships abroad.<sup>49</sup> In this regard, it may be debated whether the FY2021 budget, if enacted, would be likely to advance the Administration's stated priority of countering the influence of geostrategic competitors in Africa. For instance, officials have described Prosper Africa as partly intended to counter China's growing influence in the region, yet \$75 million in proposed funding for the initiative is arguably incommensurate with the Administration's goal of "vastly accelerat[ing]" two way U.S.-Africa trade and investment.<sup>50</sup>

Despite the Administration's pledge to curtail aid to countries that fail to govern democratically and transparently, top proposed recipients in FY2021 include several countries with poor or deteriorating governance records (e.g., Uganda, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Tanzania). Sharp proposed cuts to bilateral economic assistance, through which the United States funds most DRG activities, could have implications for U.S. democracy and governance programming in the region.

**Figure 8. U.S. Aid to Africa, Top Recipients, Recent Allocations vs. FY2021 Request**



**Source:** State Department, CBJs for FY2019-FY2021.

**Notes:** Calculations reflect assistance provided through the DA, ESF, GHP-State, GHP-USAID, IMET, INCLE, NADR, and PKO accounts. Humanitarian aid and funding allocated from global accounts/programs not included.

## Select Issues for Congress

Below is a selected list of issues that Congress may consider as it weights budgetary proposals and authorizes, appropriates funding for, and oversees U.S. foreign aid programs in Africa. References to specific countries are provided solely as illustrative examples.

<sup>49</sup> See, e.g., Remarks by Senator Menendez in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Review of the FY2020 Budget Request for USAID*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., May 8, 2019; remarks by Representative Rogers in House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, *Department of State Budget Request for FY2020*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., March 27, 2019.

<sup>50</sup> State Department, CBJ for FY2021. On Prosper Africa's role in countering Chinese influence, see White House, "Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton..." op. cit.

**Scale and balance.** Members may debate whether U.S. assistance to Africa is adequately balanced between sectors given the broad scope of Africa's needs and U.S. priorities on the continent, and whether overall funding levels are commensurate with U.S. interests in the region. Successive Administrations have articulated a diverse range of development, governance, and security objectives in Africa—yet U.S. assistance to the region has remained dominated by funding for health programs since the mid-2000s. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern over the relatively small share of U.S. aid dedicated to other stated U.S. priorities, such as promoting good governance, expanding U.S.-Africa commercial ties, and mitigating conflict.<sup>51</sup>

Meanwhile, the Trump Administration's repeated proposals to sharply reduce U.S. assistance to Africa have spurred pushback from some Members. Congressional objections have centered on the risks that aid cuts could potentially pose for U.S. national security, foreign policy goals, and U.S. influence and partnerships in Africa.<sup>52</sup> Notably, the proposed cuts in U.S. assistance come at a time when China and other countries, including Russia, India, Turkey, and several Arab Gulf states, are seeking to expand their roles in the region.<sup>53</sup>

**Transparency and oversight.** While this report provides approximate funding figures based largely on publicly available allocation data, comprehensive estimates of U.S. aid to Africa and amounts dedicated to specific focus areas are difficult to determine. Executive branch budget documents and congressional appropriations measures do not fully disaggregate aid allocations by country or region; meanwhile, databases such as USAID's Foreign Aid Explorer and the State Department's ForeignAssistance.gov provide data on obligations and disbursements but do not track committed funding against enacted levels, raising challenges for congressional oversight.

As noted above, gaps in region- and country-level assistance data may partly reflect efforts to maintain flexibility in U.S. assistance programs—for instance, by appropriating humanitarian aid to global accounts and allocating it according to need. At the same time, Congress has not imposed rigorous reporting requirements evenly across U.S. foreign aid programs. For instance, while DOD “global train and equip” assistance is subject to congressional notification and reporting requirements that require detailed information about country and security force unit recipients and assistance to be provided, there is no analogous reporting requirement governing State Department security assistance.<sup>54</sup> Public budget documents may thus include country- and program-level breakouts of some security assistance, while other funds—such as for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a PKO-funded peacekeeping capacity-building program through which some African militaries have received substantial U.S. training and equipment—are not reflected in bilateral aid budgets. A lack of data on what U.S. assistance has been provided to African countries may obscure policy dilemmas or inhibit efforts to evaluate impact.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>51</sup> See, for example, remarks by Representatives Bass and Wild in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations, *FY2020 Budget and U.S. – Africa Relations*, 116th Cong., 1st sess., November 19, 2019.

<sup>52</sup> See, for example, remarks by Senators Graham and Leahy in Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, *Review of the FY2020 Budget Request for USAID*, 1st sess., April 30, 2019.

<sup>53</sup> See, for example, Judd Devermont, “The World is Coming to Sub-Saharan Africa. Where is the United States?” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Brief, August 24, 2018.

<sup>54</sup> On U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa and associated oversight challenges, see Testimony of Alexis Arief, CRS Specialist in African Affairs, before the House Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, *U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa*, 116th Cong., 1st sess., December 16, 2019.

<sup>55</sup> Past Administrations and Congresses have attempted to address foreign assistance reporting gaps, including by establishing public databases that track foreign aid data. Such resources include <https://www.foreignassistance.gov> (a State Department tool); <https://explorer.usaid.gov> (administered by USAID); and <https://www.usaspending.gov> (a Treasury Department resource). Foreign aid data challenges are discussed in the State Department's *Foreign Assistance*



**Country Ownership.** Policymakers may debate the extent to which U.S. assistance supports partner African governments in taking the lead in addressing challenges related to socioeconomic development, security, and governance. The majority of U.S. aid to Africa is provided through nongovernment actors—such as U.N. agencies, humanitarian organizations, development practitioners, and civil society entities—rather than directly to governments. (Exceptions include U.S. security assistance for African security forces and some healthcare capacity-building programs.) Channeling aid through nongovernment actors may be preferable in countries where the state is unable or unwilling to meet the needs of its population, and may additionally grant the United States greater control and oversight over the use of aid funds. At the same time, experts debate whether this method of assistance adequately equips recipient governments to take primary responsibility for service delivery and other state duties—as well as whether this mode of delivery may limit donor influence and leverage with the recipient country government.<sup>56</sup>

**Conditions on U.S. assistance.** Congress has enacted legislation denying or placing conditions on assistance to countries that fail to meet certain standards in, for instance, human rights, counterterrorism, debt repayment, religious freedom, child soldier use, or trafficking in persons. In general, statutes establishing such conditions accord the executive branch the discretion to designate countries for sanction or waive such restrictions. Congress may continue to debate the merits and effectiveness of such restrictions. In FY2020, several African governments are subject to aid restrictions due to failure to meet standards related to:

- Religious freedom, under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292), with Eritrea currently listed as a “Country of Particular Concern.”<sup>57</sup>
- The use of child soldiers, under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA, P.L. 110-457, as amended) and related legislation, with DRC, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan subject to potential security assistance restrictions in FY2020.<sup>58</sup> In October 2019, President Trump exercised his authority under CSPA to waive certain restrictions for DRC, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan.<sup>59</sup>
- Trafficking in persons (TIP), under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, P.L. 106-386, as amended) and related legislation, with Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, The Gambia, Mauritania, and South Sudan subject to potential aid restrictions in FY2020. In October 2019, President Trump partially waived such restrictions with regard to DRC and South Sudan, and fully waived them for Comoros.<sup>60</sup>

---

*Data Review (FADR) Findings Report*, 2015, and *FADR Phase Two—Data Element Index*, 2016, and in various Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports (e.g., *Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Quality of Data on Foreign Assistance*, GAO-16-768, August 24, 2016) as well as various reports by agency inspectors general.

<sup>56</sup> For an overview of the potential benefits and risks associated with direct budget support, see Koeberle et. al., *Budget Support as More Effective Aid? Recent Experiences and Emerging Lessons* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006).

<sup>57</sup> In December 2019, the State Department removed Sudan from its longstanding listing as a CPC “due to significant steps taken by the civilian-led transitional government” to address religious freedom concerns. In re-designating Eritrea as a CPC, the Administration referred to existing restrictions rather than instituting new sanctions pursuant to the law. See CRS In Focus IF10803, *Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy*, by Michael A. Weber.

<sup>58</sup> CSPA designations are published annually in the State Department’s *Trafficking in Persons* report.

<sup>59</sup> White House, “Presidential Memorandum on Determination and Certification with Respect to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008,” October 18, 2019. See also CRS In Focus IF10901, *Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008: Security Assistance Restrictions*, by Michael A. Weber.

<sup>60</sup> White House, “Presidential Memorandum on Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Governments Regarding Trafficking in Persons,” October 18, 2019. See also CRS In Focus IF10587, *Human Trafficking and Foreign*

Some African countries periodically have been subject to other restrictions on U.S. foreign aid, such as those imposed on governments that rose to power through a coup d'état, support international terrorism, or are in external debt arrears. (In contrast to most legislative aid restrictions, a provision in annual appropriations legislation prohibiting most aid to governments that accede to power through a military coup does not grant the executive branch authority to waive the restrictions.<sup>61</sup>) Congress has also included provisions in annual aid appropriations measures restricting certain aid to specific African countries, notably Sudan and Zimbabwe.

In addition, the so-called “Leahy Laws” restrict most kinds of State Department- and DOD-administered security assistance to individual units or members of foreign security forces credibly implicated in a “gross violation of human rights,” subject to certain exceptions.<sup>62</sup> The executive branch does not publish information on which units or individual personnel have been prohibited from receiving U.S. assistance pursuant to these laws. Congress also has restricted certain kinds of security assistance deemed likely to be used for unintended purposes; for instance, language in annual foreign aid appropriations measures prohibits the use of funds for providing tear gas and other crowd control items to security forces that curtail freedoms of expression and assembly.

**Unintended consequences.** Some observers have raised concerns that the provision of U.S. foreign assistance may have unintended consequences, including in Africa. For instance, some analysts have questioned whether U.S. food assistance may inadvertently prolong civil conflict by enabling warring parties to sustain operations, though others have challenged that assertion.<sup>63</sup> Whether providing certain forms of U.S. aid, notably security assistance, may at times jeopardize U.S. policy goals in other areas is another potential consideration. For instance, some analysts have questioned whether security assistance to African governments with poor human rights records (e.g., Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Uganda) may strengthen abusive security forces or inhibit U.S. leverage on issues related to democracy and governance.<sup>64</sup> Proponents of U.S. security assistance programs in Africa may contend that aspects of such engagements—such as military professionalization and human rights training—enhance security sector governance and civil-military relations, and may thus improve human rights practices by partner militaries.

## Outlook

Congress commenced consideration of the President’s FY2021 budget request in February 2020. To date, the 116<sup>th</sup> Congress has not adopted many of the Administration’s proposed changes regarding assistance to Africa, notably its repeated attempts to significantly reduce aid to the region. Allocated funding has instead hovered around \$7 billion per year, excluding emergency humanitarian aid. As Congress debates the FY2021 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measure, Members may consider issues such as:

---

*Policy: An Introduction*, by Liana W. Rosen and Michael A. Weber.

<sup>61</sup> See CRS In Focus IF11267, *Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations*, by Alexis Arieff, Marian L. Lawson, and Susan G. Chesser.

<sup>62</sup> See CRS In Focus IF10575, *Human Rights Issues: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”)*, by Liana W. Rosen.

<sup>63</sup> For this critique, see Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian, “US Food Aid and Civil Conflict,” *American Economic Review*, vol. 106 no. 6 (2014), p. 1630-1666; for a response, see USAID’s Office of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), *(Re)assessing the Relationship Between Food Aid and Armed Conflict*, October 2014.

<sup>64</sup> For more on the debates surrounding U.S. security assistance to Africa, see Stephen Watts et. al, *Building Security in Africa: An Evaluation of U.S. Security Sector Assistance in Africa from the Cold War to the Present*, 2018.

- The economic, humanitarian, and health-related shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is expected to have a severe impact on Africa's development trajectory;
- Unfolding political transitions in Sudan and Ethiopia, which may have significant implications for governance and conflict trends in the region;<sup>65</sup>
- Conflicts and humanitarian crises in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and South Sudan;<sup>66</sup>
- Repressive governance in several countries that rank as top recipients of U.S. assistance in Africa, including Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia;<sup>67</sup>
- The effectiveness of existing conditions on U.S. foreign assistance to Africa, whether additional conditions and restrictions may be necessary, and the appropriate balance between ensuring congressional influence and providing executive branch flexibility;
- U.S.-Africa trade and investment issues, including as they relate to funding and overseeing the Administration's Prosper Africa initiative; and
- The involvement in Africa of foreign powers such as China and Russia, and the implications of such engagement for U.S. national security and policy interests.

---

<sup>65</sup> See CRS In Focus IF10182, *Sudan* and CRS In Focus IF10185, *Ethiopia*.

<sup>66</sup> See CRS In Focus IF10434, *Burkina Faso*, CRS In Focus IF10279, *Cameroon*, CRS In Focus IF11171, *Crisis in the Central African Republic*, CRS Report R43166, *Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations*, CRS In Focus IF10116, *Conflict in Mali*, CRS Report RL33964, *Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, CRS In Focus IF10155, *Somalia*, and CRS In Focus IF10218, *South Sudan*.

<sup>67</sup> See CRS Report R44402, *Rwanda: In Brief*, CRS Report R44271, *Tanzania: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, CRS In Focus IF10325, *Uganda*, and CRS In Focus IF11271, *Zambia*.

## Appendix A. U.S. Assistance to Africa, by Country

Allocations by year of appropriation, selected accounts, in thousands of current U.S. dollars

Country / Account	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020 req.	FY2021 req.
<b>Angola</b>	<b>43,942</b>	<b>42,023</b>	<b>33,619</b>	<b>24,400</b>	<b>36,400</b>
GHP-State	11,058	9,028	4,932	0	10,000
GHP-USAID	28,390	28,390	24,000	22,000	22,000
IMET	494	605	587	400	400
NADR	4,000	4,000	4,100	2,000	4,000
<b>Benin</b>	<b>23,590</b>	<b>24,512</b>	<b>25,550</b>	<b>19,300</b>	<b>19,300</b>
GHP-USAID	23,000	24,000	25,000	19,000	19,000
IMET	590	512	550	300	300
<b>Botswana</b>	<b>36,810</b>	<b>65,323</b>	<b>39,290</b>	<b>68,580</b>	<b>45,600</b>
GHP-State	36,061	64,764	38,667	67,880	45,000
IMET	749	559	623	700	600
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	<b>36,675</b>	<b>45,790</b>	<b>49,666</b>	<b>25,350</b>	<b>29,850</b>
DA	0	0	2,300	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	2,300	4,300
GHP-State	0	0	2,068	0	0
GHP-USAID	25,000	29,000	33,500	22,000	23,500
IMET	545	549	432	550	550
NADR	0	0	0	500	1,500
<b>Burundi</b>	<b>53,400</b>	<b>54,802</b>	<b>44,277</b>	<b>19,260</b>	<b>19,100</b>
DA	3,000	3,000	3,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	1,000	1,000
GHP-State	7,599	11,340	7,810	8,260	8,000
GHP-USAID	18,500	20,000	25,500	10,000	10,000
IMET	0	0	0	0	100
<b>Cabo Verde</b>	<b>299</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>356</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>125</b>
IMET	299	234	356	125	125
<b>Cameroon</b>	<b>83,395</b>	<b>80,087</b>	<b>194,380</b>	<b>52,065</b>	<b>114,200</b>
DA	0	1,000	3,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	1,000	3,000
ESF	0	0	1,000	-	-
GHP-State	37,565	39,674	139,728	32,365	90,000
GHP-USAID	21,500	24,000	22,500	18,000	20,500
IMET	607	1,036	740	700	700
<b>Central African Republic</b>	<b>26,333</b>	<b>33,908</b>	<b>46,557</b>	<b>6,600</b>	<b>6,100</b>

Country / Account	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020 req.	FY2021 req.
DA	3,000	3,000	3,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	1,000	1,000
GHP-USAID	0	0	1,000	0	0
IMET	121	90	142	150	150
INCLE	4,450	4,500	4,500	2,000	1,500
PKO	8,000	8,000	8,000	3,450	3,450
<b>Chad</b>	<b>28,069</b>	<b>32,083</b>	<b>48,263</b>	<b>2,900</b>	<b>2,900</b>
DA	0	1,000	3,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	1,100	1,100
IMET	871	800	1,161	800	800
NADR	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
<b>Comoros</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>324</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
IMET	113	324	0	100	100
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	<b>143,016</b>	<b>142,438</b>	<b>87,046</b>	<b>138,614</b>	<b>117,350</b>
DA	4,232	6,000	6,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	2,000	5,000
GHP-State	113,012	106,876	48,629	116,264	90,000
GHP-USAID	25,000	29,000	32,000	20,000	22,000
IMET	772	562	417	350	350
<b>Dem. Rep. of Congo</b>	<b>362,185</b>	<b>375,330</b>	<b>411,720</b>	<b>200,667</b>	<b>257,350</b>
DA	0	0	37,594	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	42,000	45,000
ESF	75,188	75,188	37,594	-	-
GHP-State	55,470	43,258	68,245	43,567	90,000
GHP-USAID	136,550	138,200	129,000	107,000	114,600
IMET	0	0	0	0	150
INCLE	2,000	3,000	4,000	2,000	1,500
NADR	2,000	4,000	3,000	4,000	4,000
PKO	10,000	5,000	5,000	2,100	2,100
<b>Djibouti</b>	<b>16,216</b>	<b>18,420</b>	<b>19,778</b>	<b>8,395</b>	<b>8,395</b>
ESF	9,000	9,000	9,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	2,500	2,500
FMF	500	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
GHP-State	300	300	0	0	0
GHP-USAID	1,500	0	0	0	0
IMET	652	1,038	788	895	895
<b>Eswatini</b>	<b>58,679</b>	<b>65,961</b>	<b>69,271</b>	<b>63,334</b>	<b>55,100</b>



Country / Account	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020 req.	FY2021 req.
GHP-State	51,655	58,868	69,028	63,234	55,000
GHP-USAID	6,900	6,900	0	0	0
IMET	124	193	243	100	100
<b>Ethiopia</b>	<b>749,072</b>	<b>601,293</b>	<b>634,361</b>	<b>203,869</b>	<b>278,000</b>
DA	97,857	99,551	84,615	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	51,000	92,000
ESF	0	0	38,285	-	-
GHP-State	141,812	68,813	59,594	59,169	90,000
GHP-USAID	135,550	135,550	135,550	92,850	92,000
IMET	648	945	1,543	850	1,000
INCLE	0	0	4,000	0	3,000
<b>Gabon</b>	<b>641</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>400</b>
IMET	641	520	0	400	400
<b>Gambia</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>2,179</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>200</b>
DA	0	0	2,000	0	-
IMET	26	197	179	200	200
<b>Ghana</b>	<b>135,674</b>	<b>143,217</b>	<b>143,986</b>	<b>62,750</b>	<b>63,250</b>
DA	67,157	74,157	43,418	0	-
ESDF	-	-	-	20,000	20,000
ESF	0	0	34,782	0	-
GHP-State	2,681	5,934	6,076	0	0
GHP-USAID	64,999	62,299	58,500	42,000	42,500
IMET	837	827	1,210	750	750
<b>Guinea</b>	<b>26,120</b>	<b>26,568</b>	<b>26,477</b>	<b>19,300</b>	<b>19,300</b>
DA	4,000	3,000	3,000	-	-
GHP-USAID	21,500	23,000	23,000	19,000	19,000
IMET	620	568	477	300	300
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>100</b>
IMET	149	70	0	150	100
<b>Kenya</b>	<b>743,275</b>	<b>701,603</b>	<b>488,177</b>	<b>383,845</b>	<b>330,400</b>
DA	88,079	101,579	100,670	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	43,500	39,000
FMF	1,000	0	0		0
GHP-State	496,210	441,512	205,472	276,145	225,000
GHP-USAID	86,000	81,600	115,500	54,000	56,500
IMET	924	855	985	1,000	1,000
INCLE	1,000	5,000	7,000	4,700	3,400

Country / Account	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020 req.	FY2021 req.
NADR	5,000	5,000	5,000	4,500	5,500
<b>Lesotho</b>	<b>61,708</b>	<b>79,644</b>	<b>84,654</b>	<b>78,453</b>	<b>65,100</b>
GHP-State	55,308	73,174	84,617	78,353	65,000
GHP-USAID	6,400	6,400	0	0	0
IMET	0	70	37	100	100
<b>Liberia</b>	<b>111,827</b>	<b>112,289</b>	<b>96,503</b>	<b>39,510</b>	<b>32,560</b>
DA	65,429	65,439	45,350	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	9,200	6,200
ESF	0	0	10,000	-	-
FMF	2,500	0	0	0	0
GHP-State	350	350	3,500	0	0
GHP-USAID	33,150	34,150	30,000	23,000	23,000
IMET	398	350	653	360	360
INCLE	9,000	11,000	6,000	6,000	3,000
PKO	1,000	1,000	1,000	950	0
<b>Madagascar</b>	<b>95,007</b>	<b>90,602</b>	<b>108,390</b>	<b>44,000</b>	<b>44,000</b>
DA	16,705	16,605	19,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	3,000	3,000
GHP-USAID	52,000	52,000	54,200	40,800	40,800
IMET	247	475	1,043	200	200
<b>Malawi</b>	<b>198,300</b>	<b>258,953</b>	<b>263,361</b>	<b>202,262</b>	<b>206,800</b>
DA	56,000	56,000	56,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	15,000	25,000
GHP-State	57,770	120,518	142,347	138,462	130,000
GHP-USAID	73,700	74,375	62,500	48,500	51,500
IMET	357	579	417	300	300
<b>Mali</b>	<b>145,554</b>	<b>139,892</b>	<b>134,963</b>	<b>78,925</b>	<b>85,100</b>
DA	55,541	58,541	60,801	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	28,200	33,400
GHP-State	1,500	1,500	4,500	0	0
GHP-USAID	61,500	64,800	62,800	48,850	49,850
IMET	842	986	948	875	850
NADR	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
<b>Mauritania</b>	<b>6,457</b>	<b>7,091</b>	<b>3,000</b>	<b>2,080</b>	<b>47,900</b>
DA	1,584	2,000	2,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	1,000	1,000
IMET	744	751	0	580	400

Country / Account	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020 req.	FY2021 req.
NADR	1,000	1,000	1,000	500	500
<b>Mauritius</b>	<b>286</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
IMET	286	204	219	100	100
<b>Mozambique</b>	<b>446,675</b>	<b>471,672</b>	<b>418,244</b>	<b>403,535</b>	<b>456,450</b>
DA	41,206	39,656	62,016	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	5,600	47,000
GHP-State	327,330	353,685	279,154	343,185	350,000
GHP-USAID	70,500	74,000	76,250	54,300	59,000
IMET	533	696	282	450	450
<b>Namibia</b>	<b>65,323</b>	<b>66,926</b>	<b>69,284</b>	<b>64,877</b>	<b>60,100</b>
GHP-State	65,064	66,879	69,135	64,777	60,000
IMET	259	47	149	100	100
<b>Niger</b>	<b>78,791</b>	<b>92,744</b>	<b>100,688</b>	<b>34,300</b>	<b>47,300</b>
DA	5,000	21,085	11,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	15,500	26,000
ESF	0	0	15,000	-	-
GHP-USAID	18,000	22,000	27,000	17,000	19,500
IMET	811	834	1,379	800	800
NADR	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
<b>Nigeria</b>	<b>584,886</b>	<b>519,906</b>	<b>699,349</b>	<b>431,750</b>	<b>472,100</b>
DA	80,500	92,000	74,500	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	49,000	34,000
ESF	45,500	0	0	-	-
FMF	500	0	0	0	0
GHP-State	224,782	199,561	353,417	235,800	300,000
GHP-USAID	203,500	199,000	222,500	141,900	134,100
IMET	1,041	1,092	1,034	1,050	1,000
INCLE	5,000	6,000	7,000	4,000	3,000
<b>Republic of Congo</b>	<b>1,379</b>	<b>1,446</b>	<b>3,756</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>150</b>
IMET	503	538	0	150	150
<b>Rwanda</b>	<b>142,809</b>	<b>161,251</b>	<b>148,903</b>	<b>116,562</b>	<b>105,750</b>
DA	46,000	46,000	46,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	12,200	12,200
GHP-State	53,010	74,416	61,861	75,812	65,000
GHP-USAID	43,175	40,175	40,500	28,000	28,000
IMET	624	660	542	550	550
<b>Sao Tome &amp; Principe</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Country / Account	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020 req.	FY2021 req.
IMET	338	290	155	100	100
<b>Senegal</b>	<b>116,172</b>	<b>121,301</b>	<b>124,811</b>	<b>58,100</b>	<b>67,600</b>
DA	54,000	61,185	63,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	15,500	26,000
GHP-State	600	600	4,785	0	0
GHP-USAID	60,435	58,435	56,100	41,800	40,800
IMET	1,137	1,081	926	800	800
<b>Seychelles</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
IMET	275	241	14	100	100
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	<b>18,913</b>	<b>21,952</b>	<b>22,020</b>	<b>15,600</b>	<b>17,600</b>
DA	3,000	2,000	2,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	1,200	1,200
GHP-State	500	500	0	0	0
GHP-USAID	15,000	19,000	19,000	14,000	16,000
IMET	413	452	1,020	400	400
<b>Somalia</b>	<b>456,412</b>	<b>428,908</b>	<b>409,748</b>	<b>140,000</b>	<b>137,265</b>
DA	53,344	58,000	56,500	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	43,200	43,200
ESF	9,500	0	0	-	-
IMET	180	264	225	300	265
INCLE	7,600	4,000	3,000	2,000	1,800
NADR	18,750	4,500	4,500	4,500	8,000
PKO	256,132	253,500	222,500	90,000	84,000
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>470,975</b>	<b>586,603</b>	<b>734,992</b>	<b>172,096</b>	<b>241,650</b>
DA	6,540	5,000	3,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	0	2,000
GHP-State	450,132	560,120	668,285	161,846	225,000
GHP-USAID	13,000	20,785	63,000	9,600	14,000
IMET	853	698	707	650	650
INCLE	150	0	0	-	-
NADR	300	0	0	-	-
<b>South Sudan</b>	<b>436,430</b>	<b>453,154</b>	<b>256,630</b>	<b>64,711</b>	<b>102,300</b>
DA	72,327	51,201	38,909	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	22,200	22,200
ESF	0	0	17,091	-	-
GHP-State	10,817	15,535	27,279	11,411	50,000
GHP-USAID	17,010	21,010	32,257	10,100	10,100

Country / Account	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020 req.	FY2021 req.
INCLE	2,000	180	0	0	0
NADR	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	2,000
PKO	27,491	25,000	25,000	20,000	18,000
<b>Sudan</b>	<b>77,799</b>	<b>154,606</b>	<b>127,395</b>	<b>1,500</b>	<b>12,000</b>
DA	5,000	5,000	6,500	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	1,500	12,000
ESF	0	0	1,000	-	-
<b>Tanzania</b>	<b>554,247</b>	<b>557,121</b>	<b>429,136</b>	<b>348,406</b>	<b>328,700</b>
DA	65,829	65,229	45,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	12,600	5,000
GHP-State	380,692	380,339	254,338	266,606	250,000
GHP-USAID	99,400	100,500	126,000	68,500	73,000
IMET	716	1,009	751	700	700
NADR	200	0	0	0	0
<b>Togo</b>	<b>514</b>	<b>539</b>	<b>1,841</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>300</b>
GHP-State	0	0	1,632	300	0
IMET	514	539	209	0	300
<b>Uganda</b>	<b>415,689</b>	<b>560,168</b>	<b>494,599</b>	<b>415,488</b>	<b>305,700</b>
DA	53,940	65,190	48,257	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	17,000	9,500
ESF	0	0	10,000	-	-
GHP-State	246,425	364,613	308,820	332,288	225,000
GHP-USAID	90,500	98,783	119,500	65,500	70,500
IMET	818	707	826	700	700
NADR	200	0	0	0	0
<b>Zambia</b>	<b>397,062</b>	<b>451,903</b>	<b>442,911</b>	<b>364,869</b>	<b>307,225</b>
DA	35,500	35,500	35,500	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	5,000	5,000
GHP-State	273,932	334,086	323,146	312,494	250,000
GHP-USAID	87,175	81,875	83,800	47,025	51,875
IMET	455	442	465	350	350
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	<b>197,126</b>	<b>230,838</b>	<b>242,451</b>	<b>174,512</b>	<b>139,500</b>
DA	17,793	21,500	22,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	9,000	5,000
GHP-State	109,223	127,607	142,094	144,312	110,000
GHP-USAID	42,500	42,500	26,000	20,200	23,000
NADR	1,500	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,500



Country / Account	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020 req.	FY2021 req.
<b>African Union</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>378</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>350</b>
ESDF	-	-	-	350	350
ESF	389	378	350	-	-
<b>State Africa Regional</b>	<b>280,564</b>	<b>120,959</b>	<b>137,720</b>	<b>138,785</b>	<b>154,635</b>
ESDF	-	-	-	18,200	18,200
ESF	28,964	25,964	31,000	-	-
FMF	20,000	0	0	0	0
GHP-State	0	0	0	25,000	40,000
INCLE	46,000	35,820	42,350	29,200	24,985
NADR	24,350	24,850	24,850	23,450	24,950
PKO	161,250	34,325	39,520	42,935	46,500
<b>USAID Africa Regional</b>	<b>150,938</b>	<b>119,505</b>	<b>146,635</b>	<b>177,400</b>	<b>198,000</b>
DA	137,338	106,305	133,435	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	169,400	190,000
GHP-USAID	13,600	13,200	13,200	8,000	8,000
<b>USAID Central Africa</b>	<b>56,900</b>	<b>56,900</b>	<b>57,500</b>	<b>3,900</b>	<b>3,900</b>
DA	46,900	46,900	47,500	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	3,900	3,900
ESF	10,000	10,000	10,000	-	-
<b>USAID East Africa</b>	<b>41,350</b>	<b>35,000</b>	<b>35,800</b>	<b>9,700</b>	<b>15,000</b>
DA	31,250	30,500	30,300	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	8,200	14,000
GHP-USAID	10,100	4,500	5,500	1,500	1,000
<b>USAID Sahel</b>	<b>40,000</b>	<b>39,750</b>	<b>40,371</b>	<b>19,000</b>	<b>18,500</b>
DA	27,000	22,000	22,371	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	6,500	6,000
GHP-USAID	13,000	17,750	18,000	12,500	12,500
<b>USAID Southern Africa</b>	<b>31,600</b>	<b>29,000</b>	<b>33,950</b>	<b>5,800</b>	<b>12,500</b>
DA	28,000	29,000	33,950	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	5,800	12,500
GHP-USAID	3,600	0	0	0	0
<b>USAID West Africa</b>	<b>100,830</b>	<b>72,691</b>	<b>64,780</b>	<b>29,000</b>	<b>29,000</b>
DA	57,775	55,191	49,000	-	-
ESDF	-	-	-	19,000	19,000
ESF	25,555	0	0	0	-
GHP-State	0	0	280	0	0
GHP-USAID	17,500	17,500	15,500	10,000	10,000

**Source:** State Department CBJs for FY2019-FY2021.

## Appendix B. MCC Programs in Africa: A Snapshot

Country	Program	Date Range	Amount	Focus
Benin	Compact	2006 – 2011	\$307.3 million	Land/property, financial services, judicial system, port expansion
	Power Compact	2017 – ongoing	\$375.0 million	Electric power
Burkina Faso	Threshold Program	2005 – 2008	\$12.9 million	Girls' education
	Compact	2009 – 2014	\$480.9 million	Rural land governance, agriculture, roads, girls' education
Cabo Verde	Compact I	2005 – 2010	\$110.1 million	Infrastructure, private sector development, watershed management, agriculture
	Compact II	2012 – 2017	\$66.2 million	Water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), land management
Côte d'Ivoire	Compact	2019 – ongoing	\$524.7 million	Education, transport
Ghana	Compact	2007 – 2012	\$547.0 million	Agriculture, transport, rural development
	Power Compact	2016 – ongoing	\$308 million [reduced from \$498.2 million]	Electric power
Kenya	Threshold Program	2007 – 2010	\$12.7 million	Anti-corruption, governance
Lesotho	Compact	2008 – 2013	\$362.6 million	Water sector, health sector, private sector development.
Liberia	Threshold Program	2010 – 2013	\$15.1 million	Land rights and access, girls' education, trade policy
	Compact	2015 – ongoing	\$256.7 million	Electric power, roads
Madagascar	Compact	2005 – 2009 [Terminated due to undemocratic transfer of power]	\$109.8 million	Land titling, agriculture, financial sector development
Malawi	Threshold Program	2005 – 2008	\$20.9 million	Anti-corruption, governance
	Compact	2013 – 2018	\$350.7 million	Electric power
Mali	Compact	2007 – 2012 [Terminated due to undemocratic transfer of power]	\$460.8 million	Irrigation, transport, airport and industrial park development
Mozambique	Compact	2008 – 2013	\$506.9 million	WASH, transport, land tenure, agriculture
Namibia	Compact	2009 – 2014	\$304.5 million	Education, tourism, agriculture
Niger	Threshold Program	2008 – 2013	\$16.9 million	Girls' education, anti-corruption, governance
	Compact	2018 – ongoing	\$437.0 million	Irrigation, roads, agriculture
Rwanda	Threshold Program	2008 - 2013	\$24.7 million	Civic participation, justice sector

São Tomé and Príncipe	Threshold Program	2007 – 2011	\$7.4 million	Tax enforcement, business environment
Senegal	Compact	2010 – 2015	\$540 million	Roads, irrigation
	Power Compact	Signed 2018	\$550 million	Electric power
Sierra Leone	Threshold Program	2016 – ongoing	\$44.4 million	Water sector, electric power, governance
Tanzania	Threshold Program	2006 – 2008	\$11.2 million	Anti-corruption, governance, civic participation
	Compact	2008 – 2013	\$694.5 million	Airport development, transport, water, and energy sectors
Togo	Threshold Program	2019 – ongoing	\$35.0 million	internet and communications technology access, land rights
Uganda	Threshold Program	2007 – 2009	\$10.4 million	Anti-corruption, governance
Zambia	Threshold Program	2006 – 2009	\$22.7 million	Anti-corruption, business environment, trade management
	Compact	2013 – 2018	\$354.8 million	WASH

**Source:** MCC.

**Notes:** Committed funds may not be fully disbursed due to programmatic adjustments. Date range from entry into force.

## Author Contact Information

Tomas F. Husted, Coordinator  
Analyst in African Affairs  
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov/7-....

Alexis Arieff  
Specialist in African Affairs  
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov/7-....

Lauren Ploch Blanchard  
Specialist in African Affairs  
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov/7-....

Nicolas Cook  
Specialist in African Affairs  
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov/7-....

## EveryCRSReport.com

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a federal legislative branch agency, housed inside the Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on issues that may come before Congress.

EveryCRSReport.com republishes CRS reports that are available to all Congressional staff. The reports are not classified, and Members of Congress routinely make individual reports available to the public.

Prior to our republication, we redacted phone numbers and email addresses of analysts who produced the reports. We also added this page to the report. We have not intentionally made any other changes to any report published on EveryCRSReport.com.

CRS reports, as a work of the United States government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Information in a CRS report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to members of Congress in connection with CRS' institutional role.

EveryCRSReport.com is not a government website and is not affiliated with CRS. We do not claim copyright on any CRS report we have republished.