Updated October 21, 2020
Crisis in Mali
The military’s ouster of Mali’s elected president in August
Figure 1. Mali at a Glance
2020 heightened political uncertainty amid severe security,
governance, and humanitarian challenges. Under pressure
from economic sanctions imposed by West African leaders,
the junta agreed to hand power to a nominally civilian-led
transitional government, with retired military officer and
former defense minister Bah N’Daw serving as President
and former foreign minister Moctar Ouane as Prime
Minister. Junta leader Col. Assimi Goïta was named Vice
President, a new position, and military officers are serving
in four key cabinet posts. The transitional administration is
expected to organize elections within 18 months.
Many in Bamako (Fig. 1) welcomed the military’s actions
as the culmination of weeks of protests against President
Ibrahim Boubacar Kéïta, who resigned and dissolved
parliament after being detained by soldiers. Mali’s new
authorities may struggle to meet popular expectations,
however. Much of the country’s territory is under the
control of Islamist insurgents and other armed groups. A
2015 peace accord with northern separatists has not been
Source: CRS graphic. Data from CIA World Factbook and
fully implemented. Ethnic militias, some of which appear to
International Monetary Fund; 2020 estimates unless noted.
enjoy state backing, have massacred civilians in rural
Military officers seized power in early 2012, and northern
northeast and central Mali, and military forces have been
rebels— bolstered by arms from Libya and by fighters with
implicated in extrajudicial killings. While comparatively
ties to Algerian-led Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
secure, Bamako has seen several big terrorist attacks,
(AQIM)—declared an independent state of “Azawad.” By
including a hotel siege in 2015 in which 19 civilians
mid-2012, AQIM and two loosely aligned groups had
(including an American) were killed. Rebel, terrorist,
outmaneuvered the National Movement for the Liberation
communal defense, and criminal networks often overlap.
of Azawad (MNLA) to assert control over most of the
These complex threats and security dynamics have impeded
north. France intervened militarily against the Islamists in
development and humanitarian relief efforts in a poor and
early 2013, at which point the MNLA and other factions
landlocked country with limited arable land. More than
(re-)asserted control in some areas. MINUSMA deployed in
287,000 Malians were internally displaced as of mid-2020,
mid-2013, and Kéïta won elections later that year, marking
almost double the previous year, and at least 142,000 were
the end of Mali’s post-coup political transition. The 2012
refugees in neighboring countries as of early 2020, per U.N.
coup leader, Capt. Amadou Haya Sanogo, faces charges for
figures. The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
the murder of rival soldiers, but his trial has been delayed.
pandemic has brought new health and economic difficulties.
President Kéïta was reelected in 2018, but opposition
Foreign troops have deployed to Mali since 2013 to try to
mounted over his administration’s apparent interference in
improve stability and counter terrorism. MINUSMA, a
legislative elections in early 2020, corruption scandals, and
U.N. peacekeeping operation, has up to 15,209 uniformed
worsening insecurity, militia violence, and economic
personnel. About 5,100 French troops are deployed in the
hardships. In June 2020, a loose alliance of politicians, civil
Sahel region (including Mali) under France’s Operation
society actors, and supporters of an influential Bamako
Barkhane, a counterterrorism mission that receives U.S.
religious leader convened large protests and called for Kéïta
logistical support (as authorized by Congress under 10
to resign, provoking a violent state crackdown. Regional
U.S.C. §331) and intelligence sharing. The European Union
heads of state attempted unsuccessfully to mediate,
runs programs to train and restructure Mali’s military and
including by calling on 31 disputed members of parliament
build the capacity of its civilian security forces. In 2017, the
to step down. (The National Assembly Speaker, Kéïta’s
G5 Sahel—comprising Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina
constitutional successor, was among them.)
Faso, and Chad—initiated a “joint force” to coordinate
Stalled Peace Accord
military operations in border regions, with donor support.
In 2015, Kéïta’s administration signed a peace deal with
Background. Mali has been mired in crisis since 2012,
two northern armed coalitions: one led by ex-separatists,
when state institutions nearly collapsed in the face of a
the other by pro-unity groups with ties to Bamako.
northern separatist rebellion led by members of the minority
Mediated by Algeria with broad international backing, the
ethnic Tuareg community, a military coup, an Islamist
“Algiers Accord” aimed to address northern (and
insurgent advance, and a regional drought.
specifically Tuareg) political grievances, reestablish state
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Crisis in Mali
authority in the north, and isolate designated terrorist
force protection challenges. Many troop contingents are
groups, which were not party to the talks. Implementation
reportedly underequipped; African troops (who comprise
lagged, however, while conflicts multiplied and spread.
most of the largest contingents) have suffered the most
Today, state actors remain absent from much of the north—
fatalities in insurgent attacks by far. As of mid-2020, nine
and, increasingly, from central Mali, which is outside the
U.S. staff officers were serving in MINUSMA. MINUSMA
scope of the accord. Signatory armed groups have not
is not explicitly authorized to pursue counterterrorism, but
disarmed, and maintain parallel administrative structures in
can provide logistical support to the G5 force if reimbursed.
some areas. Jihadist groups have acted as spoilers, and
U.S. Policy and Aid
maintain ties to some formerly allied signatory groups.
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale
U.N. sanctions monitors also have reported the involvement
testified to Congress in early 2020 that U.S. “diplomatic
of signatory group members in drug trafficking, ethnic
efforts are focused on supporting the 2015 Algiers Peace
violence, and cooption of humanitarian aid, along with state
Accord, which remains the best mechanism for achieving a
official involvement in protection rackets and obstruction of
peaceful and reconciled Mali.” He stated that broader U.S.
the peace process. New armed factions have emerged since
engagement in the Sahel “promotes inclusive and just
2015, with varying views of the peace accord and the state.
political systems; advances regional security by combatting
The design and process behind the 2015 accord may have
violent extremists and traffickers; and encourages economic
contained the seeds of Mali’s further destabilization. While
growth and opportunity through sustainable development
the accord is structured as a deal between Bamako and the
and increased American investment.” In March 2020, the
north, there is an armed struggle within the north over
State Department appointed Dr. J. Peter Pham as the first
territory, trafficking routes, patronage, and revenge. The
U.S. Special Envoy for Sahel Stabilization. The State
talks granted concessions to a relatively small number of
Department and U.S. Agency for International
actors who had taken up arms, alienating others who felt
Development (USAID) allocated $130 million in bilateral
victimized by the state and/or by signatory groups. The
aid for Mali in FY2019, in addition to $89 million in
mediators ruled out discussion of federalism or altering the
emergency humanitarian assistance. Since 2018, DOD has
secular underpinning of Mali’s political system, issues with
sought to scale back its counterterrorism footprint in West
wide resonance in and beyond the north.
Africa, with uncertain implications for Mali and for U.S.
support to France’s Operation Barkhane.
Islamist Insurgency
In 2017, AQIM’s Sahel branch merged with an offshoot
In early October, Special Envoy Pham affirmed that U.S.
and two local affiliates to form the Union for Supporting
military aid for Mali would remain suspended pending
Islam and Muslims (aka JNIM), led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a
elections. This would be consistent with a provision in
Malian Tuareg. JNIM has since claimed attacks on U.N.,
annual foreign aid appropriations legislation restricting
French, and state targets in Mali and Burkina Faso. In 2018,
certain aid to the government of any country in which the
JNIM attacked the G5 Sahel joint force headquarters in
military has overthrown an elected leader (most recently,
central Mali, forcing its relocation to Bamako. A separate
§7008 of P.L. 116-94 Division G, as extended under P.L.
AQIM offshoot has affiliated with the Islamic State and
116-159). Recent U.S. security assistance to Mali has
claimed the 2017 deadly ambush of U.S. soldiers in Niger.
focused on counterterrorism, professionalization, and
structural reforms, but Mali has not been a top recipient in
These groups have proven resilient, withstanding French
the region since the 2012 coup. In FY2020, President
strikes on top leaders and exploiting local grievances and
Trump waived most security assistance restrictions
communal tensions. They have expanded their areas of
resulting from Mali’s designation under the Child Soldiers
operation, enlarged their recruitment base, killed dozens of
Prevention Act of 2008 (Title IV of P.L. 110-457).
soldiers in attacks on local military outposts, and forced the
retreat of state and rival actors through targeted attacks on
Via the U.N. Security Council, the United States has helped
civilian officials, traditional leaders, and individuals
shape MINUSMA’s mandate and a U.N. sanctions regime
accused of colluding with government and/or French forces.
established in 2017. In line with Security Council actions,
Security force and militia abuses may fuel recruitment.
the United States has designated five individuals for
financial sanctions under a Mali-specific Executive Order.
The negotiated release in October 2020 of four prominent
(Other Malian individuals and entities are designated under
hostages held by JNIM—a top Malian opposition politician
U.S. and U.N. global terrorism sanctions regimes.) The
and three Europeans—appears to have increased interest
State Department allocated $347 million for MINUSMA’s
within Mali in seeking a broader political settlement with
budget in FY2019; separate U.S. aid programs also support
Islamist militants, though the prospect of direct talks
troop and police contributors. In early 2020, U.S. diplomats
remains controversial. Bamako freed some 200 terrorism
at the U.N. called for MINUSMA to be downsized and
suspects in exchange for the hostage releases, and a sizable
reoriented toward civilian protection in central Mali, and
ransom was reportedly paid.
for sanctions designations “on all sides of the conflict”—a
U.N. Peacekeeping Operation
possible reference to government actors. The Security
The U.N. Security Council has tasked MINUSMA with
Council renewed MINUSMA’s mandate in June without
supporting implementation of the 2015 peace accord as a
the proposed scope change, and Council members have not
“primary strategic priority,” most recently under Resolution
made new Mali sanctions designations since then.
2531 (2020). Support for stabilization and the restoration of
state authority in central Mali is the mission’s “second
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
strategic priority,” followed by protection of civilians and
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other tasks. MINUSMA has struggled with logistical and
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Crisis in Mali
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