
 
Updated November 20, 2020
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a 
Cuba; increased U.S. economic sanctions, which have hurt 
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy 
Cuba’s nascent private sector; and the economic decline 
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at 
associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
isolating the Cuban government.  
pandemic. The Economist Intelligence Unit forecast an 
8.3% economic contraction in 2020. 
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift 
away from sanctions and toward engagement and the 
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic appears to 
normalization of relations . Changes included the rescission 
have been effective. As of November 20, 2020, the country 
of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international 
reported 131 deaths, with a mortality rate of 1.16 per 
terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of diplomatic 
100,000  people (among the lowest rates in the hemisphere), 
relations (July 2015); and an easing of restrictions on travel, 
according to Johns Hopkins University. Cuba has provided 
remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and 
international assistance for pandemic response by sending 
financial services (2015 and 2016), accomplished through 
over 3,700 medical professionals to almost 40 countries.  
amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations 
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump 
(CACR), administered by the Treasury Department, and the 
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June 
Export Administration Regulations, administered by the 
2017 that introduced new sanctions, including restrictions 
Commerce Department. The restoration of relations led to 
on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban 
increased government-to-government engagement, with 
over 20 bilateral agreements and numerous dialogues. 
military. The State Department issued a list of “restricted 
entities” in 2017, which has been updated several times, 
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in 
most recently in September 2020. The “Cuba restricted list” 
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back efforts to 
includes 230 entities and subentities, including 2 ministries, 
normalize relations. By 2019, the Administration had 
5 holding companies and 54 of their subentities, 111 hotels, 
largely abandoned engagement and had increased sanctions 
2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 
to pressure the Cuban government on human rights and for 
41 entities serving defense and security sectors. 
its support of the Venezuelan government of Nicolás 
Since 2019, the Administration has imposed increasingly 
Maduro. In 2020, the Administration has ratcheted up 
strong sanctions. In addition to those noted below, it has 
restrictions on travel and remittances. In October, it 
increased efforts to highlight allegations of coercive labor 
announced new sanctions on remittances, effective 
practices in Cuba’s foreign medical missions, a major 
November 26, which resulted in Western Union announcing 
foreign exchange earner for Cuba. In May 2020, the State 
it would stop forwarding remittances to Cuba on November 
Department (pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export 
22 (see below). 
Control Act) added Cuba to its annual list of countries 
Cuban Political and Economic Developments. In April 
certified as not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism 
2018, Miguel Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice 
efforts for the first time since 2015. 
president, succeeded Raúl Castro as president. Castro 
  Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba. 
continues to head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021. 
Since April 2019,  the Treasury Department has imposed 
The selection of Díaz-Canel, now 60 years old, reflected the 
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels 
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several 
that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July 2019, it 
years ago and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban 
sanctioned Cuba’s state-run oil import/export company. 
revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government. 
While in power from 2006 to 2018,  Raúl Castro began to 
  Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective 
implement significant economic policy changes, moving 
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file 
toward a more mixed  economy with a stronger private 
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property 
sector, but his government’s slow, gradualist approach did 
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and 
not produce major economic improvements. 
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 
104-114).  Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national, 
In 2019, Cuba adopted a new constitution with such 
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time 
changes as an appointed prime minister to oversee 
of the confiscation. Previous Administrations had 
government operations; limits on the president’s tenure 
suspended, at six-month intervals, the right to file such 
(two five-year terms) and age (60, beginning first term); 
lawsuits. The European Union and Canada criticized the 
and market-oriented economic reforms, including the right 
Trump Administration’s action, vowing to ban 
to private property and foreign investment promotion. The 
enforcement or recognition of any judgement and allow 
new constitution also ensured the state’s dominance over 
the economy and the Communist Party’s predominant role. 
counterclaims. To date, 29 lawsuits have been filed 
against U.S. and foreign companies, including cruise 
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by Venezuela’s 
ship operators, airlines, travel booking companies, and 
economic crisis, which has reduced Venezuela’s support for 
hotels; several lawsuits have been dismissed.  
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
Cuba:  U.S.  Policy  Overview  
  Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. On travel, in 
of conscience in 2019. After six months of detention, José 
June 2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-
Daniel Ferrer, leader of the opposition Patriotic Union of 
to-people educational travel and the Commerce 
Cuba, was released in April 2020 to house arrest.  
Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private 
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana. 
and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from 
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy 
going to Cuba. The Transportation Department 
community members  suffered a series of unexplained 
suspended commercial flights to cities other than 
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues 
Havana in December 2019; charter flights to cities other 
between late 2016 and May 2018. The State Department 
than Havana in January 2020; and private charter flights 
maintains that the investigation has not reached a 
to Havana in October 2020. In September 2020, the 
conclusion regarding the cause or source of the injuries, for 
Treasury Department prohibited U.S. travelers from 
which Cuba strongly denies responsibility. In September 
staying at properties identified by the State Department 
2017, the State Department ordered the departure of 
as owned or controlled by the Cuban government; the 
nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to 
ban includes over 400 hotels  and privately owned 
minimize  the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff 
residences for rent (casas particulares) if they are 
was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has 
controlled by a prohibited government official or 
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing. 
Communist Party member (or close relative). 
 
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued 
On remittances, in September 2019, the Treasury 
to fund Cuba democracy assistance and U.S.-government 
Department capped family remittances (not previously 
sponsored broadcasting to Cuba: $20 million for democracy 
limited) to $1,000 per quarter per Cuban national and 
programs and $29.1 million for broadcasting in FY2019 
eliminated the category of donative remittances. In June 
(P.L. 116-6)  and $20 million for democracy programs and 
and September 2020, the State Department added to its 
$20.973  million for broadcasting in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94, 
“Cuba restricted list” two Cuban companies that 
Division G). P.L. 116-94 (Division J) included benefits for 
facilitate the processing of remittances. On October 27, 
U.S. government employees and dependents injured while 
2020, the Treasury Department prohibited, effective 
stationed in Cuba. For FY2021, the Administration 
November 26, the processing of remittances through any 
requested $10 million for democracy programs and $12.973 
entities on the “Cuba restricted list.” This resulted in 
million for broadcasting. Both the House-passed version of 
Western Union—the major financial services company 
the FY2021  foreign aid appropriations bill, Division A of 
used for transmitting remittances to Cuba, with more 
H.R. 7608 (H.Rept. 116-444),  approved July 24, 2020, and 
than 400 offices on the island—announcing on 
the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bill and 
November 13 that November 22 would be the last day to 
explanatory statement would provide $20 million for 
send money to Cuba until a solution could be found to 
democracy programs and fully fund the broadcasting 
keep its services open. 
request. In other legislative action, the Senate approved 
S.Res. 454 in June 2020, calling for the release of 
  Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September 
democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer (a similar resolution, 
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn 
H.Res. 774, was introduced in the House). 
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to 
process certain funds transfers originating and 
Among other bills , several would ease or lift U.S. sanctions: 
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019, 
H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R. 1898/S. 1447 
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to 
(U.S. agricultural exports); H.R. 2404 (overall embargo); 
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de 
and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel). H.R. 4884  would reinstate 
minimis rule (from 25%) requiring a third country-based 
the Cuban Family Reunification Program. S. 3977 would 
company exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10% 
require the State Department to report on countries with 
U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed 
Cuban medical missions. S. 4635 would require an annual 
licensing requirements for the export of certain donated 
report on Cuba’s medical missions and reinstate the Cuban 
items to organizations controlled by the Cuban 
Medical Professional Parole program.  
government or Communist Party and items for 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
Several resolutions would address the following: the release 
 
of Cuban political prisoner Silverio Portal Contreras 
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa 
(H.Res. 1172); Cuba’s medical missions (S.Res. 14/H.Res. 
restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross 
136); U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba (H.Res. 92/S.Res. 
violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela. 
232); Cuban religious/political freedom (S.Res. 215); Las 
Further visa restrictions were imposed on Cuba’s 
Damas de Blanco human rights group (S.Res. 531); and the 
Interior Minister (November 2019) and Cuba’s defense 
35th anniversary of Cuba broadcasting (H.Res. 971/S.Res. 
minister (January 2020) for human rights violations. 
637). Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. 
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, and CRS Report 
Continued Human  Rights Concerns. Human rights 
R45657,  Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress.  
violations in Cuba have been a fundamental U.S. policy 
concern for many years. As of October 1, 2020, the human 
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs    
rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders listed 138 political 
IF10045
prisoners, with 76 imprisoned for reasons of conscience; 
Amnesty International designated six of these as prisoners 
 
 
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Cuba:  U.S.  Policy  Overview  
 
 
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