Updated October 28, 2020
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
December 2019, Díaz-Canel appointed tourism minister
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
Manuel Marrero Cruz as prime minister.
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
isolating the government.
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by Venezuela’s
economic crisis, which has reduced Venezuela’s support for
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift
Cuba; increased U.S. economic sanctions, which have hurt
moving away from sanctions toward engagement and the
Cuba’s nascent private sector; and the economic decline
normalization of relations . Changes included the rescission
associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international
pandemic. The Economist Intelligence Unit is forecasting
terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of diplomatic
an 8.3% economic contraction in 2020.
relations (July 2015); and an easing of restrictions on travel,
Cuba’s public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic
remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and
appears to have been effective. As of October 28, 2020, the
financial services (2015 and 2016), accomplished through
country reported 128 deaths, with a mortality rate of 1.13
amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
per 100,000 people (among the lowest rates in the
(CACR), administered by the Treasury Department, and the
hemisphere), according to Johns Hopkins University. Cuba
Export Administration Regulations, administered by the
has provided international assistance to respond to the
Commerce Department. The restoration of relations led to
pandemic by sending over 3,700 medical professionals to
increased government-to-government engagement, with
almost 40 countries worldwide.
over 20 bilateral agreements and numerous dialogues.
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back efforts to
2017 that introduced new sanctions, including restrictions
normalize relations. By 2019, the Administration largely
on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
abandoned engagement by increasing economic sanctions
military. The State Department issued a list of “restricted
significantly to pressure the Cuban government on human
entities” in 2017, which has been updated several times,
rights and for its support of the Venezuelan government of
most recently in September 2020. The “Cuba restricted list”
Nicolás Maduro. In 2020, the Administration has ratcheted
includes 230 entities and subentities, including 2 ministries,
up restrictions on travel and family remittances. On October
5 holding companies and 54 of their subentities, 111 hotels,
27, the Administration announced new sanctions that could
2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and
lead to the curtailment of most remittances in late
41 entities serving defense and security sectors.
November, when the restrictions become effective.
Since 2019, the Administration has imposed increasingly
Cuban Political and Economic Developments. In April
strong sanctions against Cuba. In addition to the sanctions
2018, Miguel Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice
noted below, the Administration has increased efforts
president, succeeded Raúl Castro as president, but Castro
(including visa restrictions) to call attention to allegations
continues to head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021.
of coercive labor practices in Cuba’s foreign medical
The selection of Díaz-Canel, now 60 years old, reflected the
missions, a major foreign exchange earner for Cuba. In
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several
May 2020, the State Department (pursuant to Section 40A
years ago and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban
of the Arms Export Control Act) added Cuba to its annual
revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government.
list of countries certified as not cooperating fully with U.S.
While in power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to
antiterrorism efforts, the first time since 2015.
implement significant economic policy changes, moving
toward a more mixed economy with a stronger private
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
sector, but his government’s slow, gradualist approach did
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
not produce major economic improvements.
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July 2019, it
In a February 2019 referendum, Cubans approved a new
sanctioned Cuba’s state-run oil import/export company.
constitution that introduced such changes as an appointed
prime minister to oversee government operations; limits on
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
the president’s tenure (two five-year terms) and age (60,
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
beginning first term); and market-oriented economic
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
reforms, including the right to private property and the
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
promotion of foreign investment. However, the new
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
constitution ensures the state sector’s dominance over the
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
economy and the predominant role of the Communist Party.
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
In October 2019, Cuba’s National Assembly appointed
of the confiscation. Previous Administrations had
Díaz-Canel as president under the new constitution. In
suspended, at six-month intervals, the right to file such
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
lawsuits. The European Union and Canada criticized the
concern for many years. As of October 1, 2020, the human
Trump Administration’s action, vowing to ban
rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders listed 138 political
enforcement or recognition of any judgement and allow
prisoners, with 76 imprisoned for reasons of conscience;
counterclaims. To date, 28 lawsuits have been filed
Amnesty International designated six of these as prisoners
against U.S. and foreign companies, including cruise
of conscience in 2019. After six months of detention, José
ship operators, airlines, travel booking companies, and
Daniel Ferrer, leader of the opposition Patriotic Union of
hotels; several lawsuits have been dismissed by federal
Cuba, was released in April 2020 to house arrest.
courts or by plaintiffs.
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. On travel, in
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy
June 2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-
community members suffered a series of unexplained
to-people educational travel and the Commerce
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues
Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private
between late 2016 and May 2018. The State Department
and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from
maintains that the investigation has not reached a
going to Cuba. The Transportation Department
conclusion regarding the cause or source of the injuries, for
suspended commercial flights to cities other than
which Cuba strongly denies responsibility. In September
Havana in December 2019; charter flights to cities other
2017, the State Department ordered the departure of
than Havana in January 2020 (which were capped to
nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to
3,600 flights annually in June 2020); and all private
minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff
charter flights to Havana in October 2020 (public
was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has
charter flights to Havana remain permitted). In
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing.
September 2020, the Treasury Department prohibited
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
U.S. travelers from staying at properties identified by
to fund Cuba democracy assistance and U.S.-government
the State Department as owned or controlled by the
sponsored broadcasting to Cuba: $20 million for democracy
Cuban government; the ban includes over 400 hotels
programs and $29.1 million for broadcasting in FY2019
(essentially all Cuban hotels) and privately owned
(P.L. 116-6) and $20 million for democracy programs and
residences for rent (casas particulares) if they are
$20.973 million for broadcasting in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94,
controlled by a prohibited government official or
Division G). P.L. 116-94 (Division J) included benefits for
Communist Party member (or close relative).
U.S. government employees and dependents injured while
stationed in Cuba. For FY2021, the Administration
On remittances, in September 2019, the Treasury
requested $10 million for democracy programs and $12.973
Department capped family remittances (not previously
million for broadcasting. The House-passed version of the
limited) to $1,000 per quarter per Cuban national and
FY2021 foreign aid appropriations bill, Division A of H.R.
eliminated the category of donative remittances. In June
7608 (H.Rept. 116-444), approved July 24, 2020, would
and September 2020, the State Department added to its
“Cuba
provide $20 million for democracy programs and fully fund
restricted list” two Cuban companies that
the broadcasting request. In other legislative action, the
facilitate the processing of remittances. On October 27,
Senate approved S.Res. 454 in June 2020, calling for the
2020, the Treasury Department prohibited, effective
release of democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer (a similar
November 26, the processing of remittances through any
entities on the “Cuba restricted list.”
resolution, H.Res. 774, was introduced in the House).
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
Among other bills , several would ease or lift U.S. sanctions:
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn
H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R. 1898/S. 1447
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to
(U.S. agricultural exports); H.R. 2404 (overall embargo);
process certain funds transfers originating and
and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel). H.R. 4884 would reinstate
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019,
the Cuban Family Reunification Program. S. 3977 would
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to
require the State Department to report on countries with
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de
Cuban medical missions. S. 4635 would require an annual
minimis rule (from 25%) requiring a third country-based
report on Cuba’s medical missions and reinstate the Cuban
company exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10%
Medical Professional Parole program.
U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed
licensing requirements for the export of certain donated
Several resolutions would address the following: the release
items to organizations controlled by the Cuban
of Cuban political prisoner Silverio Portal Contreras
government or Communist Party and items for
(H.Res. 1172); Cuba’s medical missions (S.Res. 14/H.Res.
telecommunications infrastructure.
136); U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba (H.Res. 92/S.Res.
232); Cuban religious/political freedom (S.Res. 215); Las
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa
Damas de Blanco human rights group (S.Res. 531); and the
restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross
35th anniversary of Cuba broadcasting (H.Res. 971/S.Res.
violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela.
637). Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S.
Further visa restrictions were imposed on Cuba’s
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, and CRS Report
Interior Minister (November 2019) and Cuba’s defense
R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress.
minister (January 2020) for human rights violations.
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
IF10045
violations in Cuba have been a fundamental U.S. policy
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 75 · UPDATED