Updated October 8, 2020
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
Cuba; increased U.S. economic sanctions; and the
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
economic decline associated with the Coronavirus Disease
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The Economist Intelligence
isolating the government.
Unit is forecasting an 8.3% economic contraction in 2020.
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift
Cuba’s public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic
moving away from sanctions toward engagement and the
appears to have been effective. As of October 8, 2020, the
normalization of relations . Changes included the rescission
country reported 123 deaths, with a mortality rate of 1.08
of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international
per 100,000 people (among the lowest rates in the
terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of diplomatic
hemisphere), according to Johns Hopkins University. Cuba
relations (July 2015); and an easing of restrictions on travel,
has provided international assistance to respond to the
remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and
pandemic by sending over 3,700 medical professionals to
financial services (2015 and 2016), accomplished through
almost 40 countries worldwide, including in Europe, Africa,
amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,
and Latin America and the Caribbean.
administered by the Treasury Department, and the Export
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
Administration Regulations, administered by the Commerce
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
Department). The restoration of relations led to increased
2017 that introduced new sanctions, including restrictions
government-to-government engagement, with over 20
bilateral agreements and numerous bilateral dialogues.
on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
military. The State Department issued a list of “restricted
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
entities” in 2017, which has been updated several times,
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back some
most recently September 29, 2020. The list includes 230
efforts to normalize relations. By 2019, the Trump
entities and subentities, including 2 ministries, 5 holding
Administration had largely abandoned engagement by
companies and 54 of their subentities, 111 hotels, 2 tourist
increasing economic sanctions significantly to pressure the
agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 41
Cuban government for its human rights record and support
entities serving defense and security sectors.
for the government of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.
Since 2019, the Administration has imposed a series of
Cuban Political and Economic Developments. In April
increasingly strong sanctions against Cuba for its poor
2018, Miguel Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice
human rights record and its support for the Maduro
president, succeeded Raúl Castro as president, but Castro
government. In addition to the sanctions noted below, the
continues to head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021.
Administration has increased efforts (including visa
The selection of Díaz-Canel, now 60 years old, reflected the
restrictions) to call attention to allegations of coercive labor
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several
practices in Cuba’s foreign medical missions, a major
years ago and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban
foreign exchange earner for Cuba. In May 2020, the State
revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government.
Department (pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export
While in power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to
Control Act) also added Cuba to its annual list of countries
implement significant economic policy changes, moving
certified as not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism
toward a more mixed economy with a stronger private
efforts, the first such certification for Cuba since 2015.
sector, but his government’s slow, gradualist approach did
not produce major economic improvements.
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
In a February 2019 referendum, Cubans approved a new
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
constitution that introduced such changes as an appointed
that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July 2019, it
prime minister to oversee government operations; limits on
sanctioned Cuba’s state-run oil import/export company.
the president’s tenure (two five-year terms) and age (60,
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
beginning first term); and market-oriented economic
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
reforms, including the right to private property and the
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
promotion of foreign investment. However, the new
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
constitution ensures the state sector’s dominance over the
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
economy and the predominant role of the Communist Party.
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
In October 2019, Cuba’s National Assembly appointed
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
Díaz-Canel as president under the new constitution. In
of the confiscation. Previous Administrations had
December 2019, Díaz-Canel appointed tourism minister
Manuel Marrero Cruz as prime minister.
suspended, at six-month intervals, the right to file such
lawsuits pursuant to the provisions of the law. The
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by Venezuela’s
European Union and Canada criticized the Trump
economic crisis, which has reduced Venezuela’s support for
Administration’s action, vowing to ban enforcement or
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
recognition of any judgement, allow counterclaims, and
as prisoners of conscience in 2019. After six months of
potentially seek action in the World Trade Organization.
detention, José Daniel Ferrer, leader of the opposition
To date, 28 lawsuits have been filed against U.S. and
Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU), was released in April
foreign companies, including cruise ship operators,
2020 to house arrest after receiving a 4½-year sentence on
airlines, travel booking companies, and hotels; several
assault charges that critics assert were trumped up.
lawsuits have been dismissed by federal courts or by
plaintiffs.
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In June
community members suffered a series of unexplained
2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-to-
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues
people educational travel and the Commerce
between late 2016 and May 2018. The State Department
Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private
maintains that the investigation has not reached a
and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from
conclusion regarding the cause or source of the injuries, for
going to Cuba. In September 2019, the Treasury
which Cuba strongly denies responsibility. In September
Department capped family remittances (not previously
2017, the State Department ordered the departure of
limited) to $1,000 per quarter per Cuban national and
nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to
eliminated the category of donative remittances. The
minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff
Transportation Department suspended commercial
was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has
flights to cities other than Havana in December 2019;
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing.
charter flights to cities other than Havana in January
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
2020 (which were capped to 3,600 flights annually in
to fund Cuba democracy assistance and U.S.-government
June 2020); and all private charter flights to Havana,
sponsored broadcasting to Cuba: $20 million for democracy
effective October 13, 2020 (public charter flights to and
programs and $29.1 million for broadcasting in FY2019
from Havana remain permitted).
(P.L. 116-6) and $20 million for democracy programs and
$20.973 million for broadcasting in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94,
The Trump Administration imposed further sanctions in
Division G). P.L. 116-94 (Division J) included benefits for
September 2020. On September 23, the President
U.S. government employees and dependents injured while
announced a prohibition against U.S. travelers staying at
stationed in Cuba. For FY2021, the Administration
properties owned by the Cuban government; the ban
requested $10 million for democracy programs and $12.973
includes over 400 hotels (essentially all Cuban hotels)
million for broadcasting. The House-passed version of the
and privately owned residences for rent (casas
FY2021 foreign aid appropriations bill, Division A of H.R.
particulares) if they are controlled by a prohibited
7608 (H.Rept. 116-444), approved July 24, 2020, would
Cuban government official or Communist Party member
provide $20 million for democracy programs and fully fund
(or close relative). On September 29, the State
the broadcasting request. In other legislative action, the
Department added to its restricted list a Cuban company
Senate approved S.Res. 454 in June 2020, calling for the
that facilitates remittances s ent to Cubans.
release of democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer (a similar
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
resolution, H.Res. 774, was introduced in the House).
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to
Among other bills , several would ease or lift U.S. sanctions:
process certain funds transfers originating and
H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R. 1898/S. 1447
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019,
(U.S. agricultural exports); H.R. 2404 (overall embargo);
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to
and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel). H.R. 4884 would reinstate
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de
the Cuban Family Reunification Program. S. 3977 would
minimis rule (from 25%) requiring a third country-based
require the State Department to report on countries with
company exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10%
Cuban medical missions. S. 4635 would require an annual
U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed
report on Cuba’s medical missions and reinstate the Cuban
licensing requirements for the export of certain donated
Medical Professional Parole program.
items to organizations controlled by the Cuban
government or Communist Party and items for
Several resolutions would address the following: the release
telecommunications infrastructure.
of Cuban political prisoner Silverio Portal Contreras
(H.Res. 1172); Cuba’s medical missions (S.Res. 14/H.Res.
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa
136); U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba (H.Res. 92/S.Res.
restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross
232); Cuban religious/political freedom (S.Res. 215); Las
violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela.
Damas de Blanco human rights group (S.Res. 531); and the
Further visa restrictions were imposed on Cuba’s
35th anniversary of Cuba broadcasting (H.Res. 971/S.Res.
Interior Minister (November 2019) and Cuba’s defense
637). Also see CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in
minister (January 2020) for human rights violations.
the 116th Congress and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S.
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
policy concern for many years. As of October 1, 2020, the
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
human rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders listed 138
IF10045
political prisoners, with 76 imprisoned for reasons of
conscience; Amnesty International designated six of these
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 74 · UPDATED