November 2, 2020
The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States,
Japan, India, and Australia
Overview
particularly after the U.S. withdrawal from the proposed
In October 2020, in the midst of a global pandemic, U.S.
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his three counterparts
from Australia, India, and Japan convened an in-person
A Shift to Operations?
meeting in Tokyo. The focus was on boosting the
Skeptics of the Quad earlier pointed to the group’s lack of
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, aka “the Quad,” a four-
operationalization. Shortly after the October 2020 meeting
country coalition with a common platform of protecting
in Tokyo, India announced that Australia would be invited
freedom of navigation and promoting democratic values in
to join the United States, Japan, and India for the annual
the region. The gathering released no joint statement, but
Malabar naval exercises slated for November. The
Pompeo stated that the purpose of the group was to “protect
exercises, originally bilateral between the United States and
our people and partners from the Chinese Communist
India, later added Japan as a permanent member in 2015.
Party’s exploitation, corruption, and coercion.” Although
Defense officials say that the exercise could be a potent
the three other ministers framed the meeting differently in
war-fighting exercise that deepens trust and interoperability
their opening statements, fears of China’s growing
among the four militaries in the air and sea domains. All
influence and assertiveness in the region loom large.
four militaries operate compatible anti-submarine warfare
Tensions with China have worsened for all four countries in
systems, making that a promising area of cooperation.
2020, driving increased defense cooperation among them.
Despite this confluence, the Quad faces major challenges in
In addition to Malabar, Quad countries are increasing
defining itself and its goals. Does expanding defense
bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral exercises with one
cooperation provide meaningful strategic advantages? Will
another that may accelerate the ability of the four countries
the Quad broaden its activities on democracy promotion? Is
to build integrated capabilities. Examples of these exercises
it durable as a framework even in the face of leadership
include but are not limited to the India-Australia biennial
changes in member countries? These questions may be of
AUSINDEX naval exercise, the Japan-India JIMEX
critical importance to Congress given its oversight
exercise in the North Arabian Sea, and all four countries in
responsibilities, interest in security alliances, and growing
the large multilateral biennial Rim of the Pacific maritime
concern about China’s power and influence in the region.
warfare exercise. As U.S. treaty allies, Australia and Japan
regularly hold large-scale exercises with the U.S. military.
Earlier iterations of the Quad faltered. The grouping
originally arose from the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and
Criticisms of the Quad
tsunami: in the disaster relief effort, the four navies
Critics have pointed to questions about the group’s inability
coordinated, providing inspiration for more maritime
to speak with one voice on regional issues, absence of
cooperation. In 2007, a series of “Quad” meetings was
democracy promotion efforts, dearth of joint military
denounced by China as an attempt to encircle it. The effort
operations, and lack of institutional structure as limits on its
dissipated amidst member leadership transitions, concern
effectiveness. In the past, India and Australia have
about economic repercussions from China, and attention to
expressed wariness of provoking China and cornering it
other national interests.
into a defensive posture. Japan, arguably the country with
the most acute concern about China’s rise given the history
The renewed effort, begun in 2017, is bringing similar
of conflict and ongoing territorial disputes in the East China
accusations from Beijing, crystallizing the geopolitical and
Sea, has in recent years looked to stabilize relations with
economic risks for the Quad partners. All four members are
Beijing. Under new leadership since September 2020, Japan
heavily reliant on Chinese supply chains, and each of the
will face choices about how far to push a new framework
four are significantly more economically integrated with
that is likely to come under withering criticism from China.
China than with one another, especially India and Japan.
China is the first or second largest trading partner for all
Another critique involves the exclusion of other regional
four countries, underscoring the risk of angering Beijing.
countries and the potential for marginalization of traditional
bilateral alliances. U.S. treaty ally South Korea is not in the
For Japan, Australia, and India, alarm about China’s
Quad despite fitting the description of being a democracy
intentions may be coupled with a perception that U.S.
with maritime interests and growing naval capabilities.
influence in the region is waning. For years, Asian states
South Korea is likely reluctant to be included in a group
have expressed fear that the United States’ power is
that antagonizes China, but it may also chafe at exclusion.
diminishing in the region. These fears may have been
While the United States professes to support Association of
heightened by Trump’s 2016 “America First” policy,
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality in regional
multilateral efforts, member countries’ varied capabilities
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The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia
and views of China raise questions about how ASEAN or
in 2008, and a Special Strategic Partnership in 2014. In
individual member countries might interact with the Quad.
June 2020, Prime Minister Morrison and Prime Minister
Chinese opposition to the Quad may limit opportunities for
Narendra Modi of India signed a Mutual Logistics Sharing
the regional forum to be convening platform if ASEAN
Agreement and announced the elevation of their bilateral
countries come under pressure from Beijing.
ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
Japan’s Role
India’s Motivations
Japan has been at the forefront of pursuing the quadrilateral
Delhi’s traditional pursuit of “nonalignment” in foreign
arrangement, with former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
affairs—more recently articulated as an approach that seeks
(2012-2020) in particular championing the concept. Japan’s
“strategic autonomy”—has led to a deep aversion to
eagerness to pursue the Quad appears driven above all by
international alliances and a wariness toward formalized
its concern over China’s increasing power, influence, and
multilateral engagements beyond the purview of the United
assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. Expanding a
Nations. India’s views on the Indo-Pacific region typically
concept of the region to include the Indian Ocean and South
emphasize “inclusiveness” and have not targeted China.
Asia broadens Japan’s strategic landscape. In theory,
India is the only Quad member to share a land border with
engaging India eastward could compel Beijing to divert
China and the only to operate outside of the U.S.-led
some of its resources and attention to the Indian Ocean.
security alliance system, often known as the “hub and
Japan is anxious to establish a regional order that is not
spoke” architecture. Many in Delhi remain skeptical about
defined by China’s economic, geographic, and strategic
U.S. strategic intent in Asia, leading some observers to
dominance, and seeks a broader framework.
label India as the “weak link” of the Quad. Prime Minister
Modi’s 2018 efforts to “reset” relations with China after a
Japan has also worked steadily to build closer security ties
militarized mid-2017 territorial dispute and his rejection of
with both Australia and India. For the past decade Japan has
Australian participation in the Malabar exercises, led many
deepened defense relations with Australia, and the two
analysts to conclude that the Quad’s prospects had dimmed.
reportedly are nearing completion of a Reciprocal Access
Agreement (similar to a Status of Forces Agreement) to
Subsequent developments in India-China relations,
define rules and procedures when troops are stationed
culminating with violent clashes between Indian and
temporarily in each other’s country for joint exercises or
Chinese troops along their shared (and disputed) frontier in
disaster-relief activities. As another U.S. treaty ally,
the spring of 2020, appear to have driven India to
Australia uses similar practices and equipment, which may
strengthen ties with external forces to balance against
make cooperation with Japan more accessible. Japan has
Chinese assertiveness. Along with China’s 2020 military
inked an Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement with
encroachments into India’s Ladakh Union Territory, this
India, along with agreements concerning the protection of
has included ongoing Chinese alignment with India’s
classified military information and transfer of defense
traditional rival, Pakistan, increased Chinese naval
equipment and technology. Bilateral exercises with both
deployments to the Indian Ocean, and major economic and
countries have grown in number and sophistication.
infrastructure investment along India’s periphery. India’s
rejection of participation in both Beijing’s Belt and Road
Leaders in Tokyo may find the absence of South Korea an
Initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic
additional advantage of the quadrilateral grouping. Tokyo
Partnership appear to demonstrate its leaders’ intent to
and Seoul have often been at odds and resistant to U.S.
resist creation of a China-led Asia order.
encouragement of closer trilateral cooperation among the
United States, Japan, and South Korea. The Quad provides
India’s strategic partnerships with the United States and
another venue for Japan’s Self Defense Forces to increase
Japan have deepened significantly in recent years. Major
security exercises with the U.S. military.
defense purchases from the United States include heavy lift
aircraft and anti-submarine warfare platforms. India has
Australia’s Changing Strategic Posture
inked logistics support and base access agreements with
Australia’s approach to the Quad has changed significantly
both Japan and Australia, and the United States and India
since it took part in the Malabar naval exercise in 2007. The
concluded a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement,
following year, Australia withdrew from the exercise over
the final of four “foundational” pacts to deepen military-to-
concerns its participation could damage relations with
military ties. However, India has no direct maritime
Beijing. Relations between Canberra and Beijing have
disputes with China and remains wary of the Quad
deteriorated since Australia called for an inquiry into the
mechanism. While India’s government takes steps toward
origins of the coronavirus, leading China to retaliate
more engagement with the Quad, there remains
economically. In response to pressure on the rules-based
considerable confusion among many about what the Quad
order and China’s use of coercive statecraft to expand its
is and how it will fit into India’s regional strategy.
influence in Australia and the region, Canberra is adjusting
its strategic posture. It is rejoining Malabar in 2020,
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Coordinator, Specialist in Asian
increasing defense spending, and developing regional ties.
Affairs
Australia’s
K. Alan Kronstadt, Specialist in South Asian Affairs
Quad ties strengthen existing bilateral and
Bruce Vaughn, Specialist in Asian Affairs
multilateral security ties with the United States, Japan and
India. Australia and Japan signed a Joint Declaration on
IF11678
Security Cooperation in 2007, a Comprehensive Partnership
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The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia


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